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The legal and literary texts of early medieval England and Iceland share a common
emphasis on truth and demonstrate its importance through the sheer volume of textual
references. One of the most common applications of truth-seeking in these sources occurs in
the swearing of oaths. Instances of oath-taking and oath-breaking, therefore, are critical textual
loci wherein the language of swearing unites an individual’s socially constructed reputation and
his personal guarantees under the careful supervision of the community. Traditionally, scholars
looking at truth and attestation from the later medieval period tend to view early cases of
swearing as procedural, artless, or largely instinctive. In “Bound by Words,” I examine the
complexity and decisiveness of early swearing through a critical study of speech-act theory and
by looking at law as a specific type of literature. Overall, this study of Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic
texts brings together the major legal and literary sources to explore those moments when words
attempt to guarantee action or when narratives focus on the contravention of that system.
Such motifs invest language with the power to provide justice, yet these texts also demonstrate
the potential for words to cause harm and thus treat them with appropriate caution.
Ultimately, the project confronts this dependence on and apprehension toward swearing to
demonstrate the critical ways that these legal and literary texts attempt to negotiate the power
in and peril of trusting others.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Egill fram fjárheimtu, en Atli bauð logvorn í mót, tylfareiða, at hann hefði ekki fé þat at
varðveita, er Egill ætti. Ok er Atli gekk at dómum með eiðalið sitt, þá gekk Egill mót honum ok
segir, at eigi vill hann eiða hans taka fyrir fé sitt. 1
Egil brought forth a financial claim, and Atli offered a lawful defense against that charge, an
oath of twelve, that he did not have in his possession money that Egil owned. And when Atli
went to the court with his witnesses, then Egil met him and says that he will not take his oaths
for his money.
Before taking the stand to begin testimony, a witness in any courtroom of the United
States must place his or her right hand on the Bible and declare: “I solemnly swear that all the
testimony I am about to give in the case now before the court is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help me God.”2 Most Americans, even those without first-hand
experience of ever being in a courtroom, are familiar with the process and the purpose of this
legal ritual as a safeguard for truthful testimony. Such understanding is amplified as the modern
entertainment industry continues to draw upon the judicial world for storylines, especially in the
form of popular, televised legal dramas. We understand that this performance is intended to
ensure that the witness cannot conceal facts, substitute falsehood for reality, or provide only a
portion of the testimony to thereby conceal the truth. When the witness places a hand on the
religious text, this act also combines a moral imperative with the ethical appeal for truthful

1

Sigurður Nordal, ed. Egils saga Skalla-Grímssonar, vol. 2 of Íslenzk Fornrit (1933; reprint, Reykjavík:
Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 1988), p. 208. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s own.
2

Benchbook for U.S District Court Judges (Washington DC: Federal Judicial Center, 1996) 226. Although
my example uses the Bible, recently the Qur’an has also been used as an acceptable religious text for legal
oath-taking.

1

speech by means of referencing the religious commandments of a similar nature. Moreover, the
court enforces the validity of sworn testimony through severe punishments for perjury while
under oath. That the contemporary judicial oath requires so many components for it to be
effective is a testament to the critical role of truth for the proper function of America’s justice
system. Because truth occupies such a cherished position in the law today, it is essential that
veracity is protected as much as possible to maintain a stable social order. But a clear
correlation between truth inside a courtroom and the theoretical construct behind swearing to
tell the truth does not always exist, particularly when legal ‘truth’ is based on only what
testimony and evidence assert is genuine. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the disconnection
existing between the courtroom and conceptual truth as ‘legal fiction,’ “an assumption that
something is true even though it may be untrue.”3 The reality that truth is easily susceptible to
manipulations, however, falls far short of the ideal of the inviolate absolute that is necessary for
the law to operate. As Ralph Keyes asserts in The Post-Truth Era, lies have “become part of the
fabric of our lives, almost a necessity of social and professional life.”4 Due to the ease with
which language can be manipulated, it is necessary to have a way to bridge the gap between
expectations and reality. The oath is an essential process that attempts to transform words into
another intangible construct, “truth.”
The passage above, taken from Egils saga Skalla-Grímssonar, offers an example of how a
medieval author also employs legal rituals involving witnesses and oath-taking within the
narrative. In this example, Egil takes up the legal case of his wife’s inheritance, which the
previous Norwegian king improperly prevented her from inheriting. As Egil returns to plead his

3

Black’s Law Dictionary, ed. Bryan Garner, 9th ed. (Rochester: West Publishing, 2009), s.v. legal fiction.

4

Ralph Keyes, The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2004), p. 8.

2

claim for the money, the narrative offers legally relevant details to elaborate on the procedures
for a claim to an inheritance. Those familiar with such cases would recognize that Atli’s defense
employs an oath of twelve, the strongest oath available and one typically reserved for the most
serious crimes, to refute conclusively Egil’s charge with overwhelming support from among the
community. According to the earliest laws of Norway: Nu mæla sva vattar veriandans. Þar
varoom vér sem þu vari. eigi var mundr gevenn til hennar at logmale. aura einum vat. Þa er hinn
af sinn male. Ef eði vitni semr I gegn. Þa eigu þingmenn hanom arf at doma,5 “If the witness of
the defendant speak in this wise: ‘We were there, as well as you, and the mund6 was not paid to
her according to contract,’ and if there is one more witness [to this man than to the other], the
plaintiff has lost his case.”7 Here the audience can surely recognize how Atli outmaneuveres Egil
by trying to offer not only more witnesses than his opponent, but also by presenting the
maximum number of witnesses ever required by the law. The effectiveness of Atli’s attempt at
exoneration is enhanced by the audience’s common understanding of how these legal rituals
and themes function, a common understanding only made possible by the availability of clear
legal precedent, without which the literature could not utilize such casual references.
Just as this incident in the saga reinforces the expectations of how oath-taking should
happen inside the courtroom, this episode will also demonstrate quite effectively how the
abstract potency of legal regulations occasionally conflicts with the actual results of such oath-

5

R. Keyser and P. A. Munch, eds. “Den ældre Gulathings-Lov,” in Norges gamle lov indtil 1387, vol. 1
(Christiania: Gröndahl, 1846), p. 54.
6

The mundr is a sum of money paid to the bride as her own personal property, and it represents part of
the marriage ceremony that validates the relationship between husband and wife. This stipulation, that
mundr had not been paid would represent a significant problem for any case involving inheritance. When
the case of Egil’s wife is first raised by her family, Arinbjorn attempts to answer concerns of Asgerd’s
legitimacy by proving that her mother is indeed a legitimate wife of her father.
7

Laurence Larson, trans. The Earliest Norwegian Laws Being the Gulathing Law and the Frostathing Law
(Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing, 1935; reprint, Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2008), p. 117.

3

taking. When Egil’s mistrust of his opponent causes him to reject Atli’s oath, despite Atli’s
certification of his claim with the greatest number of witnesses, it reveals that the the ability of
the law to certify speech only carries the strength of the reputation of the individual making or
receiving the oaths. This literary text, therefore, offers an interesting nexus of thought,
expressing how oath-taking stands out as one of the most important forms of verbal expression
available to members of Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic communities, while also serving to highlight
the ways that law occasionally falls short of completing its expected function. Such highly
regulated verbal exchanges make up a significant portion of the legal system in both cultures,
regulating the presentation of legal charges, verifying the ethical intentions of litigants, and
providing defense through witness testimony.8 These diverse roles given to oath-taking
supplement a judicial system lacking the modern dependence on physical evidence in the
determination of guilt and innocence, thus making spoken testimony, given under oath, the
primary resource available for both prosecution and defense within medieval legal cases.9
Moreover, sworn oaths also serve a critical social component, ensuring the integrity necessary
for important communication, providing a guarantee that only truthful statements will be given
credence, and also providing every individual with access to that same level of credibility.10
Oaths presented during the process of a legal trial, however, are neither the only form nor
venue of regulated and veritable speech in medieval Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England. Indeed,

8

See Andrew Dennis, Peter Foote, and Richard Perkins, eds and trans. Laws of Early Iceland: Grágás, the
Codex Regius of Grágás with material from other manuscripts, 2 vols. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba
Press, 1980-2000), 1:85. See also the Laws of Alfred, the Laws of Hlothere and Eadric, and the Laws of Ine,
Felix Liebermann, ed. Die Gesetze Der Angelsachsen (1847; repr., Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1903).
9

A noteworthy exception is found in the Laws of V Æthelstan 2, where the trail of cattle serves as the oath
of accusation (foráþ) against the suspected thief.
10

Fredrick Pollock and Fredric Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, vol. 1,
2nd ed. (1907; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 39.

4

both cultures are also dependent on such secondary forms of veracity as the pledge, the
promise, the boast, and even the general declaration that a statement is the “truth.” The
multitude of terms for honest speech in Old English and Old Norse, despite sharing a common
connection with a general concept of honesty, does not necessarily imply equivalence between
all of these words. Indeed, this is borne out by the fact that courtrooms do not allow witnesses
to simply take the stand and speak under an implication of “truth.” It is only when testimony has
gone through the complete process of oath-taking that it attains the credibility necessary for
law.
Richard Firth Green’s linguistic study, The Crisis of Truth, considers oaths, pledges, and
promises as interchangeable forms of the same truth for late medieval England. Semantically,
the oath, pledge, and promise should have little distinction because the truth should function in
absolute terms – “if the statement is true, then the speech must be factual.”11 Comparative
analysis, however, of medieval Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon legal and literary texts suggest that,
despite shared dependence on the legitimacy of speech, a specialized hierarchy exists among
the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic vocabularies that separates the oath from other forms of
honesty. Although all statements of truth inherently build upon an identical premise that what
is said must necessarily correspond to reality, this assertion does not explain why so many
different classifications develop in Old English and Old Norse to refer to this critical feature of
social interaction. The differentiation between levels of honesty is due, in some measure, to the
corresponding complexity of the process accompanying that speech, suggesting that oaths
sworn with hands placed over religious objects in the presence of witnesses are necessarily
elevated above those alternative forms of speaking truthfully which might lack such prescribed

11

J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 10.

5

conventions. If the oath actually functions as the most complex and potent form of expressing
the truth, such a distinction raises questions about whether these additional forms are truly
interchangeable, or if they act as discreet modes of truth that must be evaluated
independently.12 Because truth and the process of expressing honesty to others seems to be
such a great concern for Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic society, a detailed study of this terminology
is necessary to uncover how the conceptualization of truth has evolved within these medieval
societies.
It is only with a greater understanding of this hierarchy of terminology that we can hope
to understand the subtleties of the individual terms and their use in law and literature.
Therefore, Chapter Two focuses on the linguistic and cultural heritage of the vocabulary
associated with oath-taking and the etymological roots of and lexical differences between the
terminology of swearing. Through that discussion, I demonstrate that the Anglo-Saxon and Old
Norse-Icelandic languages contain an overt hierarchy of vocabulary that places the oath at the
apex due to its procedural format and spiritual associations. Chapter Three furthers this concept
by undertaking a comparative summary and analysis of the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic laws
employing these words to consider how the hierarchy of language associated with swearing
functions within the legal texts of England and Iceland. This chapter also introduces a study of
the laws designed to counteract manipulation of legal truth, which will be further explored in
Chapter Four in the literary applications.
The fascination with oath-taking and oath-breaking among the Anglo-Saxons and
Icelanders arises from the inherent complexities found in communication. All language relies

12

See the problematic assertion that heroic boasting is equivalent to oath taking in Alan Renoir, “The
Heroic Oath in Beowulf, the Chanson de Roland, and the Nibelungenlied.” Studies in Old English Literature
in Honor of Arthur G. Brodeur, ed. Stanley B. Greenfield (Eugene, OR: University of Oregon Press, 2001).

6

upon a complex understanding of representation to bridge the gap between concrete forms and
their expressions. Works as early as Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, an explanation of written and
verbal communication, recognize the basic separation existent between “words, affectation of
the soul, and actual things.”13 Because written and spoken words do not correspond directly
with the original objects or actions, the system of decoding language is dependent on context to
aid in the transmission of meaning to others. More recently, the complex decoding of language
involved in Speech Act Theory has become one of the predominant methods of pulling apart the
meanings within statements.14 Language is capable of communicating multiple meanings
because implicit social arrangements and contexts provide the socially-defined significance for
each word.15 Communication becomes a process of translations as the signified object or action
must be rendered into the conceptualized representation. For all communication, Speech Act
Theory would indicate that each speech act is composed of three parts: the “act of saying
something,” also known as the locutionary act, “what one does in saying it,” the illocutionary
act, and “what one does by saying it,” the perlocutinoary act.16 As either written or spoken
words, however, that process remains susceptible to the errors of miscommunication, poor
word choice, or misinterpretation. Because the speech act itself does not absolutely necessitate
behavior, actions based upon the trust of language are endangered by the mistaken credibility
of false statements or by the misinterpretation of the speech act at any of its three levels.

13

Aristotle, De Interpretatione, trans. E. M. Edghill (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1982), p. 25.

14

Although seemingly indicating only verbalized language, The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
indicates that, “the phrase ‘speech act’ should be taken as generic term for any sort of language use, oral
or otherwise.” See The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1998), s. v. “Speech
Act.”
15

W. J. T. Mitchell, “Representation,” Critical Terms for Literary Study, Ed. Frank Letricchia and Thomas
McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 13.
16

The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s. v. “Speech Act.”

7

Speech-act theorist John Searle describes the process of verifying honesty in language as
dependent on evaluative premises given for certain acts of expression. Searle writes: “I started
with a brute fact, that a man uttered certain words, and then invoked the institution in such a
way as to generate institutional facts by which we arrived at the conclusion...the whole proof
rests on the appeal to the constitutive rule that to make a promise is to undertake an obligation,
and this rule is a meaning rule of the ‘descriptive’ word ‘promise’.”17 This idea of undertaking an
obligation is fundamental to the inclusion of swearing or promising in the Commissives category
of Searle’s five-part classification of illocutionary speech acts.18 By engaging in a Commissive
speech act, the speaker has committed himself or herself to an action, at least in theory.
Inscribing language with necessity of behavior only holds true, however, if those conventions
ensuring actions will correspond with words are appropriately maintained by all parties
involved. J. L. Austin classifies two major complications that can interrupt the process of
speaking truthfully: either the speech is prevented from adhering to accepted forms, for
example deviating from the formalized conventions, or else when speech is given an undeserved
level of credibility although it lacks sincerity of the speaker.19 Dishonest behavior uses the latter
model because the audience believes, at face value, that statements are accurate, despite the
disingenuous intentions of the speaker.
Because language can potentially fail to necessitate appropriate behavior, trust in oathtaking is complicated by the ease oath-breakers have in exploiting the power of formalized

17

John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), p. 185.
18

Hadher Hussein Abbood Ad-Darraji et al., “Offering as a Comissive and Directive Speech Act:
Consequence for Cross-Cultural Communication,” International Journal of Scientific and Research
Publications 2.3 (March 2012): 298.
19

Austin, How to Do Things With Words, p. 16.

8

verbal exchange. Those with no compunction about words holding true to their actions have
the power to manipulate the language of oath-taking to their own advantage. To return to
Searle’s process of verification, this attack on the evaluative premise that all promises must be
upheld cripples the process of appraising declarative statements because words can no longer
guarantee that action will follow speech. Under this interpretive model of language, trust that is
broken once results in the complete breakdown of the entire process of matching words with
deeds. The only answer to the exploitation of dishonesty is to invest language with something
that the community can take away in retribution for abuse. It is useful to apply Pierre
Bourdieu’s idea of “cultural capital” because it can reveal how society can check those members
who would attempt to threaten the social order. Bourdieu’s theory outlines “greatness which is
handed down (and grows, diminishes, or disappears) rather like capital but exists in the still
untheorized form of cultural capital, a form of greatness that can never be totally objectified
and that marks those who appropriate it for themselves in a legitimate and natural fashion,
from interlopers whose pretensions to claim it are discouraged.”20 However, just as “the
significance of any particular speech act category can only be fully understood in broader
cultural context,” the sources of cultural capital of any group will likely be unique.21 For the
medieval world, and the system of oath-taking in question, this “cultural capital” comes in the
form of personal reputation. Because Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic societies were founded on
honor as an immaterial measure of status, attaching reputation to oath-taking offers something
that can be revoked should an individual decide to violate the rules of honest speech. In order to
fully explore the links between appropriate speech acts and their concomitant cultural capital, it

20

Louis Pinto, “Theory in Practice,” in Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Shusterman (London:
Blackwell Publishing, 1999), pp. 104-105.
21

Ad-Darraji et al., p. 298.
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is simply not enough to rely on the legal codes available from this time period.22 The gradiations
of personal honor are too fine to be explicated in laws. Reading the literature of Anglo-Saxon
England and Iceland allows us to explore the gray spaces between truth and lies in which
cultural capital is won and lost.
As equally fascinating as the development of dependence on truthful speech is the
interest of Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic writers in the thorny complexities of language that
threaten to undermine the very systems reliant upon them. Ironically, those very problems that
have the potential to complicate truth in speech are generated by the process of swearing.
Despite representing the strongest form of offering honesty, the oath has the potential to grant
duplicitous language the same legitimate status as fact.23 The oath claims as its central goal the
authentication of justice and defense of the innocent, but legal codes are filled with cautionary
regulations24 and literary texts also contain numerous examples of those who violate the
standards of honesty.25 While oaths promote a connection between personal honor and
communal reputation, those bonds are ultimately legally protected by the exile of perjurers and
the loss of reputation associated with the abuse of this system.26 Although speech should be
divided into one of two straightforward categories, either as truth or as falsehood, the oath

22

Additionally, legal speech depends on the law being interpreted literally and symbolically, invested with
more meaning – requiring more cultural capital to produce. See further pp. 27 and 141.
23

Keyes, The Post-Truth Era, p. 21.

24

See, for example, Grágás, vol. 1, ‡ 47 which requires witnesses to declare they have not taken money
for their testimony and the Laws of II Edward 5, which levies fines against dishonesty.
25

See, for example, the trouble caused by a deceptive person in “The Wife’s Lament,” as well as the
disruption of justice caused by dishonest chieftains in Bandamanna Saga.
26

See the Laws of Edward and Guthrum 11, where perjurers are exiled along with other undesirables. See
also Jónsbók IX 22, which exiles perjurers to Norway for a period of 3 years and denies them further
access to future oath-taking.

10

cannot unequivocally eliminate those grey areas where veracity is subject to manipulation.27
For all of its success in binding words to truth, the oath is still vulnerable to dishonesty, and this
weakness threatens to destabilize the integrity of the entire social system built upon the
certainty of verbal legitimacy. Just as with swearing, there is no shortage of terminology
associated with the breach of word and truth, ranging from such minor infractions as telling
false-stories (OE leásspell, ON lausyrði) to those crimes of perjury and treason. As with
statements of truth, this surfeit of vocabulary offers indications of the levels of severity between
lies, with those considered more serious carrying stronger punishments than their less
significant counterparts. Both perjury and treason are extremely dangerous because once they
occur, all other transactions of swearing become subject to an equal level of suspicion by the
injured party. Likewise, falsehood in legal and political negotiations attacks the critical bonds
that allow for the proper function of social order and enforcement of behavior, the law courts,
and figures of authority.28 On the other hand, those speakers guilty of telling false-stories are
subject to more lenient penalties, particularly when exaggeration and invention are expected of
storytelling. Although Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic society clearly attempt to prohibit major forms
of betrayal and lying through legal regulation and social pressure, not every instance of
dishonesty is so clearly condemned by society. If lesser instances of prevarication go
unpunished, the potential exists for larger abuses to also escape unnoticed or even be acclaimed
as truth. Equivocal oaths, statements creating enough ambiguity to blur the distinction between
truth and falsehood, allow too broad an opportunity for those speakers skillful enough to

27

Austin, How to Do Things With Words, p. 137.
The absence of royal authority in Iceland limits treason until after the island comes under Norwegian
rule in 1262. The concept is present in several sagas involving royal figures, such as those in Fornmanna
Sögur and Heimskringla.
28
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deceive their opponents.29 And while the spirit of such communication does not honor the
ideals of truth, it comes as close as possible to the edge without technically contravening these
principles. Because equivocal oaths still operate within the boundaries of acceptable speech,
until their motives can be either confirmed or refuted, they are particularly hard to classify as
honest or dishonest statements.30 With the many examples of how easily an oath can be
manipulated, altered, or broken, it is not surprising that both Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon sources
pay particularly strong attention to truth and its manipulation by words. While simultaneously
an essential resource used in the foundation of both cultures, swearing actually is proven to be a
mutable and even dangerous feature. Thus, the laws of both Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England
attempt to establish legal imperatives as the means to both define and protect the reliability of
truth, and their literature can be viewed as a didactic tool showing the consequences of
accepting falsehood as truth.
Chapter Four, therefore, delves into the processes by which legal rituals and the
vocabulary of oath-taking used in the legal texts are fleshed out in the structure of the literary
plots. Because these motifs concern both the parties participating in the swearing and the
community in which the language is certified, I will highlight not only the implications for the
speaker and audience, but also for society when these rituals become part of a literary
narrative. At best, legal representations of oath-taking can provide only a narrow view into the
actual use of oaths in Anglo-Saxon England and Iceland. They are limited to procedure and
punitive measures without the benefit of substantial context or application. It is because of
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these very limitations, though, that literature can be of most benefit. While generally not
including the full, legal explanation of an oath-ceremony, the representation of oaths in
literature shows both the reasons that oaths might be used and the reasons that they might fail.
The juxtaposition of the laws presented in Chapter Three with their literary applications in
Chapter Four help to create a more wholistic picture of oaths in Anglo-Saxon England and
Iceland.
Before examining the mutual appreciation of oath-taking in Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic
sources, we must acknowledge that these two societies share a cultural context appropriate to
comparative study. These two societies have a long history of cross-cultural influence through
both trade and military contact, as well as their mutual experiences with their conversion to
Christianity, in which older pagan principles were put into direct competition with a new system
of morality.31 All of these shared cultural values imply that not only are Anglo-Saxon and
Icelandic societies joined by mutual concerns for the preservation of their communities, but
they are founded on a common Germanic heritage, most visibly found in those linguistic
similarities producing identical Old English and Old Norse grammatical structure, focus on
metrical poetics, and cognate vocabularies.32 Both Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic texts are
built around comparable literary themes, champion similar moral values, and also criticize
unruly behaviors in corresponding ways. Because Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic perspectives
regarding these cultural characteristics are so closely aligned, it is possible to interpret both
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cultures’ literary works through a unified understanding of acceptable behavior.33 It is expected,
therefore, that those issues of foremost concern to Anglo-Saxon writers are also addressed in
similar ways by Icelandic authors. The anxieties of these communities drive the production of
texts, both literary and legal, as they attempt to highlight particularly troubling social problems.
The way legal and literary texts address mutual themes can best be understood when
considering an example from the legal text, the Laws of Alfred, that open with the directive that
æghwelc mon his að ond his wed wærlice healde, ‘every man should carefully abide by his oath
and his pledge.’34 Alfred’s desire to tighten the laws regarding oath-taking is understandable in
light of the tragedy recounted in the literary text of Asser’s Life of King Alfred. According to the
text, in 846 a Viking army made peace with Wessex and then, “practicing their usual treachery,
after their own manner, and paying no heed to the hostages, the oath and the promise of faith,
they broke the treaty, killed all the [hostages] they had, and turning away they went
unexpectedly to another place.”35 The literary record of this betrayal, despite both hostages and
oaths exchanged with the Danes, underscores the social crisis of oath-breaking that the
subsequent law attempts to rectify. Asser’s literary and Alfred’s legal text both serve as
warnings should the danger of oath-breakers, particularly those Viking raiders who threaten to
destroy Wessex, be allowed to go unpunished. It is not surprising that the legal and literary
texts work simultaneously to present the dangers of broken oaths, because “law and literature
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have always lived together, trespassed on, and infiltrated each other.”36 The legal and literary
commonalities between Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic sources, therefore, are worthy of
careful observation for the analogous efforts they reveal regarding the legitimization of socially
acceptable values and the systematic suppression of those disruptive practices. Alfred’s stronger
law regarding the maintenance of oaths is made more relevant when it is placed within the
context of the Viking invasions and betrayals, providing this legal code with a social and
historical background that informs its enforcement among the Anglo-Saxons. Fully appreciating
literature requires understanding of the various social issues pertinent for that time, 37 a strategy
that can be applied equally well to interpretations of why certain laws are enacted or revised for
a historical period. Robin West writes: “By reading these jurisprudential stories systematically
and critically as stories, we may achieve a richer understanding of the philosophical arguments
they are meant to convey.”38 Indeed, the law operates so much like narrative that it is open to
the very process of reading and interpretation that drives literary study.
Among the many shared principles that regulate behavior in both Anglo-Saxon England
and Iceland, the ideals of the heroic code, expressed most fully within the literary texts, are
particularly relevant in defining masculine conduct. These warrior cultures placed specific
emphasis on the ability of the individual to develop and defend the ideals of courage, integrity,
and honor critical to participation within the larger social sphere.39 The most basic element of
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the Germanic heroic code, the comitatus, is a band of warriors reliant on those relationships of
fidelity when fighting as a unified group.40 Every participant in this system is required to uphold
the standards of moral responsibility necessary to ensure the survival of the war-band, from
sharing of treasure to courageous performance on the battlefield. The gnomic literary pieces
that describe the expected natural and social order of the world explicitly define the position of
the warrior within the larger context of the cosmos by characterizing what behaviors are
acceptable or expected, particularly when considering how an individual’s actions relate to his
or her speech.41 In line 10 of “Maxims II” the poet places soð, “truth” in the same line as sinc,
“treasure” as an indication of how important both are for the warrior group. Without treasure
and the men attracted by these gifts, the leader of the comitatus cannot expect success in
battle, just as he cannot survive without truth and the trust that it provides for his warriors.
Likewise, the Old Norse-Icelandic poem Hávamál also notes the important place that truth has
among the community of warriors. In the second half of stanza forty-two, after a long
discussion of the necessity of repaying gifts to friends, the poem’s speaker advises that hlátr við
hlátri scyli hölðar taca, / enn lausung við lygi, ‘a man should give laughter for laughter, but
return lies for deception.’42 The poem clearly shows that it is only permissible to lie after the
other party damages his own honor by lying. Additionally, the individual’s moral responsibilities
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are outlined by frequently coupling appropriate behavior with an increase in personal integrity
and honor. In a similar way, this heroic value system encourages activities associated with
courage in battle, sharing with fellow members of the social group, and upholding the
correspondence of words with deeds. This poetic construct then serves to replicate what we
know of performative behavior outlined by the legal system and its role in validating truth.
With such a strong emphasis on the individual’s relationship to the collective unit, this
behavioral code is particularly integral to the understanding of how Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic
attitudes are shaped regarding the communication of the truth. While these standards of
conduct permit warriors to conform to and enforce acceptable behavior roles, these social
codes also recognize and attempt to prevent actions harmful to the community of warriors.
Cowardice on the field of combat, greed with one’s possessions, killing outside of appropriate
circumstances, and especially dishonesty are all censured by the heroic code.43 Along with these
other transgressions, false language undermines the integrity of the comitatus by fostering
distrust and fear when absolute trust of comrades is most critical in battle. In order to prevent
the spread of any contamination to the credibility of oaths, the warrior ethos of Anglo-Saxon
and Icelandic communities chastises those guilty of such crimes with the threat of infamy in
order to staunch the erosion of social order. Thus, the role of the heroic code in the glorification
of idealized warriors following social conventions and the chastisement of those who transgress
these conventions is implicitly linked to the continuous struggle for both Anglo-Saxon and
Icelandic cultures to regulate verbal presentation of the truth found in oath-taking.
In addition to a strong connection to heroic codes, the oath in Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic
culture is also clearly tied to an importance placed on family as the most significant source of
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support for an individual. For many characters in Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic literature,
lineage is what provides them with the cultural capital necessary to earn their own reputation.44
Just as heroic ideals dictate the expectations of proper conduct in battle, the family ties of kingroups offer another way to reward allowable actions and restrain objectionable ones. Family
units and their collective reputations require protection, so logically the most powerful
members of those groups seek to minimize dishonorable practices and increase the
performance of praiseworthy ones. Familial relationships play a significant role within the
system of oath-taking by joining the microcosm of one individual’s reputation for honesty to the
larger macrocosm of status for the entire group. Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic laws frequently
require defendants to provide additional attestation of an oath through compurgatorial
witnesses, and the accused undoubtedly turned to members of his or her family for support. As
Katherine Drew comments: “Only by membership in a family could an individual be assured of
sufficient strength to bring his offenders before the courts in order to receive justice; only by
membership in a family could he be certain of having sufficient oath-helpers to support his oath
in court.”45 Furthermore, the cultural capital available to the entire community could be
significantly diminished by false oaths. The laws of Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England prohibit
anyone convicted of perjury from making use of oaths in future cases, and this punishment
destabilizes the entire kin-group if guilty of supporting a deceitful relative.46 Just as with the
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process of feuding, the most important form of external threat to family honor,47 compurgation
pulls the entire family unit into the conflict and jeopardizes the essential social bond holding
together the community. The violence of the feud, if left unchecked, necessitates retaliatory
killing that destroys entire families. While less physically destructive, complicity in oath-breaking
possesses the same devastating potential to erode the entire base of an individual’s support by
associating the kin-group with tainted language. Once incurred, the reputation of oath-breaking
cannot be undone and calls into question the honesty of each member of the family, making all
speech suspicious. Moreover, when the family facilitates the false oath standing for legitimate
speech, they encourage the escalation of future dishonesty as other parties attempt to
perpetuate similar fraud in support of their own cause. While the result of unregulated feud is
the death of an entire community, the ultimate end for oath-breaking is no less destructive for
the population when all language is mistrusted in legal matters. Because feud and oath-breaking
draw the entire family group into a complex and self-damaging system, both Anglo-Saxons and
Icelanders attempt to regulate these family activities through laws aimed at preventing the
proliferation of social disorder inherent in both actions. Because the family group serves as the
basic unit of support for both Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon culture, it is not surprising that the
careful maintenance of the family reputation is the responsibility of its members, both through
the support of oath-taking and in the preventative regulation of dishonesty. It is evident that
both societies actively seek ways in which they can maintain social stability through the
mitigation of dangerous behavior and dangerous speech acts. Thus, these two cultures provide
the opportunity for exploration of the evolution of oath-taking as it occupies such a pivotal role
in Iceland and England.
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The study of that evolution is picked up in Chapter Five as I attempt to show how the
differences between literary and legal uses of sworn language eventually result in the changes
seen by Richard Firth Green in his work A Crisis of Truth: Literature and Law in Ricardian
England, in which he seeks to understand how challenges to honesty develop in England’s legal
and literary narratives after the Anglo-Saxon and early Icelandic periods. Despite the apparent
differences between the purposes of the legal narratives, to seek regulation and control of oathtaking, these expressions serve as excellent points of literary tension and societal caution when
oath-taking fails. Therefore, it is only through the careful study of both types of sources that a
complete picture appears.
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CHAPTER 2
TRACING THE PATHWAYS OF TRUTH
An Etymological Analysis of the Vocabulary of Sworn Language
Leóf, hwonne bið ángu spǽc geendedu, gif mon ne mæg nówðer ne mid wed ne mid áða
geendigan?
Sir, when will any claim be ended, if one might end it with neither vow nor oath?48
The tenth-century anonymous letter to King Edward the Elder concerning an estate at
Fonthill also includes the plaintive question above, asking how the judicial system of the AngloSaxons could survive without sworn language. The unknown author substantiates the power of
swearing throughout the letter, even recounting how his own testimony has been confirmed. He
also notes that a collapse of legal attestation would mean failure to bring legal charges, to hear
testimony of witnesses, and ultimately to hasten the demise of the entire legal system. This
letter reflects an acute awareness that the chaos resulting from a world without guarantees
might spread quickly, undermining the law and breaking those bonds responsible for holding
society together. It is not surprising that the author includes such an affirmative view of
asseveration, as the process is mentioned numerous times in those points of controversy
surrounding the Fonthill estate. The previous owner of the land, Helmstan, is charged with cattle
theft, and in the course of his efforts to deny the accusation his word is proven to be false. This
perjury costs Helmstan his property, and it also results in the king declaring him a fugitive. More
importantly, however, Helmstan’s attempt to manipulate truth also casts suspicion on his earlier
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agreement with the anonymous author of the letter regarding both the property and the
original lawsuit for which the author provided testimony on Helmstan’s behalf. One moment of
dishonesty taints the companions of the perjurer with the suspicion of a similar guilt and
jeopardizes the integrity of any previous exchanges. While the Fonthill document presents an
example of how swearing should work in a practical sense, it further illustrates the complexity
and risks inherent in these exchanges.
What is most interesting about the account of the Fonthill letter, and especially the
episode with Helmstan, is the way the anonymous author of the letter highlights more than one
type of sworn language. The writer describes the dangers as not only a challenge to the oath,
but also specifically mentions the threat to the pledge as well.49 Since the composer of the
Fonthill missive is versed in the practical legal application of swearing and the ramifications of
perjury, his inclusion of more than one form of sworn speech is worthy of further consideration.
Initially, one may be tempted to regard the oath and the pledge as two identical forms that
operate interchangeably as the guarantor of language. Yet, the author of the Fonthill letter
deliberately juxtaposes these two words in parallel, ne mid wed ne mid áða “neither with pledge
nor with oaths.” This syntax would suggest that should one form no longer be available, the
other might provide an equivalent, although distinct, venue through which the community can
guarantee veracity. The phrase also echoes that found in the legal codes, particularly King
Alfred’s, mentioned subsequently in the letter.50 Those two distinct forms of swearing identified
as critical to a sustained judicial process raise larger questions of how one type of sworn
statement can be distinguished from the other. If both the oath and the pledge are critical for
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the defense of a legal case, then it is necessary to explore what particular features separate
these two forms. Likewise, it is also worth considering why the anonymous writer chose to omit
other varieties of swearing from his correspondence with King Edward. The Fonthill example
demonstrates the revered connection linking truth and words inexorably to our understanding
of the range of swearing, the intricacies involved in crafting these exchanges, and those
limitations that impede this fundamental practice. Only through a comprehensive study of the
intricacies of swearing can we hope to elucidate the issues surrounding honesty and dishonesty
among the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic people.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the legal and literary texts of Iceland and
Anglo-Saxon England in order to determine what forms of sworn language were available and
how distinctly each of these differs from another in respect to its potency and importance,
thereby establishing a hierarchy of swearing. But tracing the development of sworn language is
not a straightforward undertaking; rather it requires meticulous effort in compilation, definition,
and evaluation in order to establish the body of swearing terminology available to Anglo-Saxons
and Icelanders. Only a systematic study into the origins, variant forms, and the meanings of
these words can allow for an assessment of the usage of sworn language throughout the corpus
of extant Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic sources. This investigation, moreover, highlights the
influence of swearing on the legal and literary foundations of both cultures. A comparative
philological approach to this vocabulary juxtaposes Old Norse and Old English
conceptualizations of verbal guarantees in order to render a quantifiable hierarchy of
asseverations in terms of both frequency and influence. The relationship of the dialects
themselves justifies this dual-language study of swearing. The resemblance of many Old English
words to commensurate forms in Old Norse, enhanced by the presence of loan-words traced to
Viking settlement in the Danelaw and other loci of interchange, reveals an integral association
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between these two languages.51 As the Icelandic author of Gunnlaugs Saga Ormstungu notes
about pre-Conquest England, ein var þá tunga á Englandi sem í Nóregi ok í Danmorku, “in those
days, the language in England was the same as in Norway and Denmark.”52 Comparing the
language of swearing used by Icelanders and Anglo-Saxons for similarities and differences
provides this chapter with a more detailed understanding of how critical these activities were to
their respective cultures. In addition to looking across linguistic boundaries, this comparative
study also facilitates consideration of how these various forms operate in relation to the other
types of sworn language available. The search for interrelation and dependence is instrumental
for generating the categories that differentiate discrete modes of sworn language,
disambiguating a centralized conception of truth into specialized units. Insofar as is possible, a
basic etymological background of the vocabulary of swearing provides the foundations for
tracing the distinctions of these expressions and suggesting different levels of importance
among them. Thus, consideration of the linguistic development of the vocabulary of swearing
provides an essential background for later discussion of the legal and literary examples, as well
as a context for how language is expected to provide guarantees for behavior.
Given the importance placed on behavior as a reflection of personal reputation by both
Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic culture, an abundance of terminology associated with concepts of
truth and dishonesty is not surprising. Indeed, the greatest obstacle to a study of swearing is
the unwieldy and nebulous body of words associated with veracity and deception. Although the
Thesaurus of Old English is a strictly modern resource, one not available to Anglo-Saxon readers,
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its entries relating to sworn language demonstrate how significant the concept of honesty was
for speakers of Old English. The Thesaurus of Old English lists no fewer than one hundred and
twenty-nine individual nouns, verbs, and adjectives connected to swearing under the categories
of both “Law and Order” and “Social Interactions.”53 If a comparable quantity of words exists
for speakers of Old Norse, this presents a body of language too ponderous for effective study
without voluminous analysis. Tracing original meanings back to Germanic roots helps to reveal
the addition of new meanings, shifts in usage, and the decline in usage for terms that fall out of
circulation within the vocabulary of swearing. Only a carefully selected linguistic examination
can break down these expressions into component parts, thus creating useful categories to yield
a reliable system for understanding the nature of swearing. Until such time as an exhaustive
examination is available, a semantic analysis of the expressions of swearing most significant to
Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon societies can best provide the method by which the early medieval
forms of swearing covered here can be compared with later medieval texts. The results of such a
semantic analysis allow us to understand the conceptions of “truth” and thus make possible the
analysis of how the meaning has shifted and how the categories of sworn language have
changed throughout this period of European history. In fact, Richard Firth Green notes that as a
keyword, “truth” conceptually still undergoes development well into the later medieval period
in England.54 Once we have established the vocabulary of swearing, it is possible to determine
how legal rituals develop around those terms and then to understand how those rituals become
the motifs used by writers of the literary texts.
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I will explore the usage of three distinct types of sworn language in Iceland and AngloSaxon England: the oath, the pledge, the vow, and the “truth.” Each of these categories
corresponds to groups of nouns that share meaning and are likewise based on a distinct
procedure for determining the veracity of speech. These procedures involve varying levels of
complexity and are therefore arranged from the most regulated, the oath, to the least
restrictive category of speech, the assertion of “truth.” Furthermore, because a significant
number of compound nouns in both Old English and Old Norse are created by affixing modifiers
to a foundational noun, each category includes such constructed forms within their appropriate
conceptual group.55 For example, the oath of brotherhood, eiðbrόðir, specifically regulates two
individuals who wish to bind themselves into a special relationship, yet despite this narrow
application such an expression is still an oath, eið, which is regulated by the same guidelines of
oath-taking. Such specialized subcategories of swearing fall within the three major categories
outlined by this dissertation, yet their distinctive features set them apart from the other
conventional forms within the same category. The value of including the range of potential
expressions derived from compounding is that it guarantees these three categories will provide
a comprehensive overview of sworn language. Additionally, some of these specialized forms
within the three categories merit discussion in their own right to denote their unique functions.
For example, when considering the larger category of the pledge, we must acknowledge the
distintions that set apart vows as a particular type of pledging. As a subset of the pledge, the
vow serves to distinguish those instances invested with a higher level of solemnity or spiritual
significance than the typical pledge, yet not deviating so dramatically as to require an additional
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category. The list of major categories begins with the oath, a formalized invocation of truth that
also displays the largest number of specialized compound words. I have organized these
compounds into categories based on how the expression is delivered, before whom it was given,
and what specific purposes it served.
The Oath
The oath, taken before witnesses and following a carefully prescribed protocol,
represents the most complex of all of the expressions that attest to honesty. The oath
embodies an articulation of integrity not available to any other form of swearing, and this
specialized characteristic explains its recurrent usage throughout the medieval world and its
exceptional structure for ensuring honesty. Indeed, the ubiquity of the oath is a testament to its
status as the most meaningful form of swearing, and a myriad of cultures beyond the AngloSaxons and Icelanders value the oath as a critical means of expressing truth. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines the oath principally as “a solemn or formal appeal to God, or to a deity or
something held in reverence or regard, in the witness of the truth of a statement, or the binding
character of a promise or undertaking.”56 The Latin cognate iuramentum, which also signifies
swearing an oath by means of a procedural confirmation of honesty, further reflects a ritualized
and spiritual component to the oath. Iuramentum and its associated verb iuro, “to attest or call
to witness,” both originate from ius, the noun meaning “justice, right, or law” as the expression
of socially obligatory behavior.57 Not unexpectedly, divinity frequently plays a significant role in
enforcement and administration of justice. This adaptation of legal process is an attempt to
mitigate what Bourdieu acknowledges as a limitation on legal language, in which the “content of
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the law which emerges in the judgment is the product of a symbolic struggle between
professionals possessing unequal technical skills and social influence…as symbolic weapons, to
win their case.”58 Therefore, the English and Icelanders include spiritual consequences for
violations to underpin expectations of behavior. The oath, therefore, exists at the intersection
not only of a legal structure dependent on truth, but also a system of morality guided by the
principles of religious understanding. Thus, the oath becomes a self-referential acknowledgment
of veracity designed, through its spiritual component, to ensure conformity between speech and
reality.
Based on the use of the oath in the judicial system and other critical social
environments, the word not surprisingly also denotes “the form of words in which such a
statement or promise is made.”59 The oath, more than any of the other classifications of
swearing, relies on the prescriptive language and the expected potency of the comissive speech
act to ensure uniformity and adherence to a standardized expectation of how this type of sworn
language will function. The oath’s dependence on restrictive language, scrutinized phrasing, and
a formulaic structure offers little room for concession to how this category of sworn language is
delivered. Such uniformity ensures that criminals should have difficultly abusing oath-taking,
given the ease of spotting those speakers who deviate from the structure prescribed by law.
Consistency of form also accounts for the increased usage of the oath in situations where the
risk of exploitation or deception is the most dangerous, such as testimony in legal situations.
The oath depends on exchange, a feature integral to both the pledge and the vow as well, to
assure that any violations of the integrity of swearing receive an appropriate penalty. While
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monetary surety is frequently attached with the pledge or vow, the heightened religious nature
of the oath requires collateral of a higher value, most commonly including intangible aspects
such as spiritual wellbeing and social reputation. Although the risk of financial loss from the
confiscation of a pledged surety provides a certain level of incentive for conformity to truth,
pecuniary consequences offer only limited deterrence, especially in cases where an individual
does not place high value on physical property. The loopholes created for those with the
financial means to circumvent penalties for dishonesty are ideally closed, however, with the
focus on spiritual and social punishments incorporated into the oath. Irreversible damage to
either an individual’s honor or the security of his or her soul exacts a more rigorous and
inescapable penalty than plain financial reprisal for abuse of the truth; and in this respect the
oath represents the perfect combination of religious ritual and legal enforcement, ensuring that
it remains the most secure form of sworn language. Thus, the dominance of the oath as the
supreme form of sworn speech is confirmed through both its independence in asserting truth
without corroboration of outside parties, and its use of more austere and more lasting
punishments to certify integrity.
In addition to a strong emphasis on the social or spiritual consequence, procedural
phrasing, and an increased role for the divine, oaths also place a heightened significance on
gesture as it relates to the performance of swearing. While joining hands is an activity typically
associated with making a pledge, the oath also involves traditions that highlight the importance
of a speaker’s hands during the process of swearing. This body language is especially relevant
for the judicial oath where the hand is placed over a religiously significant object while swearing,
a feature that remains even within modern legal oaths.60 Such a gesture serves to tactilely join
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the individual speaking with the instrument of enforcement, and this process guarantees that
the speaker is aware of the consequences of abusing the oath. Someone swearing upon a
religious object thus distributes the responsibility for detecting and punishing perjury so that
enforcement falls not only to those individuals presently hearing the oath, but also to the
spiritual power of the one whose objects are being used. The inescapable nature of spiritual
punishment, therefore, extends the threat of penalties for those who are not physically
apprehended during the process of lying.
The significance of gesture to the act of oath-taking is not found exclusively within the
judicial oath, and many other forms of the oath also recognize the symbolic significance of
physical positioning. Much like judicial oaths, oaths expressing loyalty to others place emphasis
on the non-verbal significance of body language. The idealized image of medieval fealty, for
example, typically positions the kneeling oath-taker to appear subordinate to the individual
receiving the oath.61 Likewise, the hands of the one swearing are placed inside the hands of the
individual accepting the oath, thus symbolically placing the ability to act within the control of
the other. By positioning both the body and hands in ritualistic fashion, the language of the
oath of loyalty is confirmed through physical action.62 Thus, the physical gestures silently affirm

source. For example, pre-Christian Icelandic temples are recorded as using a golden ring dedicated to a
specific deity for swearing, while Christians also employed relics or penitentials in place of the Bible.
61

While the iconic image of the knight kneeling before the king to swear fealty is illustrative of the
significance of gesture for the medieval oath, this image cannot be universally applied to Anglo-Saxon and
Icelandic culture. Patrick Wormald notes of the Anglo-Saxons: “In the early period, there is no good
evidence that oaths were sworn either to lords generally or to kings specifically: the warrior’s loyalty to
his lord arose from the latter’s generosity, not from any ceremonial pledge.” See The Blackwell’s
Encyclopedia of Anglo-Saxon England, s.v. oath. Likewise, as a community without royal control during its
early history, Iceland also lacks the need for such ritualized social exchanges.
62

See Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 146.

30

the authority of the oath by forcing the speaker’s conformity to ritually expected motions and
physically depicting the power dynamics central to the process of swearing.
In addition to ritual and gesture as noticeable signs of its importance, a majority of the
characteristics that define the oath as the chief level of sworn language are reflected within the
etymological background of the word. The Old English áþ, a noun phonetically identical to its
modern descendent, is tersely defined by the Dictionary of Old English in its primary meaning as
“an oath,” as is the Old Norse eiðr.63 The meaning of “an oath” is further explicated through the
Indo-European root, oito-, which is connected to the Old English áþ.64 More about the oath’s
unique nature, however, is revealed by the relationship existing between oito-, meaning “oath,”
and the past-tense form of the Indo-European verb *ei-, meaning “went.”65 The sense of
completed motion derived from the Indo-European verb further enhances the ability of the oath
to testify to the legitimacy of actions concluded in the past. While the etymological connection
to the past-tense form of *ei- endows the oath with an effective means to affirm veracity of
prior actions, this sense of completed action significantly limits the ability of the oath to affirm
the truthfulness of future intentions. The solution to this temporal impediment is found in the
Gothic term *aiþs, a word etymologically related to both the Indo-European oito- and the Old
English áþ, as well as the Old Norse eiðr, which provides additional information about the
capability of the oath to convey truth into the future.66 According to the entry in A Gothic
Etymological Dictionary, *aiþs inherits the senses of both an established “course” and ultimately
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“fate” from its Celtic and Germanic roots that allude to the oath-taker’s act of walking between
pieces of slaughtered animals while swearing. 67 Linking the oath with the idea of a
predetermined outcome of actions endows the speaker with the means to validate truth across
the entire spectrum of time. Indeed, the Germanic belief that the course of humanity is
unavoidably dictated by an appointed destiny seamlessly corresponds with the position that a
suitably sworn oath has the power to guarantee the speaker’s impending behavior.68 Thus, the
áþ for the Anglo-Saxons and the eiðr for the Icelanders provide the strongest means available
for attesting to truth because they are not limited in their ability to represent the integrity of
language and they are linked to broader Germanic views regarding cosmology and the fate of
the individual. The relationship between the Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon terminology suggests
that both cultures valued the oath for its ability to convey the truth with an appropriate level of
solemnity and authority. The deeply religious bonds created by the eiðr, just as with the áþ, are
symbolically expressed during swearing by the individual connecting with the religiously
significant objects, especially relics, used within this process.69 Increasing the intrinsic spiritual
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and moral consequences, which guard against the threat of abuse and exploitation, further
enhances the considerable influence of this classification of swearing. The ability of the oath to
connect with larger spiritual and ethical forces that regulate society and to join individuals
within the larger body of the community accounts for its widespread usage especially in those
moments where the strongest guarantees of veracity are required. 70 Thus, the high regard for
the integrity and authority of the oath defines Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon positioning of this
category of sworn language within the most important settings requiring honesty.
Judicial Oaths
While every oath is based on equivalent invocations of the divine in testimony to the
speaker's honesty, great variety exists among the distinctive purposes that depend largely on
the specific function of the oath. Two classifications stand out, the judicial oath and the oath of
loyalty, because of the significant role they play in Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon cultures. The first
of these groups, the judicial oath, comprises the most significant collection of oath-taking in
regard to both the frequency of usage and the authority of the oath within the legal process. It
is, therefore, not surprising that a large number of compound nouns in Old English and Old
Norse are formed using áþ and eiðr as their principal component. In Iceland, these oaths are
called lögeiðr, specifically referring to the “legal oath” as distinct from other types of sworn
statements.71 Consideration of the numerous vernacular compound forms of “legal oaths”
reveals how significant the oath was to judicial functions in both Iceland and Anglo-Saxon
England.
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The Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic judicial systems employ the oath for many specialized
functions from the beginning to the end of any legal action. Chief among those purposes was
the oath taken before the presentation of charges that initiated the court case, as attested by
the Old English fóreáþ, the oath sworn at the beginning of every lawsuit.72 In addition to
justifying and validating legal indictments, many other specialized oaths supported the efforts of
the defendant in arguing for acquittal. Compurgation, for example, required a defendant to
swear to his or her innocence followed by the support of witnesses who swore to the truth of
the defendant’s statement. Both Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon compurgation, however, called for
different numbers of witnesses to swear depending on the severity of charges against the
defendant. In order to address the range of compurgation, compound forms were established
in both languages to indicate the number of individuals required to attest to the truth. The Old
Norse eineiðr, the "single oath," and the Old English ánfealdáþ, the “simple oath,” both
represent the basic level of compurgation relying only on the character of the person swearing.
The Old Norse lyritareiðr, an "oath of three," and the Old English þrýfealdáþ, “threefold oath”
offer additional credence by means of the added credibility drawn from two additional oathhelpers. The person swearing garners even more support by the addition of five fellow
compurgators, as reflected in the Old Norse séttareiðr, "the oath of six," or by the maximum
addition of twelve in the Icelandic tylptareiðr, the "oath of twelve." Increasing the number of
witnesses required for compurgation regulates the security of the oath by placing added
pressure on the individual swearing, especially when the oath is vital for determining high risk
legal cases. Adding more individuals to the oath-taking process ensures that only valid
statements are accepted by distributing the responsibility of protecting the oath to a wider
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group, thus mitigating the risk to the larger community that individuals might be tempted to risk
perjury.
Indeed, binding more witnesses to the oath is only one feature of judicial swearing
expressed by the numerous Old Norse and Old English compound nouns. Among the other
types of oaths central to our understanding of this category of sworn language, a number of
them serve very narrowly defined purposes related to trial procedures. Two Old Norse nouns,
the duleiðr, the “oath of denial,” and the varnareiðr, “an oath for the defense,” specifically serve
the purpose of presenting counterarguments in disputed cases. A similar oath defined the
Anglo-Saxon legal defense with the cyreáþ, “the choice oath, or oath sworn by the accused
together with a certain number of consacramentals selected by him out of a fixed number of
persons named to him by the judge.”73 In addition to those oaths specifically designated for
legal defense, some forms of swearing are restrictively designed to serve only specific legal
cases. The Old Norse morðseiðr, for example, refers specifically to “an oath of compurgation in
a case of a murderer.”74 The gravity of the accusation of homicide is reflected in the attention
given not only to its prosecution, but also in the special label identifying oaths involved in these
cases. In much the same way, those oaths associated exclusively with cases heard before
medieval Iceland’s appellate court, the Fifth Court, are labeled as fimtardómseiðr, in recognition
of their specialized usage before this Icelandic legal institution. Because the Fifth Court hears
only unresolved cases sent from the lower Quarter Courts, the oaths that it requires to function
are not necessarily the same as those customarily employed in lower courts. This complexity of
judicial process is one of the factors in the proliferation of the vocabulary of swearing. Despite
the number of compound forms attached to judicial oath-taking and the specific contexts
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associated with each form, the nature of the oath is not altered by these composite words.
These oaths remain, regardless of the specialized purposes and usages indicated by their
distinctive labels, the primary means through which words assume a judicial function through
the ritualized act of swearing.
Oaths of Loyalty
Similar to judicial oaths, a significant number of compound nouns in Old English and Old
Norse employ the word “oath” to form a subset of sworn language: the expression of one’s
fidelity or allegiance to another. While oaths taken in the judicial context serve to present
evidence or regulate legal proceedings, oaths of loyalty are designed to establish indissoluble
social bonds. While oaths of loyalty exhibit many variations, none of the compounds within the
group presents a fundamental alteration of the characteristics present in the basic oath. Instead,
this group of oaths specifically details the contexts in which oaths can be employed for a certain
political purpose.
The most common and the least socially regulated expression of fidelity is the oath of
blood-brotherhood, a variant of swearing particularly popular among the Germanic peoples.
Such oaths are designed to transform ordinary friendships into special relationships akin to
kinship, and as a symbolic representation of that unity they require the ritualistic mixing of
blood by the individuals swearing. A comrade who swears this oath is labeled in Old Norse as an
eiðbróðir, or “oath-brother,” and he must uphold those conventions expected of family
members, frequently in avenging the death of a fellow sworn companion.75 Much like the bonds
formed by swearing blood-brotherhood, the Old English geféranáð, “the oath of a companion,”
also expresses the unity of two individuals whose oath-taking allows them to create
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relationships roughly equivalent to those of the family. The prefix gefér refers specifically to “a
company of warriors” or the comitatus serving together as a military unit.76 As demonstrated by
the behavior of Byrhtnoth’s warriors in “The Battle of Maldon,” men bound by the obligations of
military service frequently share the same bond as those joined by the oath of bloodbrotherhood. The poet of the “The Battle of Maldon” recounts: hi woldon þa ealle oðer twega, /
lif forlætun oððe leofne gewrecan, “then they all wished to do one of two things, either lay
down their life or avenge their dear [companion].”77 Many of Byrhtnoth’s men refer to him not
only as their lord, but also as a “dear” or “beloved” companion who is not simply a military
leader. The loyalty expressed in these lines extends far beyond the mere obligation to fight for a
leader. In fact, as “The Battle of Maldon” and other texts demonstrate, the ultimate test for
such oaths is a willingness to risk one’s life in order to prove the reliability of such bonds of
loyalty.
While the bonds of loyalty expressed in the oaths of a companion or blood-brother
represent common forms of swearing to ensure loyalty, they are generally based on an
assumption of equal standing between those making them. Blood brothers are typically from
similar social circles and members of the comitatus share identical status as warriors. Not every
oath of loyalty, however, comes from expressions of mutual friendship or joins together
members of identical status. It is particularly true that loyalty oaths join together those of
unequal social status, and such acts of swearing are frequently associated with an individual’s
submission to authority. The rise of royal control in Anglo-Saxon England, particularly under the
consolidation of King Alfred’s reign, is further reflected by increasingly more regulation of those
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oaths of loyalty that bound the English together under the power of the king. Despite no
centralized royal authority within early Iceland, Icelanders were also not without experience
with the bonds of fealty. Contact with the kings of Norway and other rulers abroad, as well as
powerful chieftains at home, meant that Icelanders too had familiarity with the verbal
commitments binding followers under the influence of the powerful. The Old English holdáþ and
hyldáþ, along with the Old Norse trygðaeiðr both refer specifically to the process of “swearing
fealty.” Likewise, a similar relationship is expressed by the Old Norse trúnaðareiðr, or “oath of
allegiance,” which also conveys a sense of deference within its meaning. Each of these terms
allow an individual’s word to express faithfulness, yet they also depend on an individual’s ability
to submit to the power of authority.
The Pledge
The second category of sworn language, the “pledge,” has a structure that is more
loosely constrained than those aforementioned statements regulated by strict legal and ritual
practices. The pledge is characterized by the pairing of words with an exchange, and it is
defined by the OED as “anything handed over to or put in the possession of another, as security
for the performance of a contract or the payment of a debt, or as a guarantee of good faith.”78
There is a real sense of loss involved in breaking the pledge because the speaker must offer up
something of value to guarantee validity. What is offered with the pledge might be as abstract
as the person’s integrity and honor, or as tangible as the bail-money transferred during the
making of these agreements. No matter if the surety is composed of material objects or
intangible assets linked to the act of pledging, the punishment of forfeiture exists to ensure that
a speaker must honor his words. Because the individual attempting to present his or her
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language as valid also offers collateral, these arrangements are heavily weighted to favor those
who receive the pledge. As stated earlier, and indeed with all three of the categories of sworn
language discussed in this study, the burden of proof for maintaining the integrity of an
individual’s statements is primarily the responsibility of the person speaking. He or she must
ensure that the words of the pledge hold true, or at least appear so to their recipient. Only after
successfully convincing assurances and appropriately precious collateral have been exchanged
does this type of sworn agreement bind speech to an expectation of legitimacy.
Although the Anglo-Saxons did not use the root form of our modern word “pledge,”
their vocabulary did include various words that convey many of the senses of our modern
concept of pledging; consider for example, the word wǽr, whose conventional definitions of “a
covenant, compact, or agreement” help to convey the type of exchange indicated within this
category of sworn language.79 None of these initial senses, however, provide enough
background into what is typically offered as surety for this arrangement or under which
circumstances such exchanges take place. Likewise, the covenant has an extremely broad scope
from the monumentally inclusive, representative of the contractual interactions between the
human and the divine, to the infinitesimally personal, such as an agreement made between
neighbors. Some further information regarding how best to interpret the senses of the word
wǽr can be found within its additional meanings. For example, equating wǽr specifically with
the concept of the “pledge” directly links this Old English term with a non-Germanic one, but it
also helps to narrow our understanding of its place within this category of sworn speech.
Positioning an Anglo-Saxon idea within a modern designation whose etymology is
derived from an Old French word can be justified by information found in extant early glosses.
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Joseph Bosworth and Thomas Northcote Toller note in their further explication of the term wǽr
that the Anglo-Saxon glosses in the Brüsseler Codex include the word wǽr for the Latin words
foedus and pactum.80 According to A Latin Dictionary compiled by Charlton Lewis and Charles
Short, the noun foedus in classical Latin means a “league, treaty, or compact” as well as a
generalized relationship of exchange in the sense of “a covenant, agreement, or bargain.”81
Likewise, pactum communicates an implication of verbal bartering as “an agreement, covenant,
contract, stipulation, or compact.”82 The acceptance of Latinate synonyms links the foundations
of the Old French ancestry of “pledge” to the accepted Anglo-Saxon understanding of the word
wǽr. Even though evidence of a direct etymological affiliation between wǽr, foedus, and
pactum is lacking, this artificial association does provide an indication of the significance
conveyed by the Old English word, as well as providing justification for my use of the word
“pledge” to translate wǽr.
Foedus and pactum, in addition to labeling generalized bargains and agreements, also
specifically refer to marriage contracts made between two families. Because betrothal is a
specialized type of agreement regulated by conventions and designed to sanction a future
wedding, questions arise if the word wǽr also supports such a specialized sense among the
Anglo-Saxons. The answer to how to interpret wǽr, especially regarding its application to a
context of betrothal, is found when comparing the Old English term with its Indo-European
roots. The linguistic heritage helps to disambiguate this complex taxonomy by providing some
evidence of a precedent for meaning. The Gothic Etymological Dictionary positions wǽr within
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the entry for the reconstructed Gothic compound *tuz-werjan, and the etymology of the Old
English is specifically traced under the larger discussion of the component word *–werjan,
meaning “to keep, or protect.”83 Lehmann identifies two relevant Indo-European roots also
associated with the term, wer-(H)- and wēro-s. The former Indo-European root is defined as to
“be friendly.” The sincerity implied in amicability is critical in making successful agreements,
trying to affect a truce, or reaching some other type of contractual settlement. Indeed, the
Germanic motif of attempting to end conflict through marriage is quite common in Anglo-Saxon
literature, supporting the intellectual basis for reading wǽr in this manner. Beowulf contains
some of the more illustrative examples of marriage alliances formed as methods for ending
conflicts, including the betrothal of Hrothgar’s daughter Freawaru to Ingeld, prince of the
Heatho-Beard tribe and major adversary of the Danes. Yet, Beowulf comments that all of these
plans to forge peace through the marriage exchange are doomed to failure since oft seldan
hwær / æfter leodhryre lytle hwile / bongar bugeð, þeah seo bryd duge, “often anywhere after a
prince’s fall the deadly spear rests only a little while, even though the bride is good.”84 If
betrothal is to produce hope for an end to the violence of feud, strong guarantees must
accompany these bonds. Given that the pledge requires something put up as collateral, one can
assume that the life of the son or daughter stands as the surety, and punishment falls to that
offspring if either side fails to adhere to the arrangement. All of the conditional elements and
the cultural framework, therefore, are present to suggest that wǽr does apply to crafting
guarantees of betrothal. Because rituals of betrothal effectively transform outsiders into family
members, they are the ultimate form of forging affable relationships and thereby reinforce the
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linkage between the meaning of wǽr’s Indo-European root and the fundamental sense of the
Old English noun.
By looking at wēro-, the second Indo-European root associated with wǽr, a complex
relationship also emerges that joins the action of taking the pledge back to a foundational
conception of truth. Wēro- is tied to the Germanic verb *wēra-, “to be,” making this type of
speech a manifestation of how reality should be expressed through language.85 Although this
second etymological connection draws the focus away from the formalized usage of wǽr
marked by exchanges of collateral, such as betrothal, it does reinforce the significant role played
by pledging as the guarantee of speech. Exchanges made in the form of a pledge, therefore,
transform what is said into the authentic truth through the very act of articulating the
statement. The impact of the unity of reality and speech is also best expressed through the
shared connection to yet another Latin cognates, vērus and vēritas, from which we derive much
of our modern terminology for honesty, such as ‘verity,’ ‘verdict,’ and ‘verify.’ Wǽr is uniquely
positioned to operate on the border between its specific functions for constructing treaties and
wedding agreements, and its broad role as a generalized certification of factual statements. Far
from being marginalized by its flexibility of meaning, the Anglo-Saxon concept of pledge merits
examination of its service in both legal and literary usages.86
In contrast to its Old English neighbor, the Old Norse word várar receives only minimal
critical discussion as the Icelandic form of the pledge. The entry in Richard Cleasby and
Guðbrand Vigfusson’s Icelandic - English Dictionary lists only one principal sense associated with
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the word, and the entry opens with a note that várar customarily appears as a plural form.
Details about the number of the noun do have a practical bearing on the usage of the word,
since the plural form suggests that more than one exchange is necessary for the pledge to
function properly. Moreover, the pledge always requires participation from more than one
individual and at least two sides must be present for the articulation of responsibilities or the
requirements necessary for the exchange. The Old Norse plural form not only relates to the
multiple individuals involved in pledging, but also to the fact that this speech act is accompanied
by the addition of an exchange to guarantee behavior. In this sense, the pledge includes both
statement and surety, so that each use of this type of sworn language involves more than one
interaction between speaker and audience. Employing várar as strictly a plural noun, therefore,
is a logical extension for the various features that define a pledge as a distinctive form of
swearing.
Following the limitations of the noun’s number, Cleasby and Vigfusson offer the
definition of “a pledge, troth, or plight” as the primary senses of the word.87 The last of these
three denotations, the “plight,” provides an additional nuance of meaning for the pledge.
Although the word “plight” initially suggests a situation involving danger, it also conveys the
sense of “an undertaking or obligation involving a risk of forfeiture,” which is exactly how the
pledge functions.88 Because the threat of loss makes exchanging pledges operate efficiently,
associating “plight” with várar further reinforces the defining feature of this category of sworn
language. Likewise, merging the pledge with the idea of “pledging troth” reinforces the
common etymological root shared by várar and wǽr with the Indo-European verb wēro-. Given
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that the pledge is a verbal embodiment of assurance, a sensible connection exists between
“pledging troth” and the decisive nature of the verb “to be” found in wēro-. Since “troth” is also
connected with “truth,” the third category of sworn language, these overlapping denotations
enhance the value of the pledge by emphasizing the expectation of swearing as an inescapable
guarantee.
Despite the narrow denotations associated with várar, etymological evidence indicates
that an approximate correspondence of usage exists between the Old Norse term and its Old
English counterpart. Drawing on the same Indo-European roots, wer-(H)- and wēro-, várar also
traces its meaning to the feelings of goodwill and correspondence with reality that mark the
earlier discussion of wǽr. Additionally, the Altnordisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch cites a
correlation between the Indo-European roots of várar and the Latin term vērus, thus reinforcing
the pledge as a category of sworn language dependent on and tied to concepts of veracity. Yet
another additional usage strengthening the connection between Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic
pledging is found in the specialized relationship of the exchanges of betrothal. Much like the
context of betrothal associated with wǽr, várar is also used to signify the commitment of joining
families together through the betrothal agreement. The compound word várar-hendi, which
Cleasby and Vigfusson define as “a wedding-hand,” supports this specialized sense of the pledge
by specifically linking betrothal with one of the most significant actions in making the pledge.89
Just as pledges typically include the clasping of the hands as a physical manifestation that both
parties agree upon one specific perspective, so too does the spousal joining of hands during a
marriage ceremony symbolically convey the union of two individuals into one family. Inclusion

89

An English – Icelandic Dictionary, s.v. várar.

44

of the word for “hand” within this compound communicates the mutual foundations of the
pledge and its relationship with betrothal.
Although the term várar is associated with the integral social acts of betrothal and
marriage, Cleasby and Vigfusson categorize this word as obsolete, implying it is superseded by
other expressions of legitimized speech. Temptation does exist to discontinue our investigation
of várar with its classification as an archaic expression, yet given Iceland’s linguistic stability and
its lack of foreign loan-words to compete against the local vocabulary, the diminishing use of
this word merits further exploration. The period of religious conversion and the resulting
cultural transformation culminating around 1000 C.E. with the adoption of Christianity at the
Alþing, the General Assembly, had an impact on the language of swearing. Efforts to move
Iceland away from its former gods and goddesses might explain why várar was abandoned as a
regular expression of sworn language, particularly for its association with the goddess Vár. This
connection is noted by Cleasby and Vigfusson, who list the name of the goddess as the only
instance of the singular form of várar. The relationship between Vár and the pledge is
significantly deeper than orthography and reaches to the very heart of how várar was used by
the Icelanders. Included among the list of Scandinavian goddesses in Snorri Sturluson’s
Gylfaginning is a description of Vár: Níunda Vár: hon hlýðir á eiða manna ok einkamál er veita
sín á mili konur ok karlar. Því heita þau mál várar. Hon hefnir ok þeim er brigða.90 “The ninth
[goddess] is Vár: she listens to the oaths of men and personal agreements which are made
between women and men. For this reason these exchanges are called várar. And she takes
vengeance against those who violate them.” This brief account from Gylfaginning provides
many important clues about Icelandic pledges. First, the goddess highlights those core
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principles of swearing through her simultaneous responsibilities as the witness and the enforcer
of the pledge. A legitimate pledge, according to these guidelines, requires both witnesses to
affirm validity and the threat of sincere penalties to make adherence compulsory. Moreover,
the passage specifically mentions that the goddess is interested in agreements made between
the sexes. By providing the specialized context for those agreements associated with várar,
Snorri reinforces the position of the pledge as an integral feature for betrothal and matrimony.
The account in Gylfaginning also provides a substantial rational for the limited appearance of
várar since it is so conspicuously linked to a pre-Christian deity.
The Vow
The Anglo-Saxons and Icelanders had more than one expression for the process of
pledging. As a subcategory of the pledge, the vow is based upon the offering of collateral as
assurance that the individual will preserve the sincerity of what he or she asserts. The
difference lies in its inclusion of a divine invocation. The OED principally defines the vow as “a
solemn promise made to God, or any deity or saint, to perform some act or make some gift or
sacrifice in exchange for some special favor.”91 The vow ensures that, much like the pledge, an
individual’s declaration will be in complete correspondence with the reality of his or her actions.
The threat of confiscation or loss is again the motivating factor designed to ensure compliance
with the spoken agreement. At its core, for example, the vow expresses “a solemn promise of
fidelity or faithful attachment,” and this denotation corresponds identically with our
understanding of how the pledge also operates.92 While these mutual denotations present solid
evidence for grouping the vow under the paradigm of the pledge, we must still remember to

91

The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. vow.

92

The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. vow.

46

differentiate this subcategory of sworn language by highlighting the features that distinguish it.
The characteristic element of the vow is an appeal to the spiritual, which serves as the
guarantee authorizing the process of swearing. Given the distinctive combination of truth with
a heightened sacred component, it is not surprising that this form of sworn language also
includes the characteristically ecclesiastical meaning of “a solemn engagement to devote
oneself to a religious life of a definite nature.”93 This form of vowing is typically used by the
individual seeking entrance into monastic orders or the religiously sanctioned expression of
commitment made during the marriage ceremony, and it further serves to integrate personal
conviction, religious belief, and the sacred nature of ritual into a dependence on veracity. In
addition, the vow regularly replaces the physical surety present in a pledge with an exchange
based on spiritual commitment. Making a vow, therefore, incorporates a stronger level of
earnestness and faith, thus distinguishing its specialized nature. Moreover, while surety given
as a guarantee of the pledge is obligatory, sacrificing or giving gifts for the vow implies a
personal desire to offer compensation for the trust guaranteed through this process. The vow
embodies, therefore, the most significant qualities of pledging, like exchange, but adds to them
emphasis on the spiritual aspects of swearing.
Much like the etymological origins of the “pledge,” we also face the obstacle of tracing
the word “vow” back to non-Germanic roots. Like “pledge,” the origins of the word “vow” trace
back to Old French. The Old French word vo, the etymological predecessor of our modern word,
is linked to the Latin term vōtum, a “solemn promise made to a deity.”94 Tracing vōtum back to
its Indo-European roots leads to the form wegwh-, whose meaning is “to preach, or speak
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solemnly.”95 The etymological link between the Indo-European and Latin forms is clearly
outlined, yet corresponding Germanic forms connected to this root are absent. These origins,
particularly a root verb expressing preaching, reinforce the understanding that the vow contains
an additional religious emphasis for its speaker, thus enhancing the specialized function it serves
as a distinct variety of pledge. With its etymological heritage tied to Old French and Latin
sources, the earliest attestations of the word “vow” come not from the Anglo-Saxons, but rather
from Middle English sources dated to the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The late
emergence of “vow” as a word for swearing indicates that the Old English term wedd, despite
the incursion of Old French vocabulary, continued in circulation in some forms until well after
the Norman Conquest.96
Wedd, the Old English word most closely corresponding to the aspects of swearing that
characterize our modern conception of the word “vow,” is principally defined by Joseph
Bosworth and Thomas Northcote Toller as “a pledge, or what is given as security.”97 This sense
of the word corresponds closely with the preceding discussion of wǽr as the pledge, and a
mutual component of exchange suggests that little visible difference exists between these two
words in their initial meaning. Likewise, the secondary denotation cites the “pledge,
engagement, covenant, or compact,” another usage that closely resembles that of wǽr for its
use in joining together two parties through a sworn agreement.98 The Old Norse noun veð is
both etymologically and semantically akin to wedd.99 The parallel usage of the Old English and
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Old Norse words, moreover, provides us with further context to interpret the distinctive
features of the vow, in particular the vow’s connection to religious attestation. While the words
veð and wedd have their distinguishing characteristics, these terms also share some important
features, such as guarantee through exchange, linking them with the pledge. An
interconnection of meaning between vow and pledge is further supported in the Old English by
the inclusion of two Latin cognates, foedus and pactum, in the entry for wedd, elements that
further correspond to the earlier discussion of wǽr.
However, interpreting wedd and veð as a “vow” requires us both to distinguish them
from the pledge, wǽr/várar, and to acknowledge that these terms share many of the same
characteristics. Referring to wedd or veð as vow, a subcategory of the pledge, explains how
those moments of overlapping meaning can coexist. The most fundamental evidence for
reading wedd or veð as a vow instead of simply another pledge comes from their derivation
from an alternative Indo-European root not connected to wǽr or várar. Wadh-, the IndoEuropean root from which they descend, is not connected with either wer-(H)- or wēro-s, those
roots related with wǽr, despite the overlapping relationship of each with the concept of
veracity.100 Wadh-‘s meaning of “pledge” is further refined in the proto-Germanic form
*waðjan, which conveys the sense of a “pledge, surety, or bail,” reinforcing the connection
between wedd and veð, and the similar terminology of exchange found in the pledge.101
Wedd is frequently used, as attested by the exemplum listed by Bosworth and Toller and
a search of the Dictionary of Old English Web Corpus, in the translation of agreements sworn
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within many religious texts.102 The deep spiritual nature of the vow is reflected, therefore, in
the use of wedd by Anglo-Saxon translators to represent moments of significant spiritual
covenants between humanity and the divine. Wedd appears, for example, in the Anglo-Saxon
version of Genesis 6:17 to render the Latin passage ego statuam pactum meum vobiscum, ‘and I
will make my covenant with you,’ into Old English. This verse, recounting God’s vow to spare
humanity if Noah reciprocates by following God’s commands in building the ark, is particularly
significant because it testifies to the first biblical instance when God and humanity enter into
mutual agreement guaranteed by sworn language. Despite both wǽr and wedd being listed as
synonyms for pactum, it is clear that the translator’s decision to use wedd to portray such a
critical religious moment indicates the stronger spiritual application found in wedd. Although it
is not used exclusively as a biblical term in Old English, the inclusion of wedd as the principle
biblical instance of swearing reveals that it is the prevailing choice for spiritual expressions of
veracity.
An analysis of the Old Norse veð and the context for its use reveal how medieval
Icelanders employed this specific subcategory of sworn language. The definition of veð provided
by Cleasby and Vigfusson outlines only a skeletal meaning of the word as “a pledge, or surety,”
without including any alternative senses which might further amplify understanding of its use.103
Unlike wedd, veð is a cognate of the Latin noun vas, which has the meaning of “bail, security, or
surety,” and provides a physical certification of an individual’s honesty. Yet, vas also conveys
the sense of a “hostage,” the individual whose very body is given in the exchange to guarantee
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the integrity of an agreement.104 The words are linked to the process of bargaining, therefore,
and they add to the physical component for both senses of vas. Additionally, the deeply punitive
nature of such transactions if the speaker fails to uphold the terms of the agreement informs
our understanding of veð. Like the focus on exchange that drives várar, veð places an
equivalent emphasis on what is exchanged with the vow as the means to ensure true speech.
Discussion of veð focuses primarily on the exchange of property, money, or honor as the
means of enforcement to guarantee truth, yet looking further into the context for employing
this specialized form provides information about what makes this a unique form of sworn
language beyond simply a threat of punitive confiscation. Although it does not include an overt
emphasis on the religious side of swearing, as found in the corresponding word wedd in Old
English, veð does convey added respect for the solemn nature of veracity that is a distinct
characteristic of the vow. This seriousness is manifest through the specific context of two
compound nouns, veðmáli and veðfesta, which also share the same basic definition as veð. Each
of the respective components in these compounds, máli and festa, further indicate how veð was
employed in formal settings. The first of these nouns, máli, is defined not only as “a contract,
terms, or an agreement,” but also within a legal milieu as “a title, or claim” often associated
with land or property.105 The claim of an individual requires a sincere attestation following
procedures sanctioned by the justice system, and thus the vow clearly corresponds to such an
obligation of truth expressed by the compound veðmáli. While it is not the only example of
swearing recognized by the Icelandic courts, the vow conveys an increased level of respect for
the procedure involved in certifying the truth. In a similar manner, the noun festa refers
specifically to the “bail, or pledge” that ties the individual to his or her statement. Given that
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this component of the compound is also tied to an associated verb form meaning “to fasten
with a cord,” such a compound indicates how the Old Norse word for vow joins together the
exchange of surety with honesty.106 The context for the vow provided by the verb festa extends
beyond the importance of exchange and into the role of faith and personal conviction for
ensuring honesty, found especially within the verb’s secondary sense, “to fix one’s faith on, or to
believe in” something.107 Although the belief discussed in this definition transcends specific
religious application, it is based on a similar pattern of placing the individual’s sworn statement
entirely within the strength of his or her conviction. The real potential of the word veðfesta to
ensure truth, therefore, is derived not from enforcement of exchange alone: the power of the
speaker’s convictions serves as the real motivation to regulate truth within this form of
swearing.
Alternatively the compound veðfé stands out as worth noting because initial
assumptions about its meaning, that veð + fé = pledge + money, suggest that it simply denotes
the collateral used to ensure swearing. While a superficial literal translation of this compound
might suggest a connection with both “surety” and the “vow,” veðfé instead denotes a “bet, or
wager.”108 Offering surety and betting both depend on similar systems of enforcement, yet the
financial damage resulting from a bad wager does not depend on a speaker’s truthfulness or
behavior. Instead of agreements corresponding to an individual’s conduct, the monetary
exchange is the consequence of an externalized outcome ventured as part of the wager’s
agreement. However, despite the different venue of the exchange, the stakes offered in
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gambling rely on similar principles to those guiding exchange under the vow. Both the wager
and the vow compel an individual to honor the conditions of his or her spoken agreement, and
the penalty for breaking the wager, much like the violation of the vow, results in a loss of honor.
The financial loss suffered by an individual betting closely resembles the pecuniary punishment
applied to those who must forfeit their surety to a party when vows are broken. Thus, the
subcategory of the vow provides the means for a better understanding of the subtle variations
separating the medieval Icelandic usage of veð from its counterpart in várar.
The Truth
The most rudimentary level of trusted language is the declaration that a speaker is
articulating the “truth.” This form of sworn language is the most abstract of our three
categories because, unlike a pledge or an oath, the speaker relies primarily on the
uncorroborated comissive speech act itself rather than an invocation to a higher, often divine,
authority for enforcement. The perlocutionary function of the speech act is to affect the
audience, and speaking the “truth” relies on the recipient of the speech act believing implicitly,
without the speaker offering any substantial reason. What complicates the idea of the recipient
believing implicitly is that the primary definition of truth - “the quality of being true” – allows for
different understandings of the meaning of “truth.” Within that sense of the word there are two
further meanings: “the character of being true to a person” and “one’s faith or loyalty as
pledged in a promise or agreement.”109 Additionally, our modern conceptualization of truth
denotes the supplemental understanding of both “conformity with what is true,” and “a true
statement or fact.”110 Yet these additional definitions of the word fall outside of the dynamics of
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personal relationships, and they are attributed to subsequent developments in the meaning of
the word. The earliest attestations for these latter senses, according to the OED, date to the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, while the former meanings, which position truth as an
interpersonal bond, are originally found in written sources from as early as the ninth and tenth
centuries. Although many of the ethical, intellectual, and even theological aspects of the word
“truth” are not yet fully developed for use by Old English speakers, it is clear that this word and
the concept it represents is essential to the early medieval vocabulary of swearing.111
Appreciation of this expanding role of “truth” for Middle English and beyond is aided by a
careful examination of its origins from Germanic roots.
The Old English word with the strongest correlation with our modern concept of “truth”
is the noun tréow. Bosworth and Toller define tréow as “truth to a promise or engagement”
with an appended additional meaning of “faith, as in keeping the faith with a person.” 112 Tréow
also contains a stronger religious sense in the meaning of “faith in something, or belief,” which
links it with a spiritual “trust, or confidence.” Faith and truth are connected in a fundamental
way since neither relies on external enforcement, yet both are measured by the internal
conviction of the individual. Likewise, they both are built upon a sense of infallibility, and neither
faith nor truth can exist without an absolute belief by the individual who holds them. The
magnitude of tréow, however, is not contained within a singular definition and Bosworth and
Toller provide further nuances of meanings for this important Old English noun. Two of these
additional senses of tréow include “truth of the strong individual to a weaker, grace, or favor,”
and “truth to a person, or fidelity,” which provide further indications for how this category of
sworn language was shaped by relationships among the Anglo-Saxons.
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Fidelity can only originate from within the speaker and requires outward signification in
order to demonstrate the internal certainty. The power and status of the one receiving
assurance of loyalty are expected to be equal to or higher than the speaker offering his word of
honor as security for fidelity. This usage of tréow has clear implications for communal and social
relationships because truth only functions properly when an individual uses it to connect with
others. The strength of personal belief, moreover, allows an individual to convey this
trustworthiness to an audience through the act of making a sworn statement about this
conviction. Grace, on the other hand, may not be confirmed by the one asking for it; and
likewise grace cannot originate from within, but must come from an external source. While
loyalty typically unites people of equal rank or connects persons of a lower social rank with a
higher, grace usually operates along the opposite spectrum of social relationships. Grace is used
to bind one individual with more power to another who is seeking assistance, and those who ask
for grace typically do not have their own power. Tréow communicates this wide range of
meanings for speakers of Old English, yet no matter which social relationships are involved, all
are equally dependent on the correspondence between the speaker and the sincerity of his
speech. Defining tréow as the “truth” allows it to represent the potential of one’s word within
any context, expanding the force of meaning when it directly corresponds to the act of making
promissory speech. While this Old English word covers a broad range of usage, from secular to
religious truth, the fundamental basis for every function of tréow is rooted in its guarantee of
“truth” as the most basic category of sworn language.
The link bridging “truth” as either a personal conviction or a public proclamation of
veracity is further enforced by looking at tréow’s Indo-European root form *deru-. 113 The
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primary meaning of *deru- is listed as “solid, steadfast; hence specialized sense of ‘wood,’ ‘tree,’
and objects made of wood.”114 Not surprisingly, Bosworth and Toller include a separate Old
English noun tréow, meaning “a tree,” or a “beam, log, stake, staff, or cudgel,” directly
preceding the entry for the one denoting “truth.”115 While the connection to the natural world
might initially appear confusing, there is an instructive relationship between the relative
durability of timber and the permanence and inflexibility which should characterize the truth.116
There is, however, more than one term associated with *deru-, and a second noun, truwá, also
has its origin in this same Indo-European root. As an alternative Old English form for “truth,”
truwá is related to tréow through a shared initial phoneme as well as a similar meaning of
“faith” as it is related to an individual’s credibility. 117 Bosworth and Toller list further senses of
truwá as “belief, confidence, and trust,” which further establish this word as a synonymous form
within the same category of sworn language. Indeed, the final sense listed for truwá expresses
“a solemn assurance of good faith,” which directly applies these earlier principles of honesty to
the act of speaking. Another word that shares the meaning of “truth” essential for this survey is
the noun tréowþ, whose orthographic connection to tréow is unmistakably visible. Much like
the two earlier terms, tréowþ also conveys the meaning “truth and good faith.” Yet tréowþ also
possesses a secondary sense conveying the specialized meaning of “a covenant or an assurance
of good faith.”118 These words are all indicative of the process of investing confidence in sworn
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language, a feature so central to the Anglo-Saxon perception of swearing that an individual’s
assurance of sincere speech is equated with his social customs and religious convictions.
For representations of “truth” in Old Norse, the parallels to Anglo-Saxon equivalent
words are also comfortably apparent. The noun form trúa, which closely resembles the Old
English truwá, is initially defined by Cleasby and Vigfusson as an individual’s “trust” or
“belief.”119 The phrase “as an oath” included after this first sense of the word, is an indication of
the close association of this noun with the other forms of sworn language. This clarifying sense
does not imply that Icelanders would automatically approach the word trúa with the same
regard as an oath, but that the word is meant to convey the same respect for the power of
language to authenticate veracity. Such an understanding of the word is illuminated by the
association of two colloquial expressions also connected with the process of swearing: þat veit
trúa mín, “upon my word,” and svá njóta ek trú minnar, “by my troth.”120 Although this
phraseology may sound overly casual by modern standards, both axioms undeniably employ the
word truá in order to communicate the legitimization of speech to those who are accepting the
individual’s statements. The serious nature of truá is further supported by the additional
meaning of “faith, belief, in a theological sense” included by Cleasby and Vigfussion as the
second entry for the word. This shared mixture of trust and faith found in the Old English and
the Old Norse word is indicative of a common linguistic ancestry with the Indo-European root
*deru-.121 The Altnordisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch also supports this shared etymological
heritage while observing a common link in religious usage between the Old English and the Old
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Norse forms.122 For both “trust” and “faith,” the initial sense is followed by the clarifying
understanding of belief and a personal confidence of trust in something. This supplementary
context for the Old Norse word suggests that it is not enough to understand truá as the position
of veracity alone, since it must also stand in place for the conviction of the individual. The
complex meanings associated with the word truá require careful scrutiny of its usage within the
Old Norse corpus in order to separate out statements about faith from those about veracity.
This distinction is most pertinent when truá functions substantively in a purely religious sense
specifically to represent Christianity, as in the phrase taka við trú “to receive the Christian faith.”
While this sense of trust offers an interesting perspective of Christian spiritual authority,
particularly for post-conversion Iceland, it does not inform our understanding of the legal sense
of truá in the context of sworn language. Despite the need for cautious investigation, however,
appreciating how this sense of truth is inexorably linked to personal conviction as much as to
language makes this contextually specific term especially appealing for what it can reveal about
sworn language.
Much like their Anglo-Saxon neighbors, Icelanders also had more than one term
available for expressing the idea of truth. In addition to truá, the Old Norse noun tryggð also
shares a connection with “truth.”123 Tryggð also has as its principle meaning “faith,” and this
definition is clarified by “good faith, or trustiness.”124 Just as with truá, this word shares a
personal conviction supporting the individual’s language bordering on devout belief. Unlike the
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religious connotations associated with truá, however, those clarifying senses appended to
tryggð by Cleasby and Vigfusson have a more mundane application in friendship. This meaning
of friendship is suggestive of the communal, social relationship of “truth,” and further linked by
the legal applications dependent on the support of others to verify certainty of speech. The
subsequent senses defining tryggð enhance our understanding of how the use of “truth” can
forge the essential bonds between individuals, especially as a legal expression of “plighted faith,
or truce” connecting members of society.125 Within a legal context, particularly as a method of
ending conflict, “truth” requires the participation of second parties to offer external validation
of what is declared. Only when sworn statements are accepted as true by both sides will a truce
function successfully; likewise, an individual can only offer his or her loyalty to another if the
latter party is willing to accept that declaration. Tryggð falls into line with the perception of
“truth” expressed above by truá, but it also emphasizes the function of sworn language as a
social construct, one that is contingent on both the speaker’s belief in what is said and the
probability that it will be believed by others.
“Sooth”
The lexicon of sworn language is quite extensive and, just as with the vocabulary
describing any other abstract concept, more than one synonym can function interchangeably as
an alternative way to convey the same ideas. It is, therefore, not surprising that additional
expressions exist that do not come from mutual etymological roots, but whose applications do
fall within the parameters of the same classification of “truth” as it applies to sworn language.
Unlike the previous grouping of terms based on the Indo-European *deru-, with three Old
English and two Old Norse words, another ancillary term exists that traces its linguistic descent
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from different origins. The Old English noun sóþ also carries the principal meaning of “truth, in a
general sense.”126 The inclusion of the qualifying phrase “in a general sense” by Bosworth and
Toller suggests that this form of truth is more idealistic and less clearly defined in its usage than
any of the previously discussed terminology. The classification of sóþ as a theoretical or
philosophical embodiment of “truth” is further supported by the supplemental entry of
“conformity with an absolute standard” following its initial meaning. The unqualified agreement
suggested by this definition is a very idealistic position, one that is especially rare in a world
where misinterpretation, uncertainty of meaning, and especially deception tend to blur lines
between honest and fallacious speech. The inflexible nature of sóþ in response to such
challenges is enumerated by the secondary sense of the word as “truth in regard to a particular
circumstance, or exact conformity with the facts of a case.”127 As the embodiment of these
intangible qualities, sóþ also functions ideally within a legal context, particularly as it
communicates the agreement of spoken words with the actual events described. Sóþ
corresponds to this understanding of “truth” so strongly that in many instances it is also used
synonymously for a “fact,” something known with certainty to be true. Subsequent definitions
provided by Bosworth and Toller also reinforce the role of sóþ in connecting the intangibles of
speech and reality in a concrete way. But in application with sworn language specifically, sóþ is
connected to “fidelity to a promise” or the exact ability of a speaker to hold true to what he or
she has already declared. Unfortunately, such an expression can only legitimately be evaluated
after the individual has already acted and behavior already exists by which the truth of the
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promise can be assessed.128
The basis for rendering sóþ as the union of speech and reality is found in the IndoEuropean root from which the word traces its etymological origins. Lehmann’s A Gothic
Etymological Dictionary places sóþ, as well as its Old Norse counterpart sannr, under the entry
for *sunjis, the Gothic word for “truth and trust” derived from the Proto-Indo-European sṇtī.129
This Indo-European form is itself derived from the present participle of *es-, another IndoEuropean root-word whose own meaning further explains the interconnection of each of these
features. Because *es- is the verb expressing “to be,” naturally its participle form, *sont-, is
used to describe something with “being,” and hence possessing an actual physical existence.130
This means that if something is labeled as “true,” according to the meaning derived from this
etymological heritage, it must indeed be real. Since the qualification of reality is conceptually
linked to the very physical nature of a “true” statement, there is no room for prevarication.
Likewise, there can be no falsification or separation from this sense of “truth,” since losing this
characteristic would also be tantamount to losing the essence of what is described. Comparing
the origins of “truth” in sóþ with those discussed earlier in tréow, the abstract quality of the
verb “to be” stands out against the tangible nature connected to the permanence of the “tree.”
In this manner, both ends of the spectrum of reality, the physical and the metaphysical, are
represented within this single category of sworn language.
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Just as sóþ represented an alternative form used for truth by the Anglo-Saxons, the
noun sannr was used by speakers of Old Norse as a substitute for either truá or tryggð. Sannr,
which is also rendered as saðr, is connected to the same Indo-European root as sóþ and the
usage of the Icelandic word also mirrors that of its Old English counterpart.131 Cleasby and
Vigfusson open their entry for sannr by listing “justice, or equality” as the primary sense of the
noun.132 This denotation corresponds with the secondary meaning of sóþ, reaffirming the
linguistic bond between the languages. Neither “justice” nor “equality,” however, convey the
same meanings as “truth” and so this survey will not concern itself with these alternative senses
of sannr. An applicable meaning is found in the secondary denotation of “evidence, or proof”
and herein the noun has relevance as part of the first category of sworn language, “truth.” The
proof offered by this meaning comes, much like for the word sóþ, from the way the term can
qualify the actual physical reality of something. This word, therefore, can express the potential
that language will be found true, or the “truth” of a statement has already been verified. Such
power for the authentication of speech can naturally function productively within a legal
context. The potential value of sannr in offering proof is evident in the phrase eigi vitu vér sann
á því, which Cleasby and Vigfusson render as “we know not the truth thereof, or have no proof
of it.”133 As the final term within our third category of sworn language, sannr must also be
carefully scrutinized in order to target specifically those instances when it pertains to
attestation. The “truth” is a decisive element in the maintenance of sworn language, and as one
of the foundational principles upon which this language develops, without it there can be no
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confidence in the authority of speech. The careful study of the Old English vocabulary,
specifically tréow, truwá, tréowþ, and sóþ, along with the Old Norse terminology, trúa, tryggð,
sannr, and saðr, provides the means to assess the utility and effectiveness of sworn language.
Consideration of a speaker’s attempts to validate his or her language as “truth” may constitute
only the most rudimentary level of swearing, yet this most fundamental degree of veracity also
provides the foundation for the comparison of all other varieties of attestation.
Later Developments
No etymological analysis of the lexicon of sworn language would be considered
complete without additional discussion of how these words are transformed through later
usage. Tracing the way that the contemporary expressions for truth are shaped by the medieval
lexicon requires exploration of the changing nature of language, particularly as a result of
invasion and the ensuing linguistic interchange. Historically England was frequently assaulted by
outside forces, most notably the decades of Viking raids, the rise of a Danish kingship under
Cnut, and the eleventh-century Norman Conquest. As a consequence of these incursions, the
language of the English continuously adapts to accommodate the new groups assimilating into
the native population.134 Conversely, medieval Iceland did not suffer from similar incursions,
and Heather O’Donoghue notes that, “…modern Icelandic has changed very little from its
medieval form, while English has changed a great deal.”135 Indeed, the modern Icelandic nouns
like trú and sannur, both of which retain the sense of “truth” found in their medieval roots, still
bear a clear visual resemblance to their medieval antecedents. Middle English, however, saw
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the simplification of the language conventions of Old English and an influx of additional Norman
vocabulary, resulting in gradual changes to the vocabulary of truthfulness.136
The Middle English ōth, which was rendered through a variety of spelling variations,
reflects very little shift in meaning or in its apparent frequency of use. The Middle English
Dictionary primarily defines ōth as “a solemn invocation of God, sacred relics, or one’s troth to
witness the truth of a statement or one’s intent to carry out a promise or agreement.”
Attestation to this usage dates from around the beginning of the thirteenth century. The legal
application of the ōth is enumerated in the secondary definition of “legal proof of someone’s
innocence or motive,” as well as “the truth of one’s statement in a legal or governmental
proceeding.”137 Evidence of the continued usage of this word is found in The Peterborough
Chronicle, whose historical account began in Anglo-Saxon times and continued into the Norman
occupation of England, thus making the oath the best preserved of all forms of swearing
discussed in this study.
Although it seems that only minor differences separate the “pledge” from its related
concept of the “vow,” examining the evolution of terms associated with these two categories
further expands the features that distinguish one expression from another. Looking at the
etymological successors of these words in both Middle English and modern Icelandic not only
reveals those eventual shifts in meaning, but also indicates the frequency of their successive
usage. An examination of their regularity of use and the transformation of their meanings
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suggests that at some point, while the Anglo-Saxon expressions for “pledge” and “vow” ceased
to function in their original capacity as indicators of sworn language, the Old Norse forms
entered modern usage unaltered.
Turning first to the modern Icelandic expressions corresponding to veð and várar, it is
possible to see larger developments for these words than for those discussed in the previous
category of sworn language. Since the medieval Icelandic lexicon remains relatively unchanged,
it is not surprising that veð continues to express the “security, or collateral” intended to secure
an agreement.138 Yet absent from the modern noun is the denotation signifying the vow itself
rather than the physical exchanges that guarantee it. A shift in meaning, therefore, moves the
modern word veð away from the expression of swearing and toward the “mortgage” or the
“pawned” collateral that ensures the intangible truth of the vow. As nuanced as the shift in
usage for veð appears for present-day Icelandic, várar experiences an even stronger change
between the medieval and modern world. An expression already marked by limited use and an
etymological past linked to pre-Christian deities, várar is conspicuously absent from the
vocabulary of modern Iceland. Religious conversion undoubtedly hastened a shift away from
this obsolete term and resulted in the rise of alternative forms for swearing. The outcome of
this analysis indicates that neither the “pledge” nor the “vow,” as they appeared in medieval
times, survive in modern Icelandic parlance.
Looking at the Anglo-Saxon expressions for “pledge” and “vow” reveals shifts in usage
and denotation commensurate to those experienced in the Icelandic vocabulary. For example,
wǽr undergoes a significant divergence in meaning from its original Old English. By the
fourteenth century, the Middle English noun wēre, although etymologically aligned with wǽr,
exhibits only a minor connection to the denotation of its Anglo-Saxon predecessor. Rather than
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functioning as an expression of truth regulated by sworn language and guaranteed by the
exchange of surety, wēre instead signifies an individual who acts as a “guardian, or protector.”139
The dissociation between the Middle English and Old English words, however, is not as far
removed as the difference between the meanings of “pledge” and “guardian” might initially
suggest. Indeed, credibility is an essential feature for swearing to function properly, and it is
also necessary for delegating an individual’s protection to another. Reflection on the IndoEuropean root of wǽr further illuminates the relationship between trustworthiness and
security, and several cognates associated with the Germanic form werjan communicate
meanings of “kindness,””friendliness,” and “faithfulness” that bind together the earlier and later
senses of this word.140 Much like the shift of the Icelandic veð from expression of truth to
physical manifestation of surety, the transformation from wǽr to wēre occurs when a different
sense of the word receives an increased emphasis by later usage.
Yet another major transformation is the significant decline in frequency between the
Old English and the Middle English words. While wǽr appears in a number of Anglo-Saxon texts
from biblical translations to homiletic writings, wēre is attested by The MED in only one Middle
English version of Genesis. Just as with the disappearance of várar from modern Icelandic, a
similarly sharp decline in wēre indicates the rise of an alternative expression to take the place of
wǽr as “pledge.” Wedd, much like its Old Norse counterpart veð, corresponds to a Middle
English cognate whose orthography appears overtly unchanged despite a minor shift in the
principal denotation of the word. The Middle English wed no longer functions initially as the
vow, but rather as the expression of “something temporarily held by or deposited with a
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creditor in order to ensure payment of a debt or fulfillment of an obligation; a security.”141 Just
as veð begins increasingly to center its usage on the physical rather than the verbal guarantee of
truthfulness, so too does wed increasingly function as the surety exchanged between parties
rather than a vow.
The shift in the Middle English wed does not mark a complete abandonment of sworn
language for this word. Indeed, the secondary sense of the Middle English denotes “an
undertaking to pay, a pledge, or a contract” to honor the debt incurred.142 Yet the “pledge”
expressed in this sense does not extend beyond the physical exchange, and the words certify
truth only in so far as to guarantee that a monetary transaction will occur in the future. While
increasingly defined by surety and exchange, the Middle English usage of wed is not entirely
devoid of meaning relating the sanctity of verbal agreements and acts of expressing true
intentions. Among the additional meanings conveyed by wed is the sense of “something
presented or pledged as a token and guarantee of a promise, specifically a token and guarantee
of a promise to marry.”143 From this usage can be traced our modern conception of the
wedding ceremony, and the vows exchanged during that ceremony embody this spirit of
swearing. Yet even in expressions of the wedding, this vow is not without the exchange of rings,
objects designed to represent the physical manifestation of the words expressed during the
vow. Additionally, wed has the meaning of “something hazarded or put at risk of forfeit through
the contingency of events, or the fortunes of war,” a meaning that corresponds to the act of
gambling expressed in the Old Norse compound of veðfé.144 While various expressions and
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denotations are appended to wed during the later medieval period, these senses still remain
closely aligned with the Anglo-Saxon function of the word as an expression of truthful speech.
Indeed, a majority of these Middle English denotations are founded upon expectations
of veracity to govern the exchange. The continued dependence of wed on honesty, coupled
with its increased emphasis on physical manifestations of this expression, accounts for its
continued usage throughout the medieval period. Unlike the waning appearance of wēre within
the vocabulary of Middle English, textual evidence supporting continued use of wed ranges from
the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries.145 Wedd serves, therefore, as a critically important Old
English noun whose place in the vocabulary of truth continues to resonate throughout the years
after its focus has shifted away from the intangibility of speech toward a materialistic accent on
collateral. The evidence of such a profound alteration to the function of wedd is best expressed
through the lack of a modern English expression that is the equivalent of the original AngloSaxon meaning. Looking at the closest noun related to the Old English word, the “wedding,”
one finds a ceremony with the purpose of gathering witnesses to ensure truthful and legitimate
expressions of commitment. Even within modern parlance, though, this ceremony still refers to
the act of exchanging statements labeled “wedding vows.”146 Thus, the vestiges of the Icelandic
and Anglo-Saxon “pledge” and “vow” continue to survive in modern usage, but only as shadows
of their former selves.
Although the Middle English words for “truth” did experience some minor
transformations during the subsequent rule of the Norman kings, these terms remain largely

145

Ibid., s.v. wed.

146

The Old English noun weddung, linked etymologically with wedd, conveys the meaning of “betrothal”
rather than the exchange of vows during the actual marriage ceremony itself. The Middle English noun
wedding is defined as the “the act of marrying,” suggesting that at some point the definition shifts away
from promises exchanged before marriage to promises exchanged in the act of marrying.

68

correspondent with their Anglo-Saxon forms. Tréow, for example, continues unaltered in its
primary meaning and only minor changes in orthography result in the Middle English word
treue. While the noun treue continues to function primarily as an expression of pledged faith
and belief, it also develops additional usage as “a deferral, or delay” and “an end to affliction, or
respite.”147 The Old English word provides the origin of our modern expression of a “true”
statement, yet is also the foundation for “truce” as the suspension or elimination of hostility.
For tréowþ, the transition from Old English is once more visible in the orthographic changes that
result in the Middle English treuth. Although the Middle English word retains those meanings
formerly employed by Anglo-Saxon speakers, to those are added the further meanings of
“honor, or integrity” and “virtue, or rectitude of character.”148 Some conflation must have also
occurred during the Norman Conquest, and the subsequent influx of French terminology results
in the assimilation of additional qualities into the meaning of tréowþ. The MED includes an
additional entry for treuth with the denotation of “things as they are, or reality,” a quality
formerly retained in Old English specifically for the word sóþ. Initially this conflation might
suggest that treuth comes to function as a substitute for a term no longer available to Middle
English speakers, yet sōth continues to be an integral Middle English word that retains its earlier
Anglo-Saxon denotations. Indeed, unlike the other words for “truth” that continue to accrue
additional meaning throughout their continued usage, sōth does not pick up any further
signification during its subsequent use.149 Although the word “sooth” eventually becomes an
archaic expression for modern English speakers, its employment in Middle English texts
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demonstrates its continued value as a marker of sworn language. The survival of all these Old
English entries further testifies to their profound importance for the medieval world. Despite all
of the changes brought about by the Norman invasion, the influx of a competing French
vocabulary, and even the passage of time, the successors of each word persist within the English
lexicon, so that they ultimately retain the same nuances of meaning preserved in their Old
English antecedents.

CONCLUSIONS
Undoubtedly, a significant number of words associated with swearing are present within
Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic texts. The three major categories of oath, pledge, and truth
outlined in this study signify the important place that sworn language has in both Anglo-Saxon
and Icelandic culture. This diverse body of terminology, appearing throughout the legal rituals
and literary narratives of England and Iceland, must not be considered uniformly synonymous or
subject to an unrestricted exchange between the various categories of swearing. Instead, each
grouping must be understood for its own nuanced sense of the representation of veracity and
the individualized legal functions that manifest themselves into distinct literary patterns. Only
by examining each of these three expressions for their own distinctive features can we hope to
understand the subtle variations that distinguish each form of sworn language from the next.
These distinct categories of sworn language approach the bond between words and deeds from
different conventions and varying levels of potency. Understanding the connections and
etymological foundations of these words allows us to distinguish between their regulation of
acceptable social behavior and punishment for those who attempt to manipulate truthfulness.
The “truth,” as well as the related word “sooth,” relies primarily on an individual’s belief
in the abstract nature of words corresponding with the “reality” constructed around swearing.
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And while the statement that something is “true” does not rely on the same traditions as the
oath for its creation, it does draw on a similar desire for language to necessitate or regulate
behavior. Pledges, as well as the subcategory of vows, make use of a system of exchange
typified by the transfer of monetary surety designed to enforce truth through confiscation. The
oath stands out as the most formal and ritualized expression of honesty. Oaths are made on
symbolically significant religious objects and often include witnesses who broaden the social
responsibility for their enforcement. The intensive study of the language chosen from the
judicial and literary texts of Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England reveals that, not only does the
oath vary from the pledge, the vow, and the general statement of “truth,” but a clear hierarchy
of veracity and formality exist. This hierarchy allows modern readers to better understand the
significance that these terms have in the writings of Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England and
appreciate the semantic choices made by the authors.
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CHAPTER 3
SAFEGUARDING SWEARING WITHIN THE LAW
Legal Prohibition and the Protection of Sworn Language
Æt ærestan we lærað, þæt mæst ðearf ís, þæt æghwelc mon his að ond his wed wærlice
healde.150
We decree first, that the need is the greatest, that every man should hold carefully to his oath
and his pledge.
Position is frequently a correlative function of prominence. If this axiom remains true,
then the decision of King Alfred and his West Saxon advisors to begin their efforts to collect and
reform English law with an edict demanding accuracy in swearing is a deliberate indication of its
salience for the legal process. Although this Alfredian law is by no means the earliest or only
legislation to address potential abuses of honesty, it does give a refreshing and straightforward
glimpse into the mentality behind the regulation of sworn language. As the prologue to Alfred’s
legal corpus explains: Ac þa ðe ic gemette aþær oððe on Ines dæge mines mæges, oððe on Offan
Myrcna cyninges oþþe on Æþelberhtes, þe ærest fulluhte onfeng on Angelcynne, ða ðe me rihtest
þuhton, ic ða heron gegaderode, ond ða oþre forlett,151 ‘And those [laws] which I found either in
the day of Ine, my kinsman, or in [the day] of Offa, king of Mercia, or in the day of Æthelberht,
who first received baptism among the English, I compiled those which seemed the most
appropriate to me herein, and I left out the rest.’ Given that the regulation upholding swearing
is not explicitly attributed by the text to any other Anglo-Saxon ruler, it is safe to assume that
this law is crafted specifically for Wessex to resolve situations not fully addressed by any earlier
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edicts. Accordingly, the context of Alfred’s legislative reform program and the deliberate
arrangement of this specific law at the start of his legal compilations confirm the meaningful and
elaborate nature of swearing as a foundation of early Anglo-Saxon law.
Additionally, the Anglo-Saxon effort to codify swearing has many features in common
with similar foundations in the openings of various Icelandic legal texts. Much like the legal
reforms of Wessex, the culmination of another royal effort for legislative assemblage and
renovation is the thirteenth-century laws of Jónsbók, which also begins by emphasizing the
importance of swearing.152 The introduction to this new code includes a concise explanation by
King Magnús, the Norwegian ruler of Iceland, explaining the methodology behind revising his
collection of laws. The prefatory letter states:
Þingfarar balkr er nu sem fyrr at onnduerðu ritaðr. fyrr en hefui sialfa bokina. þuiat aðr
hæir at skipat se þingit. ok nefndir se skoðaðar logrettu men kosnir. eiðar fluttir. grid
sett. ok sidsemdum lyst at þui betr werði bokinne hlytt sidan ok domum sem þingit er
betr sidat ok stillt, ‘The chapter on traveling to the assembly is now as before written at
the beginning before the book itself begins because it is fitting first that the assembly be
set, the nominations reviewed, the members of the Law Council chosen, oaths taken, a
truce established, and the rules of the assembly proclaimed, because the better
behaved and orderly the assembly is, the better respect paid thereafter to the book and
the judgments reached.’153
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In addition to the specific mention of taking oaths, every activity mentioned in this preamble,
from the nomination of assembly judges to the acceptance of the court’s legal judgments,
involves the exchange of sworn language as the guarantee for legitimized legal conduct. Like
Alfred before him, Magnús acknowledges a desire for the orderly arrangement of materials as
the driving force behind his consequential legislative reform. The adjustments made by these
shrewd West Saxon and Norwegian kings anticipate that the law, especially when it is connected
with valid assurances of honesty, possesses the potential to guide the community away from
instability.
The intentional positioning of oath-taking at the forefront of both the Anglo-Saxon and
Icelandic legal texts raises important questions about these two Germanic cultures. Why, for
example, would such commonly understood concepts about truth need to be explicitly defined
for groups who already enjoyed their customary usage for centuries prior?154 Given that Alfred
and Magnús are both building upon the precedent of earlier legal traditions, their efforts to
solidify behavior left ill-defined by prior legislation must represent a response to some
significant changes within their respective societies. Safeguarding swearing becomes a priority
for both kings, and they ultimately respond with similar methods of codifying honesty in more
structured ways. The existence of realistic internal or external threats to the smooth function of
justice, specifically those discernible as endangering swearing, must have provided the impetus
to address concerns about this critical legal institution. In addition to exploring these significant
moments of legal evolution, it is also pertinent for us to ask not only how these noteworthy laws
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are shaped by earlier legislative contexts of English and Icelandic swearing but also how the laws
themselves affect the application of swearing within the emendations that follow them.
Answering these questions allows for the exploration of how ritualized exchanges of “truth”
developed as the most crucial judicial foundation for early medieval England and Iceland.
In so far as it is possible, tracing the potential motivations for the laws regarding
swearing illuminates the importance of these exchanges. Likewise, deeper knowledge of
background information, as well as the historical illustrations of how oath-taking is occasionally
abused, quantifies the fear that insincere individuals may exploit these practices, thereby
undermining the judicial system. The probable impetus, for example, behind Alfred’s law
binding an individual to the “oath and pledge” stems from the longstanding conflict between
the English people and their ninth-century Danish opponents, often recorded as manipulating
situations to their political or military advantage. Frequently Alfred’s negotiated peace treaties
with these invaders are complicated by their blatant disregard for the inviolability of swearing.
The Winchester Chronicle includes one clear example of this duplicity in the record for the year
893. The chronicler writes, On þys geare, þæt wæs ymb twelf monað þæs þe hie on þæm
eastrice geweorc geworht hæfdon, Norþhymbre and Eastengle hæfdon Ælfred cyninge aþas
geseald and Eastengle foregisla VI and þeh, ofer þa treowa, swa oft swa þa oþre hergas mide
ealle herige ut foron, þonne foron hie, oþþe mid oþþe on heora healfe an,155 ‘In this year, which
was twelve months after they had made the fortification in the East Kingdom, Northumbrians
and East Anglians gave oaths to King Alfred and the East Anglians gave six hostages; but
nevertheless, against that truth, just as often as the other armies went out in full force, then
they marched either with them or on their side.’ With adversaries so willing to abandon the
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sincerity of their agreements, the previous laws of the English must appear to Alfred
inadequately equipped as a force to counteract the flagrant violation of sworn statements. By
adapting legislation to address new threats of dishonesty, particularly when an enemy so
perceptibly undermines trust, the West Saxon king and his councilors can tailor the rule of law
to meet the immediate concerns of their situation.
Mistrust of prior political agreements also illuminates how King Magnús and the
Icelanders shape their own legislation in response to the potential for erosions in social stability.
Reluctance by some Icelanders to accept Norwegian dominance frequently complicates the
royal administration of the island, as Norway’s foreign political pressure is occasionally met with
local resistance.156 The issuance of Jónsbók as a replacement for the previous code, Járnsiða,
constitutes an attempt to ameliorate Icelandic objections and to evoke a respect for the king’s
ability to bring order to the political system of Iceland.157 Stressing the primacy of those laws
involving oath-taking, especially in the context of assembly procedures, is a deliberate move by
Magnús to evoke the terms of the Gamli Sáttmáli, the “old covenant” forged between Iceland
and Norway in 1262 – 1264 during a series of local assemblies, resulting in the submission of
Iceland’s commonwealth government to Norwegian royal control.158 While this union assures
the continuance of many traditional Icelandic practices, it also contains the mutual agreement
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whereby Icelanders pledge their cooperation with Norwegian rule. Skulu vier og vorir arfar
hallda med ydur allan trunad medan þeir og ydrir arfar hallda vid oss þessa Sattar gjord. En
lausar ef hun ryfst at beztu man[n]a yfir syn,159 ‘We and all our successors shall hold faith with
you, as long as they and your successors hold this covenant with us. But it is dissolved if it fails
the inspection of the chief men.’ Magnús, therefore, deliberately opens Jónsbók by honoring
the heart of this agreement, assuring Icelanders that nu sem fyrr, ‘now as before,’ procedures of
the assembly and court systems of Iceland will continue. As such, the king honors the conditions
of the covenant and presents the need for adherence to one’s sworn duty in the introduction to
his own code.
As much as the positioning of swearing in Jónsbók deliberately evokes the Gamli
Sáttmáli, it also makes a clear appeal, like Alfred, to a tumultuous historical situation caused by
flagrant refusal to maintain the bonds of truth. In the period prior to Iceland’s union with
Norway, a time known as the Sturlungaöld, or ‘Sturlung Age,’ the rivalries between the powerful
goðar, the ‘chieftans,’ are described as a serious disruption to the equitable administration of
justice.160 Because of the lack of any centralized executive branch of government in the early
Icelandic commonwealth, enforcement of lawful verdicts is largely dependent on the consensus
of the community.161 The competition between powerful leaders, trying to place their own
advancement above the needs of their districts, results in a heightened sense of lawlessness for
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this period. Íslendinga Saga describes a quarrel between Snorri Sturluson and Magnús
Guðmundarson that results in Snorri’s opponent being unlawfully summoned and punished.
This scenario is made more disturbing by the fact that Snorri himself serves in the office of
lögsögumaðr, or ‘lawspeaker,’ during this case.162 If the very official responsible for the
“correct” application of law manipulates it for his personal gains, then other individuals seeking
power are more likely to act partially in their own legal cases. The resultant judicial anarchy
perpetuates conflict among the most formidable families in Iceland, whose struggles for control
drive individuals seeking justice to ally themselves with those families. Justice becomes even
more a matter of personal connections than a dependence on the structure of the law or merits
of a case. As a result, King Magnús deliberately refers to the Gamli Sáttmáli to evoke this period
of unfair legal practice, specifically calling attention to those individuals sworn to uphold the law
who violated their oaths for individual gain. Thus, just as with the Anglo-Saxons, the law
becomes the means of addressing problems of dishonesty, and the placement of swearing at
the center of these royal reforms reinforces the effort to develop an organized and unbiased
legal system.
Legal Approaches to Swearing
The laws of late ninth-century Wessex and thirteenth-century Iceland, understandably,
are not alone in their efforts to maintain inviolability for expressions of honesty within judicial
matters. As a result, the reforms of Alfred and Magnús are at the heart of an extensive body of
legal regulations conveying the necessity of accurate language for legal usage.163 Tracing the
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influence of those precepts broadens our appreciation for the care taken by Anglo-Saxon and
Icelandic judicial systems in standardizing the truth. Selecting laws from such a diverse body of
material, spanning periods of significant political and social change, however, poses a serious
challenge by offering an excessively expansive perspective on such legal influences.164
Moreover, casting the figurative net too broadly for the sources of each law can easily
overwhelm this study through the effort to trace foreign influences on the Icelandic and English
systems of law. Therefore, I will look at the broader categories of swearing outlined in Chapter
Two in order to manage the individual laws within a larger context of the evolution of legal
attestation. A good way to review and to supplement these categories is to look to Hermann
Baltensberger’s 1920 dissertation, Eid, Versprechen und Treuschwur bei den Angelsachsen.
Baltensberger has carefully explored Anglo-Saxon regulations in comparison to other
contemporaneous sources, primarily the laws of the Frankish kingdoms. For example, when
speaking of the English coronation oath, he writes: “Die Verordnung, wonach sich ein freier,
landloser Mann einem Schutzherrn zu kommendieren hatte, steht schon in den Kapitularien
Karls des Dicken, also ein halbes Jahrhundert früher, ehe sie in den Gesetzen Aeþelstans
erscheint,”165 ‘The regulation commanding a landless, free individual to have selected a patron is
already in the Capitularies of Charles the Fat, which were enacted a half century before they
appear in the laws of Aethelstan.’ Similar external influences on domestic legal policy can be
found in the correspondence between Norwegian and Icelandic legal texts, whose influences
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can also be traced. Norse legislation, including the Gulaþing’s law, Frostaþing’s law, and the
New Law of the Realm (Nyere Landslov), is comprised of materials akin to those found in the
Icelandic laws of Grágás, Járnsíða, and Jónsbók. Laurence Larson, in his English translation of
the Gulaþing provisions, notes the strong resemblance between the chapters regarding peace
pledges and the corresponding chapters in Grágás.166 Likewise, Jana K. Schulman, in the
introduction to her translation of Jónsbók, explains the close relationships of influence between
the Norwegian and Icelandic laws.167 Although such links reveal wider patterns of legal
development, no direct comparison explores the similar attitudes toward swearing as they exist
between the laws of Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England. This study, therefore, aims to fill that
gap and explore the correlations between the corresponding vocabularies of swearing and
comparable legal rituals of Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England to build appreciation for how both
cultures react to situations dependent on the social roles of honesty. This linkage is important as
it addresses the long history of interaction between Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England.
Baltensberger begins his analysis of Anglo-Saxon swearing with carefully defined
categories of the separate functions of swearing. Under this schema of classification, individual
branches of attestation are recognized as separate entities based on the purposes for their
exchange. For example, the Amtseide ‘oath of office,’ is distinguished from the Friedenseide, the
‘peace oath,’ because they serve dissimilar functions. Baltensberger’s approach is beneficial for
drawing conclusions about how each type of expression is crafted to meet these specifically
defined goals. Additionally, because Anglo-Saxons and Icelanders have similar objectives for
swearing, these categories can be useful for the comparative study of each society.
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The classifications created by Baltensberger make two major divisions between Einfache
Versprechen, ‘simple promises’ involving only one speaker, and Gegenseitige Versprechen
‘mutual promises’ requiring oaths to be presented by multiple parties. What distinguishes these
categories is the means by which an oath is validated (or invalidated) through the action (or
inaction) of the audience. While those expressions in the Einfache group require only passive
acceptance of the listener, those classified as Gegenseitige are of no value without a
corresponding oath offered by the addressee. Neither a marriage ceremony nor peace treaty
can be considered valid unless equivalent oaths are expressed by both participants. Although
Baltensberger’s primary separation of sworn language offers minimal distinctions between
types, his further subdivision of this language into eight separate oath-forms offers more
relevant ideological categories useful for the purposes of this study. These groups include:
Krönungseid ‘coronation oath,’ Bestätigungseid der Witan ‘confirmation oath of the council,’
Richtereid ‘judicial oath,’ Kaufzeugeneid ‘business oath,’ Eid des Geleitmanns ‘oath of the bondman,’ Friedenseide ‘peace oath,’ Eid der Eheschließung ‘matrimonial oath,’ and Reinigungseid
‘oath of purification.’ Clear legal ramifications exist for each of these eight oath-types, making
these oath-types an ideal starting point for the purposes of our present study.168 Keeping the
focus of this category specifically on swearing as part of a formalized conclusion to violent
confrontation ensures the relevance of legal texts to this study. Likewise, Baltensberger’s
system acknowledges pledges and vows as closely related to the process of oath-making, with
the Versprechen bei der Eheschließung, ‘matrimonial pledge,’ discussed jointly with the marriage
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oath. Although this study will draw a greater distinction between oaths and pledges than
Baltensberger,169 his consideration of these individualized categories serves as the foundation
for the legal study of this chapter.
Additionally, this study expands upon Baltensberger’s research by considering the legal
codification of other forms of sworn language outlined in the hierarchy of swearing, both AngloSaxon and Icelandic, from two additional perspectives: those measures designed to promote
swearing as a legitimate practice and those designed to summarily punish attempts at
undermining the viability of such customs. While consideration of the specific audiences and
expectations behind each form of swearing is important, it is also possible to seek broader
unified intentions behind different types. For example, the purification oath (Reiningungseid)
and the judicial oath (Richtereid), despite being positioned as individual kinds of swearing by
Baltensberger, both depend on the expectation that the language of an individual’s expression
can affirm honorable intentions for future behavior. Likewise, an oath designed to punish
abuses of perjury holds the same universal purpose as those seeking to penalize a fraudulent
merchant. Applying these broader ideological approaches to Baltensberger’s narrowly defined
categories of the law produces a complementary understanding of how these diverse pieces of
legislation ultimately serve mutual purposes for society.
“Truth” Within the Laws
“Truth,” as a concept vulnerable to subjective interpretation, serves as a potentially
undesirable basis for making legal decisions, especially when presented without other forms
guaranteeing its accuracy. As a result, it is not surprising that statements of “truth” by
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themselves serve in a very limited capacity within the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic legal systems.
While all judicial matters depend, to some degree, on the accuracy of “truth” available either to
the defendant or the plaintiff, not all information is granted equal admittance within the
confines of a courtroom.170 Furthermore, not all types of evidence enjoy the same level of
credibility, and the law naturally prefers those specialized forms of proof considered to be both
reliable and consistent.171 For the medieval communities of England and Iceland, the simple
honesty offered by a statement of the “truth” does not convey enough credibility for use by the
general populace. Given the legal preference for formalized means of attestation, especially
where the implementation of judicial punishments are concerned, it is worth considering why
“truth” only appears under special circumstances for the benefit of an exclusive group with the
permission to exercise such unqualified statements as legally admissible evidence.
While the oath and pledge, discussed below in this chapter, reflect predetermined and
ritualized systems for offering credible statements, the alternative expression qualifying
something as “true” employs comparably less rigidity in its structure. Looking at those few
instances where flexibility is permitted in the creation of legal support, it is clear to see that the
law is founded on fears about the potential mismanagement of sincerity, especially if this
method of offering proof becomes available to the entire community. Understandably, this
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apprehension originates with a concern that “truth” is a subjective construction which seems to
be open to interpretation by each individual. If justice is based exclusively on a “truthful”
testimony of two witnesses, it is possible the account of one might differ significantly from the
other. Indeed, it is even possible that each speaker can still consider his or her own perspective
as authentic, despite contradictions between the two accounts.172 Statements of “truth” also
include few consequences of overt punishment when compared to those laws designed to
curtail violations against oaths or pledges. Although “truth” presents a problematic
combination of a non-ritualized structure and the potential for inconsistencies in testimony,
Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic laws remarkably employ this form of language to provide legal
verification – albeit in some very specialized circumstances.
So rare are appearances of “truth” as a means of offering legal proof that its significance
can quickly be overshadowed by the larger and more formal means of sworn language. Only
three passages from the corpus of Anglo-Saxon law rely on this attestation, and Icelandic legal
texts exhibit a similar scarceness, with Grágás containing only two uses of the noun, sannr, and
Jónsbók including only one.173 The stringent application of this expression is proof of a
deliberate limitation on the individuals with access to this type of sworn language. The AngloSaxon codes do not employ any of the forms of “truth” (truá, tryggð, or treow) associated with
the modern English cognate of this word. Instead, only the noun soþ is used consistently within
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a legal context when verification is required without swearing or pledging. In contrast to the Old
English reliance on only one expression, the laws of Iceland employ a more inclusive vocabulary
of legal “truth.” Despite, however, finding all three nouns (trúa, tryggðr, and sannr) within the
Icelandic law, their limited numbers also demonstrate deliberately limited usage to prevent
unauthorized exploitation of this expression. Thus, the significance of “truth” as a legal
expression is found in the deliberate management by legal authorities attempting to control its
application.
Among the English, the earliest appearance of soþ is found in a law of King Wihtræd,
who governed the kingdom of Kent around the year 695.174 Directly following a collection of
laws stipulating punishment for individuals convicted of practicing witchcraft or violating
religious fasts, the code outlines, in a series of nine edicts, a hierarchical progression of swearing
necessary for the exoneration of potential defendants, dependent on the social status of the
accused. This list begins at the top with provisions for testimony offered by a king or bishop and
proceeds down the class structure until it reaches the method for clearing a slave accused of a
crime. The series of laws begins by declaring bioscopes word ond cyninges sie unlægne buton
aþe,175 ‘the word of the bishop or of the king is incontrovertible without an oath.’ It seems only
natural that the king, as political and military leader of the kingdom, is afforded special
consideration as always speaking truthfully, even without offering an oath. Imbuing the
bishop’s words with similarly unquestionable authority follows logically from his corresponding
position as the spiritual sovereign without peer in the kingdom.176 Although the bishop and king

174

Lisi Oliver, Beginnings of English Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 148.

175

Wihtræd 16. Gesetze, 1:13.

176

Patrick Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, (Oxford: Blackwell,
199), p. 102. Wormald characterizes most of Wihtræd’s legal code as being concerned primarily with
defining the legal “status of the Church men in Kentish society.”

85

certainly have the ability to make oaths, the law absolves them from this activity because they
do not have social equals capable of impugning their assertions.
Directly following the special status of the king and bishop as always speaking the
“truth,” the code outlines the means of exonerating the next highest members of society. This
law, directed specifically at the priests and rulers of monastic communities, calls for the use of
soþe, ‘by truth,’ rather than the oaths required for all subsequent individuals. The law reads:
Preost hine clænsie sylfæs soþe, in his halgum hrægle ætforan wiofode ðus cweþende “Veritatem
dico in Christo, non mentior.” Swylce deacon hine clænsie,177 ‘The priest should clear himself by
his own truth, in his holy garments before the altar saying this: “I speak the truth in Christ, and
do not deceive.” Likewise, a deacon should clear himself [of an accusation].’ While a ritualized
statement in Latin in a prescribed location is still required of the speaker, the priests and
monastic leaders are expressly allowed to avoid labeling their declarations as oaths. Every other
person listed in Wihtræd’s collection of attestations is required to proclaim his innocence by
means of an oath. The use of soþ for the religious community is, therefore, a deliberate and
exclusive arrangement designed to highlight the special status of the clergy in England.
Although it may seem likely that only relying on “truth” opens the law up for
exploitation, Wihtræd’s code is not without its justification in granting this special status to
religious leaders. Of all social groups, the priestly community is believed to be the least likely to
manipulate language dishonestly.178 The expectation of the king is that the Church will only
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select worthy candidates, bound by the sacramental rites of ordination to live virtuously, giving
priests and deacons a moral credibility with which their words are trusted above all others.179
Moreover, a very clear biblical justification exists to motivate Wihtræd’s exemption of the
clerical class. During the Sermon on the Mount, in Matthew 5:34, Jesus offers a very strong
pronouncement against any form of swearing. He says: “But I say to you not to swear at all,
neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God: nor by the earth, for it is his footstool: nor by
Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great king: neither shall thou swear by thy head, because thou
canst not make one hair white or black. But let your speech be yea, yea: no, no: and that which
is over and above these, is of evil.”180 Although interpretation of this passage may encourage
readers to see deliberate exaggeration to stress a moral point, the Kentish legislation of
Wihtræd codifies this accommodation so that priests can still respond to accusations without
literal disobedience of the Gospel prohibition.181 Of particular interest in this law, however, is
the way that the Kentish version creates limitations beyond the biblical passage. While Jesus
offers no restrictions on who should speak without swearing, the Kentish law is only
comfortable granting this right to a select group who, in the ideal world, would be unlikely to
abuse it. Herein we can see the gap between the religious ideals upon which the law is founded

179

The existence of this specialized category raises questions about the qualifications of individuals
entering the clergy during the early medieval period. The Icelandic struggle with clerical celibacy provides
a clear example of how problematic regulating the behavior of priests could be for early medieval
Christians. See Jenny M. Jochens, “The Church and Sexuality in Medieval Iceland,” Journal of Medieval
History 6.4 (December 1980): 377-92.
180

Matt. 5:34-7.

181

Hyperbole in the Sermon on the Mount is commonly accepted as Jesus’s means of pointing out how
flawed human behavior can be. In the passages immediately preceding swearing, Jesus advises the
removal of limbs associated with sinful behavior. Such an extreme action is frequently interpreted by
religious commentators as being designed to focus the attention of the audience on their sinful behavior.
For more, see David Buttrick, Speaking Jesus: Homiletic Theology and the Sermon on the Mount (Louisville,
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002).

87

and the reality that all individuals, even the clergy, are occasionally not trustworthy enough to
credit with such an inclusive level of dependence on their language.
Looking beyond Wihtræd’s law for priests, we find that swearing still occupies a
significant place in the law, despite the biblical proscription to the contrary. Justification for
legally obligated swearing must rationalize placing believers within a context where they are
required to offer words beyond simply an account of “truth.” Fortunately, just such an
explanation is found within the laws of Jónsbók. One provision about oaths in the final chapters
of the section addressing the crimes of theft simply states:
Af þuí at guð sialfr er sann leikr. þa vill hann þat huers mannz með sannleik ia sem ia er.
en þat með sannendum nei sem nei er. en þo fyrir breyskleika sakir mannzins er
sialldan truir berum orðum. þa heímtaz eiðar optliga ok fram flytiaz. ok er þat æigi synd
sem satt er suarit.
Because God Himself is truth He wants that every man according to truth say “yes”
when “yes” is required, but according to truth, “no” when “no” is required. But yet
because of man’s weakness – who seldom believes unsworn words – thus oaths are
demanded and sworn often, and that is not a sin when they are truly sworn.182
Legitimizing swearing allows for the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic judicial systems to continue using
this crucial feature without excluding Christian speakers. Placing the onus on the frailty of
human behavior for an individual’s failure to follow the law or to adequately honor Jesus’s
prohibition on oaths shrewdly absolves ecclesiastical and secular government from the
responsibility of encouraging this activity.
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Jónsbók outlines the three elements necessary for any oath to be legitimate: sannleikr j
reínní samuítzku. at hann sueri þat eítt er hann veít [ok] ætlar ef anarlaust satt wera, ‘truth in
clear conscience that he swears only what he knows and thinks without doubt to be true.’183
Internalizing these requirements (conscience, knowledge, and belief) offers more rationalization
for how Christians can continue to swear, since their statements continue to match what they
believe to be the “truth.”184 Thus, in the example cited above of the differing testimonies,
neither party actually commits a sinful act if each witness speaks what he believes to be an
accurate account. As trivial as this may seem to a modern audience, medieval lawmakers
looking to continue the practice of taking oaths accept this rationalization as the means to
preserve the spirit of the practice while making it palatable to Christian oath-takers.
In addition to confining “truth” to those individuals with the requisite sanctity to be
trusted, subsequent legislation also employs this expression in situations where the
conventional modes of attestation present challenges. One such law, issued by King Æthelstan
at Exeter, employs “truth” in an attempt to address negligence and corruption among the royal
officials governing the kingdom. Felix Liebermann dates this collection of ordinances to the
decade between 927 and 937, and Patrick Wormald characterizes it as a body of legislation
designed to urge adherence to earlier legislative efforts.185 The failure of earlier laws to function
properly offers motivation for Æthelstan’s next code and explains why the king turns from
traditional methods of swearing when updating his laws at Exeter. Among this collection,
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following a discussion of preventing bad conduct among retainers and lords, the law introduces
the following provision regarding those in positions of supervision:
Ond swylc gerefa swylc ðis forgemeleasie ond ymbe beon nylle, gesylle ðam cinge his
oferhyrnesse, gif hit man him ongerecce mid soþe on he hine ungereccan ne mæge.186
And any reeve who is negligent of this [effort to prevent evil], and is not occupied with
it, shall pay the king for insubordination, if one accuses him with truth and he cannot
clear himself.
Æthelstan’s ruling declares that any local representative of the king refusing to enforce the law
will be subject to discipline. What makes the application of this penalty so noteworthy is that it
places the burden of proof on the reeve, who must clear himself of the accusation of
malfeasance in order to free himself. Instead of obliging a complainant to swear using
sanctioned methods, the fine is applied if the claim is merely characterized as having been based
in “truth,” and if the reeve cannot defend himself. While this regulation depends primarily on
the failure of the official to provide a defense against the charges, it bespeaks a serious royal
concern over previous disobedience among shire officials. Wormald asserts that, “Æthelstan did
face a serious conspiracy around 933, if not at his accession.”187 Any suspicions over the
behavior of the reeves in working against the king are further confirmed by the prologue of
Æthelstan’s Exeter laws. The king writes, ic hæbbe geahsod, þæt ure frið is wyrs gehealden,
ðonne me lyste oþþe hit æt Greatanlea gecweden wære, ‘I have discovered that our peace is
kept worse than what pleased me or what was declared at Greatly.’188 Allowing the conviction
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of the reeve for only a statement of “truth” seeks to rebuild confidence that the representatives
of royal authority will act with integrity and loyalty. Aethelstan’s law, therefore, addresses the
legitimate fear that untrustworthy reeves could abuse their authority in order to frustrate legal
testimony of their own criminal behavior.189 The Exeter law addresses this by allowing any
individual, even if he might otherwise lack necessary support for a full oath, to bring charges
against a reeve for questionable behavior. Because an accusation with “truth” is enough to
increase scrutiny on the reeve’s behavior, this inclusive means of proof serves as a significant
deterrent for inappropriate behavior where more conventional methods of swearing might be
susceptible to failure.
Following Æthelstan’s adaptation of “truth” to function as proof within a context not
restricted only to members of the clergy, the last appearance of this type of sworn language is
given even wider application and more force within the laws of King Edgar. The circumstances
of this final Anglo-Saxon treatment of “truth” enhance the way such statements function not
only as proof, but also as part of the qualities that make for a smoothly governed society. The
shift from solely offering testimony toward a mindset of honesty also reflects a wider change in
the political situation for the Anglo-Saxon ruler. Unlike the fear of political disobedience that
pervades much of Æthelstan’s legal reform, Edgar’s reign is described by Frank Stenton as,
“singularly devoid of recorded incident” to threaten his royal authority or encourage legal
change. 190 Despite not facing as many concerns as his predecessors, King Edgar issues four
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separate legislative codes as a means to bring stability to his kingdom. One such text, the
Wihtbordesstan Code, dated by Liebermann to around 962, contains the longest of Edgar’s legal
passages and an inclusive reference to “truth” exploring the necessity of such statements.
Wormald characterizes the laws originating from Wihtbordesstan as “more informal, and at the
same time more flamboyant” than any others issued by Edgar. 191 Such stylistic features may
offer some evidence for why Edgar turns toward “truth” as the abstract means of speaking
about justice in his kingdom. Moreover, Wormald also observes that, “the Wihtbordesstan
Code was the first [issued by Edgar] that used Scandinavian terminology to any marked degree.”
192

Indeed, while discussing the duties of kingship, one law from Wihtbordesstan specifically

mentions all three populations of Englum ge Denum ge Bryttum,193 ‘English and Danes and
British,’ which Edgar attempts to unite through the bonds of his common legal system. As a
result, the universal concept of “truth” becomes the bridge Edgar can employ to unite the
different cultural groups living under his overlordship. To accomplish this integration, the earlier
restrictions about which individuals are allowed access to this form of judicial expression are
notably removed, while the concept of “truth” becomes less a feature of judicial proof and more
an indication of social order.
The prologue to the Wihtbordesstan Code begins with an announcement that Edgar
seeks the remedy for a færcwealme, ‘pestilence,’ afflicting his kingdom.194 Adjusting the law to
prevent criminal behavior allows the king to end sinful practices among his nation, ultimately
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reciprocally leading to the departure of the physical affliction. This motivation explains why
many of Edgar’s laws are directed at stopping theft, governing honest trade, and enforcing the
proper collection of tithes. Among such legal amendments, a healthy respect for “truth”
appears central to an effort to cure the social ills plaguing the kingdom. In a manner similar to
Æthelstan’s rule enforcing the reeve’s behavior, Edgar hopes to expand the use of “truth” so
that it serves as proof and as a motivating factor in how all people act. The Wihtbordesstan law
says:
Mid Anglum ic hæbbe gecoren on min witan, hwæt seo steor beon mæge, gif ænig man
mid anbyrdnesse beginð oþþe mid ealle ofslyhð ænigne þara þe ymbe þas smegunge bið
ond þæt dyrne orf ameldað, oþþe þara ænigne þe on soðre gewitnesse bið ond mid his
soðe þæne unscyldingean ahret ond þæne scyldigean rihtlice fordeð.195
I with my councilors have determined what the penalty will be among the English, if any
one attempts resistance or openly slays another who is involved in this investigation [for
theft] or who gives information about the stolen cattle, or anyone who is giving true
witness and saves the innocent and rightly destroys the guilty by his truth.
Although this law is vague about the specifics of the penalty determined for the person
obstructing the investigation, the legal narrative offers a respectful appreciation of the growing
power of “truth” to protect against crime. Edgar’s law states that by giving honest testimony,
even without the formulaic structure inherent in formalized oath-taking, the witness is
empowered to act as both the protector and the prosecutor of justice. The essence of “truth,”
spoken by the witness, is joined with the physical evidence of the obstruction to provide enough
substantiation of the thief’s guilt. While the key element here may seem to be the implicit
admission of guilt of a person trying to obstruct testimony, the law focuses more of its praise on
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the honesty of the testimony. Despite the potential loss of the victim’s ability to corroborate his
testimony formally under oath, the “truth” itself is seen as sufficient to make the case. Edgar’s
law seeks, therefore, to inspire a truthful attitude as the ultimate foundation for justice by
endowing it with more credibility than the act of swearing itself.
Although the Anglo-Saxon legal system seems to approach “truth” with a sense of
cautious skepticism, the English are not alone in treating unqualified statements of honesty with
a sense of unease. The Icelandic laws, particularly Grágás and Jónsbók, share the careful
reservation that “truth” only functions on the periphery of lawfully credible statements. Two
specific sections within this body of early law employ “truth” adjectivally in statements of
honesty without requiring more formalized terms of swearing. The first is the expression sannr
at sök, commonly translated as ‘guilty,’ literally ‘true to the charge’ against the individual.
According to Heinrich Beck’s Wortschatz der altisländischen Grágás, various morphological
forms of sannr are employed in twelve different laws in this context.196 In addition, Jónsbók
includes ten references to sannr within the framework of expressing an individual’s culpability.
Because these conditional expressions of responsibility are such critical features of law, it is
clear that the potential evaluation of legal accusations represents one of the most significant
roles that “truth” plays within the laws of the Icelanders. No less significant than its use for
ascribing guilt to an individual, the second adjectival form of “truth” appears within another
formulaic legal phrase common to both Grágás and Jónsbók. Unlike the expression of
culpability marked by sannr at sök, the phrase sannaz ok réttaz, ‘most true and right,’ serves as
an affirmative statement designed to evaluate the quality of potential Icelandic lawsuits,
supporting the legality of the claimant’s case. Beck notes an additional seven appearances of
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this axiomatic language, all of which are used as clauses supporting the larger, more significant
passages describing legal oaths.197 As such, this superlative expression of truth attempts to offer
qualifications for the pursuit of a case, which can justify its prosecution. For example, in Chapter
25 of Grágás, the formula for challenging a court requires the individual to declare sem ec hygg
sanazt oc rettast oc hellzt at logvm,198 ‘as I think most true and right and in accordance with the
law.’199 The key to this passage is the statement that this is measured not only in accordance
with the individual’s belief, but ‘in accordance with the law.’ Thus, ‘truth’ itself is not employed
without a guiding force to ensure its application. Similarly, in Jónsbók, the section describing the
oath of the Law Council also includes the reference sannazst fyrir guði, ‘truest before God,’ as
one of the expressions to certify the intention of the nominee to serve as an impartial judge.200
Although the direct legal reference (réttaz) has been removed in Jónsbók, the sense remains
consistent with that found in the earlier laws. Just as this legislation acts as a verifying force
regulating the ‘truth’ expressed in Grágás, the law in Jónsbók also relies on the external
substantiation, in this case divine authority, to guide the application of the attestant’s honesty.
Thus, the analysis of these two adjectival, formulaic legal expressions reveals some very clear
facts about how ‘truth’ is employed within the law. There is only a very limited application for
this term within the context of law. The prescribed oath-taking procedures that employ ‘truth’
include it as one component within the larger framework of the oath, guaranteeing that the
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more substantial quality of the oath will cover any potential discrepancy in the more fluid
concept of ‘truth.’201 Likewise, because of the potential for differences of perception when it
comes to the understanding of what is genuine, these laws also include external, idealized
standards by which such expressions can be evaluated. These expressions depend on the law
itself or divine agency to grant a sense of legitimacy to language that would otherwise be
considered potentially too variable to be fully trusted in most legal contexts.
The Pledge in the Laws
Although the pledge is the more influential form of attestation when compared to
statements of “truth,” it too does not enjoy either the prevalence or the distinction associated
with taking an oath.202 This limited currency can potentially be attributed to the fact that only
certain contexts require this form of verbal exchange, thus restricting a widespread inclusion
throughout the law. What ultimately distinguishes the pledge from its counterparts, the “truth”
and the oath, is both its functionary role and the requirements it employs to meet these needs.
Pledges serve a distinctive double function with two specialized legal meanings: either as the
markers of solemn declarations exchanged with additional assurance of honesty or, more
frequently, as affixing extra protection to agreements through a ritualized exchange of
resources. The latter form, particularly in the laws of Grágás and Jónsbók, involves the
guarantees of legal possession of land offered as a surety to encourage honesty. As a result,
most pledges are driven not explicitly by the actual transfer of wealth, but rather by the
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potential that these obligations will be exacted if expectations are not met. This form of
swearing, therefore, uniquely combines the process of swearing with the legalized threat of
confiscation as the means to encourage one’s adherence to the details of the agreement.
Despite the tendency of some modern translators to conflate the pledge and the oath as
equivalent forms, evidence from the laws themselves suggests that both the Anglo-Saxons and
Icelanders understood these as distinct efforts, albeit subtly distinguished, to validate a
speaker’s intention. Confirmation of the pledge as an independent form of swearing appears in
seven Old English laws that specifically pair the pledge with the oath, wedd ond að, as a
formulaic combination.203 Rather than simply using one form of sworn language, the compliers
of the legal texts join these two elements together to form a stronger bond of sincerity. This
combination indicates that both forms must share a foundation of truthfulness satisfactory for
law; nevertheless, the law purposely mentions them not as interchangeable alternatives, but as
distinct legal expressions with their own unique functions. Æthelred’s code, dated by
Liebermann to 1008, includes a law that all good Christians must word and weorc fadige mid
rihte and að and wedd wærlice healde, ‘properly direct words and deeds and faithfully hold oath
and pledge’ within a broader provision dictating proper Christian behavior.204 These laws
reoccur within the institutes of Cnut, who also calls for the strict adherence of the community to
higher standards of honesty so that að ond wedd wærlice healde,205 ‘they should hold strictly
the oath and pledge.’ While the oath and pledge initially appear to be two sides of the same
coin, the Anglo-Saxon kings who issue laws about pledging intend this combined expression to
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provide a very special function by enhancing the bonds between the individual swearing and the
person receiving the promise. By evaluating the features separating the oath from the pledge,
we can distinguish why each is critically important for the proper function of politics, trade, and
daily life.
The clearest difference between pledging and oath-taking, shared by both Iceland and
England, comes from the fact that the pledge is a form of sworn language more closely
associated with an individual’s material possessions. The Old Norse term veð and the Old
English term wedd both appear in legal situations connected with the exchange of money or
property, and such items are tied to verbal promises by means of the accounting of chattels or
with the physical possessions serving as collateral for the statement. Two laws from Grágás
involving the discussion of courts of confiscation – particularly for debt – discuss the need to
consider initially honoring an individual’s pledges before adjudging the financial penalties of law.
According to Jesse L. Byock, during such courts, “men who could prove their claims had first
right to the property, and then the chieftain could take his fee.”206 Given that such petitions for
redress would be centered primarily on seeking compensation for injury, it is worth noting that
the law does make certain provisions designed first to meet the demands of family honor.
Chapter 49 of Grágás reads:
Jafnt scal þangat bva fe mál öll sem til scyllda doms. Oc sva of lanzvirðingar oc sva doma
cono sitt fe ef hon átti eða veð mála ef voro. Oc hveriom sina avra fulla ef sva má. en
ella iafnt skerþa sem at sculda domi.207
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Suits concerning money are to be prepared for this court just as for a debt court, and
similarly in the matter of land-valuing and in adjudging to the wife what property is hers,
if she had any, and in redeeming pledges, if there were any, and to each his full amount
if that may be, but otherwise equally reduced as at a debt court.208
While concern for the welfare of the deceased man’s wife is clearly the law’s primary concern,
the claims of those individuals holding pledges with the decedant are noticeably given some
priority in their attempt to recover their portion of the property offered to them in their verbal
agreement. As a result, those with a claim against the honor of the deceased have the
opportunity to enforce the terms of the dead man’s pledge and thereby fulfill any outstanding
obligations originating from this prior contract. The assurance of keeping the terms of the
pledge intact, therefore, is ultimately enforced by ensuring early access to the collateral
available to the court. Both parties involved in this form of sworn language are assured of the
sanctity of the guarantor’s promised surety being available to meet the obligation of the
agreement.
Pledging is also closely linked with property ownership in both Grágás and Jónsbók, as
the obligations of these verbal agreements are cautiously regulated in the laws monitoring the
sale and purchase of assets. Like preemption, the legal right of an original seller to repurchase
property for a fixed price, the pledge also brings outside parties into the traditional business
transaction, which the law closely monitors.209 Much like a modern lien, where outstanding
debts against the homeowner are transferred with the sale of the house, the Landbrigða, ‘Land-
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claims,’ sections of Grágás and Jónsbók make clear that the transfer of ownership does not
invalidate previous commitments based on earlier pledges. Chapter 192 of Grágás reads:
Ef maðr selr land sit manne oc vill hann legia alög mala eða lög veðr oc eigo þeir at
hannsalaz þan mala sem þeir ero asáttir eða veð. Þan mala scal lysa at lög bergi eða þat
veð sem þeir handsoloðuz hit næsta alþingi eptir cavp þeirra.210
If a man sells his land to someone and wishes to put a right of lawful preemption or a
legal pledge on it, then he and the buyer have the right to make a formal agreement on
the preemption right or pledge on which they are agreed. The preemption right or
pledge on which they have formally agreed is to be published at Lögberg at the next
General Assembly after their deal.211
The requirement that such arrangements be openly published annually at the Law Rock ensures
that the collateral used to guarantee a pledge will not be devalued by selling it to a new owner.
This prevents potential fraud because those using land as security will not be able to escape the
responsibility of honoring their commitment by simply claiming that the property is no longer in
their possession. The consistent value of the pledge is reaffirmed in Jónsbók, when the law
states: en þat er logueð at hann skal taka iafn marga ara sem skynsamir men vi virða at hann se
vel af halldin, ‘that is a legal pledge in another’s land: that he shall take as much money as six
prudent men deem appropriate so that he is fully satisfied.’212 Allowing the jury to impose
additional compensation for the pledge-holder makes certain that property transactions will not
unduly destabilize the value of what is offered as guarantee within these arrangements.
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In addition to a judicious consideration of how to protect pledging in the face of
challenging land-claims, the laws of Jónsbók also apply this form of sworn language in two
instances involving livestock. Because domestic animals possess as much value as the land on
which they feed, the involvement of pledging to regulate transactions involving these
alternative forms of collateral seems only natural.213 The first of these laws presents a situation
very similar to those involving the transfer of landed property. The law states that, nu er su kyr
dauð en hann attí veð j annarri þa skal hann þa hafa fyrir sína kw, ‘now if this cow dies and the
owner has a pledge in another cow, then he is to have this cow for his cow.’214 The law clearly
states that, like the property that is transferred, honoring the obligations presented in a pledge
takes precedent over the opportunity to discharge the original article upon which the pledge is
stipulated, even in the instance of the accidental death of the animal. As a result, the owner of
any such agreements can be confident in his ability to be compensated without the potential of
a significant loophole. This requirement is made all the more forceful by the legislation
preceding, where rent for livestock is exacted if the person who takes custody of the animal kills
it deliberately. Thus, an individual pledging his cattle as surety could not avoid the commitment
by simply killing the beasts as a deliberate means to escape the responsibility of the debt.
Jónsbók additionally stipulates that word of an individual’s pledge should be honored,
even when the speaker is challenged by poverty or other demands that might undermine his
ability to meet his obligation. This provision is most clearly expressed when the typical roles of
the pledge agreement have already been reversed. When livestock, which was previously used
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as collateral, is again in the possession of the individual to whom they are owed, the law orders
the pledge of future payment alone to be sufficient enough to restore the animals to their
former owner, especially if this action will prevent starvation for the one requesting the return
of the animals. The law says: þa skal hann veðleggia eða fa vorðzlu mann iafn godan veði, ‘then
he is to give a pledge or provide a guarantor as good as a pledge.’215 Implied within this
segment is a desire to have compassion on those members of society who are least able to
afford the punishment of mistrust; yet returning the livestock to an owner so close to poverty
forces a serious risk that compensation may never be forthcoming should the arrangement fail.
While it might seem that a law designed to force the return of collateral to a financially
risky owner would undermine the potential for pledging to function properly, Jónsbók includes
additional regulations that make the situation outlined above the exception rather than the rule.
Within the chapter specifically covering pledging, ownership of the valuable used for collateral
seems to pass, albeit temporarily, to the individual accepting the pledge. The law states: Nu legr
maðr oðrum veð fyrir eínn huern lut. þa skal sa abyrgiaz veð er tekr, ‘now if someone gives
another man a pledge in return for something of value, then the one who receives the pledge is
to be responsible for it.’216 As a result of this practice, the burden of reclaiming property used as
surety rests squarely on the shoulders of the party offering the pledge. This law clearly provides
a motivation for the speaker to remain honest to the terms of the arrangement in order to
recover the item, yet it does so by clearly mistrusting that language can correspond to the value
of the asset. Indeed, this same law requires that all such transactions should be carefully
monitored to prevent fraud. All items acting as collateral require that skal veð wirða, ‘he should

215

Jónsbók, pp. 224-5.

216

Jónsbók, pp. 324-5.

102

have the pledge assessed.”217 Such an appraisal could prevent the awkward situation where
multiple claims are present for the same piece of property, but most likely they are designed to
ensure that the item offered can match the value stated by the language of the pledge. As a
result, the pledge is an appealing form of sworn language because it produces both valued
property, whose worth is clearly established, to meet the needs of the agreement, while also
transferring the care for that guarantee into the hands of the party accepting it.218 As a result,
the pledge offers the most flexible form of swearing because the incentives to recognize it as
legitimate are contained within its system of surety. Even if an individual’s social situation
makes his word otherwise questionable, as with cases of destitution or accusations of
lawbreaking, the inbuilt system of offering up inducement in the form of physical property
ensures that everyone can have access to this form of swearing, provided that the value of the
pledged property assuages any original concerns about the speaker’s honesty.
While Icelandic law makes pledging a desirable form of arranging financial dealings,
especially when additional guarantees for veracity are needed, Anglo-Saxon law proves more
accommodating of such exchanges when criminal allegations undermine a speaker’s credibility.
Pledges act, for the English, more like the modern exchange of bail, where the money grants
freedom and provides incentive to prevent further criminal conduct on behalf of the person
pledging it.219 Extending beyond an ordinary agreement for repayment, such laws link the
concepts of compensation with the idea of surety as a form of regulatory practice. For example,
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the law code of Ine, who ruled the West Saxons from 688 to 726,220 states that, gif hwa him
ryhtes bidde deforan hwelcum scirmen oððe oþrum deman ond abiddan ne mæge, ond him
wedd sellan nelle, gebete XXX schill,221 ‘if anyone demands justice in the presence of any shireman or of another judge and he cannot get it, since he will not give a pledge to him, he should
pay thirty shillings as compensation.’ Both Liebermann and Frederick Attenborough interpret
the internal clause about denied pledges, along with the statement about the fine, to be
directed at the individual originally accused of the crime.222 This would suggest that the pledge
requested of the defendant is critically important to the process, and his denial of that
agreement is treated as an offence worthy of garnering a substantial fine.223 Indeed, denying
the surety of the pledge, as defined by Ine 8, does not actually affect the guilt or innocence of
the accused; instead, this law merely addresses the refusal of an individual to participate in the
system designed to enhance the pecuniary penalty for convicted criminals. Requiring the pledge
of all citizens, furthermore, makes certain that every member of society is keenly aware of the
personal responsibility needed to facilitate the advancement of justice through honesty.
While pledging during the reign of Ine seems closely tied to the need for honest
participation in the judicial system, the role of such agreements is further developed within the
laws of ninth-century Wessex. King Alfred specifically links violations of the pledge with
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punishments designed to exact a physical and spiritual price from those guilty of neglecting the
responsibility of such promises. The law states: Gif he þonne þæs widdige þe him riht sy to
gelæstanne ond þæt aleoge, selle mid eaðmedum his wæpn ond his æhta his freondum to
gehealdanne,224 ‘If he then pledges himself to something which is lawful and proves false to his
pledge, he shall give with humility his weapons and possessions to his friends to keep.’ While
the forty-day period of incarceration that follows would suggest that the relinquished property
might be restored after the time is served, the message Alfred sends about the serious
economic and religious ramifications of pledge-breaking is absolutely clear. Later in the same
code, Alfred again provides for financial punishment for borgbryce, ‘violation of bail,’ to be
paired with similar spiritual punishment for wedbryce, ‘pledge-breaking,’ that is scrift scrife,
‘penance prescribed by his confessor.’225 Under Alfred, the speaker making the pledge offers
both moral and economic capital as a means of holding himself to the words expressed within
the agreement.
A few decades later, under the reign of Æthelred in England, pledging begins to develop
into a preventive means to bind the defendant to the system of prosecution by exacting a
penalty for refusal to participate properly in the judicial process. Æthelred’s code established at
Wantage most clearly expresses the expanding role of pledging, as it contains two separate laws
related to pledging as a means to secure financial guarantees against suspected criminals.
Wormald asserts that the Wantage code demonstrates clear signs of Scandinavian influence and
that it contains “particular reference to the Danelaw” in both its vocabulary and composition.226
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Given the tenuous relationships between the Anglo-Saxons and the Danes, it is ultimately not
surprising that assurances based on sworn language are reemphasized as a unifying force of
social relationships within the Wantage code. Indeed, the two regulations relating to pledging
involve the transfer of money as the means to proactively inhibit the possibility of criminal
behavior. The first of these relates to the arrest of tihtbysian men, ‘men laboring under many
accusations’ whom the shire reeve is pursuing for further legal action. Æthelred urges that each
man of such dubious reputation sylle VI healfmarc wedd, ‘ give six half-marks as a pledge.”227
Regardless of whether this pledge of money is designed to hold the accused against the
possibility of flight or to incentivize prosecution of criminals by placing funds in the hands of the
reeve and members of the district, it modifies the relationship of such agreements so that
pledging becomes a proactive force to reduce the influence of dangerous individuals on society.
In a similar manner, the second law regarding pledging requires gif hwa þeof clænsian wylle,
lecge on C to wedde, ‘if anyone wants to clear a thief, let him place one hundred [silver marks]
as a pledge.’228 The law again places newfound authority in the hands of the person accepting
such a pledge to insure the safety of the realm by encouraging the community to thoroughly
test the reputation of those accused of theft. By requiring the exchange of money at the outset
of such proceedings, the law makes certain that only those defendants who are confident in
their innocence will be willing to risk the potential loss of money required by this exchange. As a
result, the purpose of the pledge moves further from its original intention of compelling
behavior from a speaker and toward a new role in the safeguarding of intentions for the
individual who is already accused of committing a crime.
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In summary, the pledge performs a number of critical roles within the laws of early
medieval England and Iceland. Marked by its clear association with the exchange of property
and money as collateral, this distinctive form of swearing has a close affinity to business and
trade relationships. The constraint on behavior dictated by the offer of physical security
necessitates a bond far stronger than that elicited by mere statements of “truth,” yet these
agreements also appear more capable of adapting the introduction of additional requirements
to their purpose. As a result, the pledge also serves in many laws beyond the realm of
commerce to project assurance when questions of loyalty or honesty threaten to undermine
confidence in an individual: these pledges further safeguard social stability by offsetting
challenges to trust with monetary compensation. Indeed, the addition of further commitments
to the pledge provides extra legal protection by offering further punishment should the surety
be confiscated, thereby making the risk greater to accused thieves or individuals of dubious
character. As such, the pledge effectively develops as a legal means to add another layer of
prevention against dishonesty that is marked by its flexibility, effectiveness, and strength as an
alternative form of sworn language.
THE OATH IN ANGLO-SAXON AND ICELANDIC LAW
The Coronation Oath
In following the classification system instituted by Baltensberger, the coronation oath,
or Krönungseid, is a fitting place to continue this survey of legal swearing. This oath-type is
perhaps the most narrow in regard to both its purpose (to legitimize the reign of the new ruler)
and usage (available to a king at the time of his investiture); yet, this oath also provides a prime
example of how swearing can be used in the broader context of attempting to bind the
community together under one centralized authority. Likewise, the Krönungseid is closely linked
to the concept of reciprocal exchange, whereby the king’s promise to act as the agent enforcing
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justice is met by his supporters’ own pledges to remain loyal to his rule. Coronation oaths,
therefore, are useful, illustrative examples of the idealized forces behind sworn language. They
are accompanied by solemn ceremonial acts, make use of symbolic representations of power
(the crown), are conducted before witnesses, and they rely on spoken statements to guarantee
the fulfillment of one’s expected role. For both the king and his subjects, the coronation oath is
the ultimate category of swearing because it joins these individuals together within the bonds of
community, thereby classifying all those outside of the oath-taking as ‘others.’ For these
reasons, the oaths exchanged during a royal coronation are an appropriate opening for our
exploration of oath-taking in both the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic laws.
Although coronation oaths are not found in the earliest Icelandic laws of Grágás, those
settlers who emigrated from Norway to escape the tightening royal authority there must surely
have been aware of the requirements of such acts. Jóhannesson’s discussion of Íslendinga Saga
notes that a major motivation for the settlement of Iceland is the effort of King Harald Finehair
and his supporters to “extend their authority over the entire country, and then to suppress all
acts of violence within [Norway’s] boundaries.”229 Such increases in royal authority, naturally,
are accompanied by an escalation in Harald’s efforts to secure loyalty and to project his rising
power. As a result, it is safe to assume that those chieftains seeking relocation may have fled to
Iceland because of the social pressure to swear allegiance to King Harald in the wake of his
conquests; therefore, these Norwegian colonists were, at the very least, familiar with the
corresponding oaths required by the king for those former enemies wishing to become his
subjects.230 Haralds Saga ins Hárfagra supplies the details about the requirements of these
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exchanges, particularly for those Norwegians facing the tough choice of surrendering to the
king. After describing the battle of Hafrsfjord, the saga states: Margir váru þeir ok ríkismenn, er
gengu til handa Haraldi konungi ok gerðusk hans men ok byggðu lond með honum,231 ‘There
were many powerful men who surrendered to King Harald and became his men and dwelt in the
land with him.’ Although the expression gengu til handa Haraldi konungi, literally translated as
“put themselves into the hands of King Harald,” does not expressly mention the defeated
warriors offering oaths to the victorious king, the implications for oath-taking supplied by this
statement are perfectly clear. Indeed, even the reference to placing oneself in another’s hands
provides an image tantalizingly similar to that of a feudal vassal placing his own hands within the
hands of the liege lord, an act often associated with oath-taking within a context of expressing
future loyalty.232 While construing this statement as anything more than a general declaration
of surrender by Harald’s opponents runs the risk of over-interpreting such evidence, it is clear
that the act of submission to King Harald requires some type of formal guarantee against future
opposition to his rule by Norway’s aristocracy. The exchange of oaths between king and
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subjects, like those used during the coronation, provides the relationships necessary to inspire
the security of Harald’s reign subsequently described by the saga narrative.233 Thus, there is no
reason to doubt that, although they did not employ such features for themselves in their earliest
laws, Iceland’s first settlers from Norway did understand the nature of coronation oaths and
their importance for the structure of government.
Grágás clearly does not include any coronation oaths among its many legal formulae,
but the later Icelandic laws of Jónsbók do feature this important legal ritual in a noteworthy
way.234 The scribe of the Skálholtsbók manuscript of Jónsbók initially breaks from his
presentation of the Christian laws in the second section by omitting the laws of King Magnús for
both royal succession and the exchange of oaths necessary for the coronation of a new king.235
As a result, it might initially seem that the Skálholtsbók manuscript of Jónsbók too does not
apply the power of royal oath-taking to the context of inaugurating the king’s ascension to the
throne or the affirmation of householders to follow his rule. Because no Icelander could hope to
ascend to the Norwegian throne legally, the omission of these regulations in the Skálholtsbók
manuscript does not appear unreasonable in a book designed specifically for use in Iceland.
However, after the legal amendments of Eiríkr and Hákon, the scribe supplies the missing
sections regarding coronation procedures. It is possible that the motivation for including the
chapters on succession and coronation could reflect a simple desire to present a thoroughly
complete copy of the law, but it is also likely that the missing provisions are appended as a way
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of highlighting the supremacy of royal authority over the island.236 Given the initial complaints
by Iceland about the Norwegian legal code, Jarnsiða, it is possible the final chapter of Jónsbók is
devoted specifically to the oaths sworn by kings, royal officials, and householders during the
coronation to remind the Icelanders of both the king’s responsibility to ensure equitable law and
the population’s duty to support their ruler.237 As a result, it is the coronation oath (and those
given in response to the king) that ties together the entire framework of the law by reasserting
national identity and drawing attention to the obligations of each member of society. In this
respect, the laws for royal coronations in Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England serve a similar
purpose in drawing a population together into one unified group.
The Anglo-Saxon institution of coronation pre-dates those included in Jónsbók by almost
three centuries, yet the larger purpose of such oaths in building community remains very
similar. Although the first written records of coronation law in England are dated by
Liebermann to the last quarter of the tenth century and attributed to Archbishop Dunstan, the
origins of these rituals are undoubtedly founded upon traditions reaching back to earlier
times.238 The account of King Alfred’s rise to power, for example, depicted in the De Rebus
gestis Aelfredi, provides some clues to the importance of mutual agreement in establishing the
leadership of the king. Asser writes: totius regni gubernacula, divino concedente nutu, cum
summa omnium illius regni accolarum voluntate, confestim fratre defuncto suscepit,239 ‘[Alfred]
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took up the entire government of the kingdom, by permission of divine will, and with consent of
all those inhabitants of the kingdom, after his brother died.’ The central element in this
description of Alfred’s rise to power qualifies his reign as dependent on both a heavenly
confirmation and the mutual endorsement of his community. Given that the coronation oath
recorded by Dunstan includes statements appealing to similar spiritual and social approval, it
can be inferred that Alfred too must have relied on some manner of ritualistic exchange of
promises to substantiate his claim for Wessex. As Thomas Hill argues, Asser’s depiction of Alfred
clearly defines him as a valid ruler by means of the language used to describe his ascension,
particularly highlighting the bravery and wisdom that authenticate his kingship.240 Despite
Asser’s partiality for Alfred and his motivation to depict him in a more regal light, there is further
justification for reading this scenario as a starting point for the Anglo-Saxon coronation oath.
Shortly after describing Alfred’s rise to power, the narrative reports on a series of negotiations
with the Danish raiders involving swearing to certify their peace treaties. This culminates in the
actual exchange of oaths sworn by the leaders of the Danish invaders using relics to verify the
treaty.241 Clearly Alfred, more than any of the Anglo-Saxon kings before him, relies on the legal
power of the oath as a means to derive supremacy over his kingdom and then over his
opponents. The coronation oath, under the command of a capable king like Alfred, becomes the
stepping stone for the extension of royal authority by building consensus by means of a
contractual relationship between the king and the population. Much like the story of the early
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Icelanders, there is a level of speculation about the earliest experiences of the Anglo-Saxons
with coronation oaths; yet, from these murky beginnings, it is still possible to discern how
significant oath-taking in royal contexts becomes for both peoples.
Though the actual coronation oaths included in Dunstan’s Promissio regis and Jónsbók
are relatively straightforward, they both provide some interesting clues about the usefulness of
such expressions and the reliance of both the Anglo-Saxons and Icelanders on similar
expressions of promise. These are best found in the commentary included by the scribe
between the formulae offered for each classification of oath-taker. For example, while there is
nothing unexpected about the Jónsbók account of the king being required þau kristín laug
hallda, ‘to uphold the Christian laws,’ it is what precedes this expression that offers more insight
into the relationship established between ruler and subjects within the coronation oath itself.
The scribe explains the king’s requirement to swear to his intentions by saying: en at konungr
viti sík þui helldr skylldugan log at hallda, ‘and so that the king knows himself more required to
uphold the laws.’242 In a similar way, the oath of Dunstan’s Promissio also starts with assurances
for the protection of Godes cyrice ond ealle Cristen folc, ‘God’s church and all Christian
people.’243 Yet, just as with Jónsbók, it is the circumstance behind the actual words that prove
to be most fascinating. The preface to the Promissio states that Dunstan issued a challenge to
the king that forbead him ælc wedd to syllanne butan þysan, ‘prohibited him to give any pledge
except this one.’ This prefatory statement reveals the desire for consistency in the king’s
coronation, and like the words offered in Jónsbók, it also ensures that the king is aware of
exactly what will be required of him to rule.
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Beyond the simple assurances of an informed king, the Krönungseid also fulfills multiple
purposes by conferring on the king his role as defender of justice and simultaneously alleviating
the concerns of the populace that he will not dishonestly violate the laws he has sworn to
uphold. As such, the king’s coronation oath binds him to the community with very specific
ritualized legal formulae to make him ultimately accountable for the proper implementation of
lawful behavior. This relationship is reinforced by the line within the Jónsbók oath-formulae
stating that the law is to be amended eptir þuí víti sem guð lérr mer, ‘in accordance with the
reason that God grants me.’244 The king’s administration of governance, therefore, is not free to
be changed at will without justification. In a similar way, Dunstan’s coronation oath requires the
king to judge on eallum dómum riht ond mildheortnisse, ‘with justice and mercy in all
judgments.’245 The religious implication of this line is completed in the resulting clause stating
that through the king’s mercy and justice on earth, God’s grace and mercy is delivered to the
people. As such, both coronation oaths emphasize the divine nature of the king’s relationship to
the law, a bond that the oath itself serves to complete by linking the king to the physical
manifestation of holiness (the relic) upon which he swears. Ultimately, the coronation oaths
that appear in the later laws of Anglo-Saxon England and Iceland are designed not only to
appease concerns over potentially abusive rulers, but also to remind the audience of this event
that the king is closely linked to the divine because he is the one person responsible for
upholding the honest application of the law within the community.
Oath of Office
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Closely related to the oath of coronation is the Bestätingungseid, ‘confirmation-oath,’
offered by those officials who participate in the administration of the king’s justice.
Baltensberger conceives of this category to describe those nobles on the Anglo-Saxon Witan,
‘royal council,’ who work together with the king Gute Gesetze zu gehen und schlechte zu
entferen, ‘to propagate acceptable laws and remove bad ones.’246 Such expressions
reemphasize the socially unifying quality of the law and affirm its authority by lending broader
enforcement among the people. Baltensberger explains that many kings, like Æthelberht,
Hlothaere, Eadric, and Wihtræd, were solely responsible for their laws, while Alfred and those
kings following him are more inclusive in the way they jointly affirm the role of others in
implementing these codes. The culmination of such expressions of support is found in the tenth
section of Æthelstan VI, which states: þæt þa witan ealle sealdan heora wedd ealle togædere
þam arcebiscope æt Þunresfelda, þa Ælfeah Stybb ond Brihtnoð Odan sunu cóman togeanes
þam gemote þæs cinges worde, þat ælc gerefa name þæt wedd on his agenre scire…247 ‘The
entire council all together gave their pledge to the archbishop at Thunresfield, where Ælfeah
Stybb and Brihtnoth, Odda’s son, came together for the meeting of the king’s word, that each
reeve take the pledge in his own shire…’ In offering their solemn pledges to support this royal
pronouncement, every member of the council becomes bound to the process of its
implementation. They must now act, like the king, to ensure that all members of their
community take the oath legitimately and honor what they have said. This change in legal
administration is an adroit effort to safeguard the sanctity of the law by means of an additional
level of legal protection. Should any individual initially refuse to swear to uphold the law, his
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behavior will instantly become suspect. Likewise, the councilor under whose jurisdiction the
offender lives will be required to punish him, for fear that any lapse in swearing may invalidate
his own oath offered at Thunresfield. The king has, in effect, presented a clever way to ensure
adherence to the law while equally distributing the means of enforcement down to the
community level, where observation of aberrant behavior is more likely to take place. This also
allows the judicial system to exact an even higher penalty for lawbreaking, because the criminal
can be convicted both of the original crime and for the failure to adhere to his pledge regarding
the law.
While the Bestätingungseid is employed quite effectively by later Anglo-Saxon kings to
distribute the burden of law enforcement, it takes on a much more relevant role among the
early commonwealth of Iceland, where such legal promises for the accurate implementation of
the law are even more critical. Because the early Icelandic government empowers the
lögsögumaðr248 to serve as a dispenser of justice without explicitly granting him the authority to
enforce any legal judgment, the law places “emphasis on the integrity of the individual human
being” to uphold his individual role in the preservation of justice until the thirteenth-century
unification with Norway introduces royal justices.249 Yet before a litigant can feel comfortable
trusting that his case is receiving equitable treatment, some level of verbal assurance needs to
be given. Therefore, every man nominated before the Law Council to serve as a judge is
required, as stated in Grágás, to obtain the oath of his nominating chieftain that ek nefni
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þegn,250 “I nominate a good man and true” with the integrity to uphold the law reliably.251 To
swear that a man is “good and true” initially sounds very casual, but it is indeed a serious
designation that testifies to that individual’s quality for seeking the truth and conducting himself
with proper behavior. Although it may seem superficial to demand this oath of the nominating
chieftain regarding his candidate, it assures the community that the potential judge is honorable
enough not to be swayed by corruption. Moreover, this also ensures that the man in question
will not be influenced by excessive loyalty to the chieftain who nominates him. The chieftain’s
oath also requires him to determine that er eigi vili anar maðr betr raða fyrir lögom órum eða
landz bvi en sia maðr. þeirra manna er ec eiga cost iminom þirðiungi her a þingi,252 “no one is
more able and willing to bear responsibility for our laws and common weal among those I have
to choose from in my assembly.”253 The litigants are, therefore, assured that they are receiving
only the best candidate who does not have a personal bias or who does not stand to gain
anything through the corruption of the law.
Just as the chieftain certifies his choice for the court with the profession of an oath, the
men selected to preside over legal cases as judges also need to confirm their moral positions
before they can begin interpreting the law. The oaths for the confirmation of the judges are
designed to provide additional scrutiny to their character as the mediators of the law. Grágás
says that: Þat er oc aðr þeir tace adomi sínom. at þeir scolo eið vina aðr nema þeir hafe uninn
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aðr,254 “It is also prescribed that before they [can] begin their judging, they are to swear an oath,
unless they have already sworn.”255 The oath offers assurance to all the parties involved in the
case that the judges’ decisions will be performed according to the law and not motivated by
personal gain. Jónsbók adds to the oath of the judge that he swear fyrir guði, ‘before God’ to
serve in a responsible manner.256 Adding this religious reference links the process of swearing
back to the soul of the person, as well as placing a futurity to any punishment dispensed for a
breach of this oath. God will, in the end, hold the judge spiritually responsible for how he
performs his legal duty, providing him with a strong incentive not to take this oath carelessly.
Thus, no conscientious interpreter of the law should be willing to use his position of authority to
abuse the law under the threat of such punishments.257
Not only does Icelandic law demand official pledges of impartiality and good conduct
from those individuals called forward as judges and the chieftains who nominate them, it also
includes a formulaic oath required for any person in the court who wishes to present a case for
trial. Prior to beginning this litigation, the plaintiff is obliged to swear an oath in the presence of
the accused and two other witnesses that the case is conducted in a legitimate manner. Such
oaths ask for verification that: ec mun sva søkia soc mina a hendr honom… sem ec hyg sanaz oc
réttaz oc hellzt at lögom. oc ec hyg hann sanan at söc þeirre er ec hefi ahendi honom… oc ec
hefca fe boðit I dom þena til liðs mer vm soc þessa,258 “I shall prosecute my case against him...in
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the way I think most true and right and most in accordance with the law, and that I think he is
guilty of the charge I bring against him...and I have not offered money for support in this case of
mine to anyone in this court and I shall not offer it.”259 Not to be confused with the oaths that
attest to guilt and innocence, this swearing is only concerned with the moral substance behind
the charges. Corrupt practices, particularly the use of money to influence outcome, are
substantial threats to the fair process of the judicial system, a vulnerability addressed through
the assurance of these verbal declarations. The fact that the oath has a special clause about
bribery indicates the powerful temptation of money to corrupt a verdict, delegitimizing the
entire trial process by reducing it to a commodity that is bought and sold rather than won
through facts and witnesses.260 The provision affirming with the future tense “I shall not offer”
closes an important loophole that would otherwise allow the plaintiff to swear the oath and
then offer the bribes after giving the court an honest declaration. Grágás, therefore, permits
litigants to bring forward all charges out of a genuine feeling about the defendant’s
responsibility for having acted illegally and not for other reasons such as revenge or defamation
of an enemy. Thus, the verbal contracts espoused by the participants in the legal cases
authenticate their motives, while simultaneously trying to prohibit any manipulation of the
outcome by more dubious means, like bribery.
Judicial Oaths
The Richtereid, ‘judicial oath,’ is one of the most important categories of oath-taking
available to the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic communities. It represents the largest classification
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of swearing because these statements are used in both the delivery of charges against an
individual and in the presentation of testimony used to make the legal case. As a result, the
Richtereid is the most frequent and influential oath appearing in the law. Its use for the AngloSaxons and Icelanders reflects the serious importance of community and personal honor within
the Germanic legal tradition. Fredrick Pollock and Fredric Maitland see spoken support during
legal procedures as “the primary mode of proof, an oath going not to the truth of specific fact,
but to the justice of the claim or defense as a whole.”261 The role of the oath-giver, therefore, in
making or breaking the legal case connects every judicial case back to the community and the
trust that this collective places in every individual speaker.
In bringing charges against someone, the oath is an invaluable means of presenting both
the indictment against the accused and clearing the intention of the accuser. Court proceedings
under Æthelstan ofga ælc mon his tihtlan mid foreaðe262 ‘require each man to begin his charge
with an oath taken first’ before any legal action is considered. Likewise, the early law code of
Edward, written in the first half of the tenth century, states that those who wish to bring a
lawsuit against another must geyþe ðonne mid aðe, ðæt he hit for nanum facne ne dyde 263
‘declare then with an oath, that he did it for no fraud.’ In making this statement, the claimant
ensures that the prosecution of these charges is done out of genuine desire for justice rather
than for personal or vindictive means. The desires for personal vengeance that stems from
feud, as well as the greed and envy that often lead to unjustified cases, are nominally prevented
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through the purgative oaths designed to inhibit those bringing legal accusations under dubious
motivations.
In addition to validating the cause of the petitioner, oaths taken by prosecutors also
work on varying levels, in large measure to incriminate the defendant. Alfred’s law code
proclaims that: Gif hwa oðerne godborges oncunne ond tion wille, þæt he hwelcne ne gelæste
ðara ðe he him gesealde, agife þone foreað on feower circum 264 ‘If a man charges another about
a solemn pledge given under the endorsement of God and wishes to accuse him, that he has not
fulfilled any of the promises which he made to him, let him render the oath taken first in four
churches.’ Here the oath has gone beyond a simple statement of intent and has expanded to
function as a way for one party of the legal case to state the guilt of the other. The foreað in
this legal tradition declares the intention, but it also links these words to an explanation of how
the defendant failed to uphold the pledges given earlier. Legally prescribed words now join with
the narrative indictment of the accuser to create testimony. This move toward accusatory
words is further heightened by several laws dealing with theft. Ine, the West Saxon ruler from
688 to 726, commands that the man who kills a suspected thief mot gecyðan mid aðe þæt he
synnigne ofsloge265 ‘must prove with an oath that he killed him [while] guilty [of thievery].’ The
words of the oath-speaker in this instance bear even more narrative weight than previously
granted by earlier law codes. The testimony of the killer must marginalize the victim, and, by
transforming the dead man into a criminal the speaker is able to escape any repercussions for
his own actions. The proof of his words carries a powerful influence in this case, heightened
even further by the fact that the accused victim is unable to react to these charges. Further
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linked to the accusatory power of this oath is the provision that nalles ða gegildan266 ‘the
associates [of the slain man] are not allowed [to offer oaths in his defense].’ Any chance for a
defense of the dead man now rests solely on the fallibility of the killer’s words. The social risk,
however, in making this one speaker’s voice so authoritative is that it comes dangerously close
to allowing the killer to get away with murder, simply by falsely accusing the victim of stealing. It
is at this nexus between honest declaration and legal loophole that certain restrictions must be
applied to the verbal power of the legal oath. In later iterations of the thievery code, Ine adds a
provision that should the killer dierneð ‘conceal’ the crime rather than proclaim it openly, the
protection of his oath is lost. This amendment attempts to clarify the ambiguity regarding
justifiable homicide and limit the verbal exploitation of this liberty, as well as open avenues
where the slain man’s associates may testify and potentially exonerate the accused thief.
The production of oaths in legal cases and the power contained within the presentation
of this sworn language functioned not only on the side of those prosecuting these suits, but also
with those who wished to use their words as a potent form of legal protection. Indeed, the use
of the oath as a means for declaring innocence is even more widespread in its appearance
among the Anglo-Saxon laws than the oath as declaration of guilt. For example, when discussing
the proper manner to free a man from the allegation of cattle theft, Æthelstan’s law code states
that he needs only gecyðe mid aðe267 ‘declare with an oath’ to verify that he is innocent. As
with the paradigm of the killer of the thief above, it is the oath of only one individual that
exonerates him or her. Many of these laws make no mention of the accused needing further
corroboration regarding guilt or innocence.
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Not all legal cases are so easily ended, though. For those accused of committing
robbery, the option of presenting an oath allows them to escape prosecution provided að sceal
bion healf be huslgengum268 ‘the oath should be half the amount for a communicant.’ 269 The
term huslgengum is somewhat troublesome to translate. Attenborough notes that reference to
the huslgengum implies a special class of citizens whose word carries more social value among
the Anglo-Saxons.270 Bosworth and Toller also suggest this understanding in An Anglo-Saxon
Dictionary, which attempts to clarify where that increased value might come from in its
definition of huslgengum as an individual who is allowed to receive the sacrament of
communion.271 The connotation of spiritual purity necessary to participate in this holy ritual is
carried over to the activity of swearing, lending more value to the words of people in this class.
Likewise, a man accused of participating in a raiding party needed CXX hida272 ‘an oath of one
hundred and twenty hides’ to clear himself. The expression of an oath as an economic quantity,
measured by the fine associated with breaking one’s word, places greater emphasis on swearing
in certain situations. Likewise, certain forms of swearing drew more credence when additional
witnesses lent their words to the case. For example, Æthelstan’s law code regarding livestock
claims asks the defendant to claim one witness from five neahgebura ‘of his neighbors’ to
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confirm his word.273 The prosecution’s selection of two men from among ten neighbors,
however, could nullify this oath. By stratifying the process of swearing, some oaths become
more influential, particularly when compared to a weaker counter-oath offered by the opposing
party. The potential exists, therefore, for unjustly accused individuals to escape unwarranted
punishment through the gathering of credible witnesses.
In some cases, however, the use of words alone is not persuasive enough to turn the
tide of conviction and for these moments the trial by ordeal was necessary. The ordeal
combines the physical proof of activity with the divinely sanctioned words of the oath, uniting
both into a bodily trial, which is able to exonerate or convict the accused. It is appropriate that
these physical demonstrations of innocence, such as the consumption of consecrated bread or
the retrieval of a stone from boiling water, be merged with their nonphysical manifestations
through oaths. Every participant in the trial by ordeal is required by Æthelstan to swerige ðonne
þone að þæt he sy mid folcryhte unscyldig ðære tihtlan, ær he to þam ordale ga274 ‘swear an
oath under common law that he is innocent of the accusation, before he goes to the ordeal.’ In
presenting this oath before ordeal, the role of divine intervention to punish those who might
abuse their ability to swear ensures that only an honest person would be vindicated in his trial.
As Lisi Oliver suggests, inherent in this swearing is the idea that deceitful words would invoke
divine punishment mandated by the curse for speaking falsely.275 It is this sanctified nature of
the oath that obliges its inclusion in the ordeal’s otherwise physical expression of justice. Thus
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the ordeal exemplifies, when the defendant survives the physical test, the power of the oath to
certify innocence and to liberate an accused person.
Just as the verbal declarations of innocence before ordeal serve to guarantee the
defendant’s freedom, should he survive the ordeal, the addition of other compurgators, or
‘oath-helpers,’ also moves the character of the defendant beyond the realm of legal attack.
While it is easy to confuse the addition of further oath swearing with witnesses in the strictly
modern sense, Wormald notes that the addition of oaths by other parties involves primarily
vouching for a good character rather than “actual evidence of witnesses as to particular facts at
stake.”276 In Wihtræd’s legal code, the provision for drawing on assistance using oaths reads:
Ceorlisc man hin feowra sum his headodgemacene on weofode; ond ðissa ealra að sie
unlegnæ277 ‘A common man with three other men who are his social equals at the altar can clear
himself [by oaths], and the oath of all of them is not able to be broken.’ Compurgation allows
for the community to take a direct hand in the use of legal oaths. However, in asking for
additional help in testing legal words the Anglo-Saxon legal system inadvertently creates the
possibility for further competition between opposing sides, as each group maneuvers to outswear the other. For example, King Alfred’s law regarding the failure of one party to fulfill
solemn pledges allows that se oðer, gif he hine treowan wille in xii circum do he ðæt278 ‘the other
party [being accused], if he wishes to clear himself of a charge, let him perform [oath swearing]
in twelve churches.’ The implication within this passage is that whoever has the most oaths will
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offer a more honest version of events and therefore will win the case. Veracity appears to be
replaced with quantity rather than quality, and thus the value of what is said becomes negated.
The Grágás laws on assembly procedures make very clear that giving one’s word is a
very serious action, one that requires the presence of not only the defendant for the swearing,
but also the chieftains in charge of rendering the verdict.279 These oaths guarantee that proper
procedure is followed for the summoning of witnesses and that the corroboration of their word
is made in a legitimate way. Furthermore, all those men who vouch for another are bound by
oaths similar to those issued by the plaintiff and defendant. Grágás distinguishes two separate
classifications for these witnesses based on the timing of their oath-taking. The most important
of these is the compurgator, a witness responsible for giving endorsement to those oaths taken
prior to trial. Much like the oath of the plaintiff and defendant, these men give additional
assurance that their party would pursue the case sem hann hygr sanazt oc rettaz oc hellzt at
lögom,280 “in the way he thinks most true and right and most in accordance with the law.”281 In
binding the prosecution and defense to witnesses by oaths, the court has the power to levy
serious penalties on those who abuse the legal system by manipulating truthfulness, as well as
the family members and friends who would assist in perpetrating this fraud. While the swearing
of compurgators provides no direct testimony to be used in the proceeding, it again adds an
important moral weight behind the oaths already presented before the trial is initiated.
As well as using oaths as pre-trial authorization through compurgitorial oath takers, the
Icelandic legal system also invests the words of a sworn witness with the level of credibility
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necessary to ascertain the defendant’s guilt or innocence during the presentation of the case
itself. The words become the proof necessary to make the case. This responsibility, however,
requires that the witness cannot change his testimony to affect the trial’s outcome. Grágás
requires these speakers to offer evidence for þav öll er þeir hafa verit I nefndir,282 “everything
they were named to witness,” providing no opportunity to omit or alter any information.283
Oaths impose an order upon the words spoken, and when additional attestants swear with the
same words this adds further credence to the veracity of the testimony. As Jónsbók states: Sva
er ef einn berr vitni með manni sem engi beri, en .ii. sem .x., ef maðr uggir eigi anditni i moti,
“And if one bears witness for a man it is as if no one bears [it], but two are as [good as] ten, if
the man does not suspect contrary testimony in the matter.”284 And while including more than
one witness bolsters the proof, consistency must be maintained throughout to minimize
problems with memory or perspective that potentially create differing testimony among various
oath takers. Grágás, therefore, states that:
Ef maðr hefir þa söc at søkia er vattorð fylgir. oc a hann at beiða rettingar at oc
framburþar. váttar scolo vina eiða aðr oc bera vetti siþan. Þa bera þeir rétt vætte ef þeir
bera þav orð öll er þeir voro at nefndir… Lengr er þeir ero asáttir scale in fram telia
vætte. en aðrir giallda á samquæþi sit.285
If a man has to prosecute a case in which testimony figures, he has to ask the witness to
frame the wording of it and deliver it. Witnesses are first to swear oaths and then give
their testimony. They give their testimony rightly if they utter all the words they were

282

K, 1: 58.

283

Grágás, 1: 69.

284

Jónsbók, p. 9.

285

K, 1:57.

127

named to witness...As soon as they are agreed, one of them is to utter the testimony
and the others give their assent.286

Such confidence is placed on testimony sworn with an oath that Icelandic law provides that even
if the person delivering the words falls ill, or is injured, he can swear this testimony on to other
witnesses who can repeat the statement before the court with as much authority as the original
presenter.287 The fear of providing support for untrue words and the intrinsic belief that a curse
threatens the soul of the false speaker ensures the honesty of these statements.288 Without the
assistance of these words, cases are not able to move forward through the judicial system. Thus,
the full legal potential of the oath is reached through the evidence submitted in the
presentation of testimony given under the guarantee of oaths.
Adding testimony from other individuals who are not directly linked to the case as either
plaintiff or defendant, particularly when a case requires more than a single compurgator,
creates a potential crisis when both parties can employ witnesses to swear for their respective
sides. Obviously, both groups in the case cannot enjoy the benefit of oath-helpers, particularly
when trying to determine responsibility. To bypass this complication Grágás offers this
provision:
Lengr er þeir ero asáttir scale in fram telia vætte. en aðrir giallda á samquæþi sit. Nv
verþa þeir eigi allir a eitt sáttir oc scolo þeir hafa sítt mál er fleire ero saman. oc scal
maðr vætte tellia fram or þeirra flocke. hinir school giallda samquæði sitt á er lið hava
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mina af þvi at þeir hafa eigi afl til anars. Enn þeir scolo þat mæla þa er þat vætte er borit
at þeir mundi ana vætte bera ef þeir hefði afl til. oc queða a huert vætte þeir mundi
bera. oc verðr þeim eigi at liúg vætte þott hinir se sottir vm. Nv verða þeir iafn margir
hvarir tuegio er sitt vilia bera huarir. oc scolo þeir hafa sitt mal er lengra vætte bera.289
As soon as they are all agreed, one of them is to utter the testimony and the others give
their assent. If they do not all agree on the same thing, then those in the majority are to
prevail, and a man from that group is to utter the testimony. The minority are to give
their assent, because they do not have the numbers to do otherwise, but when that
testimony is given, they are to say that they would have given different testimony if they
had the numbers, and state what testimony they would give, and this is then not false
witness on their part even if the majority are prosecuted for that. If they turn out to be
equal in number, the two groups who each want to give their own version, then those
are to prevail who give longer testimony.290

Thus, the problem of which side will benefit from the testimony of witnesses is a matter of how
many supporters that individual can raise to swear for his side. As William Ian Miller comments,
“success or failure of a disputant’s claim hinged less on matters of proof than on his ability to
recruit support for his case.”291 Assistance from the family group, or those who are their allies,
becomes all the more important when their statements are vital in the competition for oaths.
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The competition for oaths, as a result, draws more people into the process of swearing and
heightens the danger to the community should those oaths be broken.
In investing such importance in the oath, Icelandic legal systems also increase the
danger of allowing serious crimes through a person’s manipulation of words. The very real
threat of perjury endangers the oath system by conceding credibility to speech that should not
be given any level of trust. Because the protection of swearing is necessary to keep the
Icelandic judicial process running smoothly, the legal texts make very clear that abuse of the
oath process is an offence that merits a serious response. The punishment for falsehood,
according to Grágás, is lesser outlawry þav oll er borin verða a varþingi eða a heraðs dómom
heima i heraðe. Þegnscapar lagning eða quið burði eða vetti þat varðar fiorbavgs garð292 “for
falsehood in any formal means of proof at a spring assembly or locally at district courts, in giving
one’s word of honor or a panel verdict or testimony.”293 The law, therefore, does not tolerate
any abuse of the legally prescribed uses of language, and it makes an effort to try to remove
anyone convicted of the crime of lying under oath from the community. Regarding questionable
oaths, Grágás also states:
Huar þess er mðr hefir þan eið vnin er hann hefir fleira undir scilit oc verðe hann
tortrygðr vm eiðin þa er hann scal þav fleire gögn af hende leysa er eiðar eigo at fylgia.
þa scal hann þar lata bera vætte þat er hann nefnde at þa er hann van eiðin eða vina
ella eið i anat sin.294
Whenever a man has sworn an oath to cover several points and doubt is raised about
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his oath when he comes to perform other legal acts in which oaths are to figure, then he
is to have witnesses brought whom he named to witness it when he swore the oath or
else he is to swear again.295

The implication behind this law is that once a person’s words become suspect, he loses the
ability to be trusted and everything he says becomes doubtful. The need to call the confirming
witnesses to the oath also casts doubt onto the words of the compurgators, and the entire
group becomes tainted through the suspicion that their language is dishonest. But reliance on
the oath is required in some cases, particularly in cases involving homicide, where the
Staðarhólsbók manuscript of Grágás adds that for those who varna eiðana þa er þat fiör bavgs
söc um eið fallit,296“refuse the oaths, there is a lesser outlawry case for the oath-lapse.”297
Concealing the truth through a refusal to swear makes a man guilty of trying to obscure the
truth, and therefore in need of punishment.
Challenges to oaths are found not only in the swearing of suspicious oaths or in the act
of revealing deception, but also in the form of oaths given “correctly” that attempt to get
around the purpose of the oath. In Chapter 37 of the personal rights section of Jarnsiða the
following provisions are included regarding oath taking:
Sva liz oss oc oðrum skynsomom monnom, at up þa iafnaðar æiða, sem menn hava haft i
sættargerðom manna, at þat se mæirr með ofkappe gort, helldr en logom oc rættindom.
Oc af þui at ver hovom ollom monnom log suaret i rikino, þa viliom ver at þesser æiðar

295

Grágás, 1:75.

296

Grágás efter det Arnamagnæanske Haandskrift Nr. 334 fol., Staðarhólsbók og en Række andre
Haandskrifter. Vilhjálmur Finsen, ed. (1883; reprint, Odense: Odense University Press, 1974), p. 305.
Hereafter cited as St.
297

Grágás, 1:211.

131

falle vannlega niðr, oc þa æina uppi lata sem logbækr vatta, en þat ero dul æiðar, oc um
kenzlu mal þau, sem æige ero logleg vitne til.
Sva liz oss oc haskasamlegt fire guðe, at þar sem sa maðr suerr fire, sem male a
at suara, þa skulo aller sueria epter hans æiðstaf, þo at þeir vite eige hvart er þeir sueria
satt eða æige. Nu viliom ver þa skipan a gera, at sa sueri fullan æið fire sek, er fire male
er, en aðrer sanne hans eið, með þui skilorðe, at eige vito þeir sannare fire guðe, en þeir
sueria.298
Thus it seems to us and to other prudent men that about oaths of equity that men have
observed in the making of agreements of men, that those are done more through
stubbornness than in accordance with law and justice. And because we have confirmed
by oath the laws in our kingdom for all men, then we wish that these oaths be dropped
altogether, and those only come forward that the law confirms, and those are oaths of
denial and oaths in cases of circumstantial evidence to which there are no lawful
witnesses.
Likewise it seems to us dangerous before God that whenever a man swears an
oath, who has to answer in a case, then all those swear according to his oath-formula,
even though they do not know whether they are saying the truth or not. Now we wish
to make this change, that he shall swear a lawful oath on his own behalf who is to
answer the charge; and the others affirm his oath, with this condition, that they did not
know [it to be] truer before God, when they swear.299
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The complaint of the Norwegian king, Magnus Hákonarson, regarding the oath process is that
not only are the witnesses lying, but also aspiring to misrepresent these dishonest words as
truthful ones. In correcting the way in which the people are making their oaths, Járnsíða reveals
how easily the language lends itself to manipulation and how vigilant the law is required to be in
order to prevent this exploitation. While the power of the oath is undeniably strong, it is also a
power that the Icelandic world recognizes as precariously close to being a threat to the very
system that requires it to function.
As powerful as oaths seem to be within the Icelandic world, the Anglo-Saxon laws also
recognize the same dangerous potential for their abuse; as a result, English kings frequently
attempt to regulate oath-taking through strict punishment for those seeking to abuse the
system. Just as a murderer can exploit the oath given by the killer of a thief to excuse the
commission of homicide and the combined falsehood of four men becomes irrefutable ‘truth,’
the awesome and dangerous potential of language requires restriction in its legal sense in order
to ensure honest usage. Of particular concern are perjury and slander, the deliberate misuse of
words for personal gain or to escape punishment. Æthelstan’s code recounts the mandate for
punishment forþon ðe ða aþas ond þa wedd ond þa borgas synt ealle oferhafene ond
abrocene300 ‘because the oaths and the pledges and securities are all ignored and broken.’ The
first step toward preventing the abuse of legal oaths is removing the ability to swear from those
Anglo-Saxons found guilty of committing these crimes. Æthelstan declares: Ond se ðe manað
sweroge, ond hit him on open wurþe ðæt he næfre eft aðwyrþe ne sy301 ‘And the man who
should swear a false oath and it becomes evident about him, then he shall never afterwards be
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worthy of giving oaths.’ To lose such a personal right to participate in the legal rituals of a
culture so strongly tied to language is a profound punishment not only to the individual, but also
to the family and community dependent on these words for support in future matters.
Likewise, nalles þa gegildan, 302 ‘the associates [of the slain man] are not allowed [to offer oaths
in his defense],’ preventing people even suspected of collusion with a person acting in a
dishonest way from taking action against the killer of the thief. Because the thief is considered
inherently insincere, merely associating with him is reason enough to distrust the words of his
friends and family. In devaluing the word of the community, Ine’s law makes prevention of
crime the responsibility of not only the individual, but also the entire kin group or neighbors
who stand to lose verbal protection through one person’s misconduct.
Punishing the social group of the accused liar was not the only answer available to the
law as a means to curtail false swearing. Anglo-Saxon kings also had available at their disposal a
variety of effective punishments designed to give stronger assurance to the safeguarding of
truth through more lasting reprisals. One such law by Edgar states that a slanderer should have
his tungan scyldig303 ‘his tongue cut out.’ Cutting out the tongue is a symbolic gesture, removing
the offending body part from the lawbreaker to get rid of the impurities. Likewise, without the
tongue, no possibility exists for repeating slander, and the extreme reaction to this crime is
designed to ensure an individual maintain careful scrutiny over his words at all times. Under
similar circumstances, Cnut’s code announces that any man convicted of swearing false oaths on
haligdome ‘holy relics,’ he will ðolie ðara handa, ‘forfeit those hands.’304 Amputating the hands,
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much like cutting out the tongue, ensures that the perjurer will never again take oaths because
he lacks the ability to hold the relics for swearing. Thus, the law guarantees harsh physical
reprisals on all of those criminals who are caught in the act of manipulating oaths for their own
advantage in order to discourage this behavior and preserve the sanctity of speech required for
the Anglo-Saxon legal system.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE FOR THE LEGAL APPLICATION OF SWORN LANGUAGE
Though Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic laws provide useful indications of the power and the
potential abuses of swearing, it is worth noting that the legal texts themselves offer only a
limited perspective of the practical daily operation of sworn language. The prescriptive nature
of legislation is designed to discourage objectionable behaviors through punishment, while
simultaneously encouraging socially positive conduct through legalized justification. Yet, such
legal regulations do not always directly correspond with how swearing is actually performed
outside of a hypothetical context.305 Only by finding the scarce evidence of genuine legal
swearing, when it is applied to practical situations, can the authentic application of such
theoretical paradigms be translated into an understanding of actual, concrete action.
The body of extant documentary evidence in the early medieval world, however, is
limited by the scarcity of written records describing such transactions involving oaths and
pledges in any sufficient detail. Although an abundance of accounts exists to describe court
proceedings throughout England in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, only a meager number
of cases survive for the early Anglo-Saxons and much of that information is recorded
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indirectly.306 Michael Clanchy, in From Memory to Written Record, places the number of extant
writs and charters from Anglo-Saxon England at approximately two thousand, a quantity
comparable to “a single session of the royal justices in eyre in an average-sized county” during
the thirteenth century.307 Icelandic documentary sources, likewise, offer sparse accounts
describing the political and legal realities for the island’s early period. Byock explains, “Icelandic
annals, diplomatic texts, and church writings offer only limited information about the early
society.”308 Hallvard Mageroy also characterizes legal writing for medieval Scandinavia as, “a
literary superconstruction upon a judicial practice that was principally still non-literate, one that
preserved old oral formulas and inherited juridical symbols.”309 The combination of prior oral
traditions and the slow movement of Christianized, Latin-based writing into the extreme north
results in scant written testimony to the practical implementation of swearing. Additional
complications for Anglo-Saxon scholarship come from what Wormald describes as, “no
acknowledged corpus of Anglo-Saxon lawsuits,” although he does present a catalog of ninetyfive records associated with primary court cases from this period.310 Iceland’s deficiency in
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recorded evidence, also perceptible, is attributable to either the harshness of its climate or an
early dependence on orality. Such an environment also makes it difficult to uncover actual
sworn language in any early context. As Miller notes, “The greater part of the surviving written
record from which we can hope to reconstruct a social history is either narrative or normative,
that is, either sagas or law.”311 In the absence of definitive documentation of how oath-taking or
pledging is actually contracted among the early Icelanders, we must extrapolate its particulars
from those sources that are available. Such restrictions to our understanding enhance the
appreciation for the limited proof, even tangentially attached to swearing, gleaned from the
documentary sources. Although the evidence for genuine acts of legal swearing is not as
ubiquitous as the act itself must be, it is possible to interpret those extant sources to provide
some small insight into how the principles of the law are actually applied in real legal situations
when plaintiffs and defendents put the legal rituals into practice.
In the absence of extensive records for Anglo-Saxon and early Icelandic court
proceedings, it is necessary to shift the documentary investigation toward the collections of
cartulary, testamentary, and epistolary writings available from this period. Though such
documents are written for alternative purposes, such as granting lands or conferring about
matters of religious concern, they are still legitimate legal texts and often include useful
passages tangentially related to expressions of honesty. Such glimpses into these various legal
situations offer adminicular (secondary) evidence about the universality of swearing and the
various challenges presented by this activity. Among such diplomatic texts are wills, the written
bequests of prominent citizens, which offer compelling indications about the range and
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authority of swearing among these medieval communities. Extant wills, especially those found
in the shires of Anglo-Saxon England, present statements that focus attention on maintaining
legitimacy and accuracy of the words used in each bequest.312 At the heart of such
testamentary writing is the assumption that the words of an individual, when he is no longer
capable of defending them, will be respected. As such, it is not surprising that these documents
frequently include statements closely associated with binding the words of the text to the
speaker’s desire to have constancy in execution of his last will and testament. One such
declaration appears in the closing warning from the will of Thurstan of Norfolk, a wealthy
eleventh-century landowner, seeking to make the document unalterable by binding the words
to a promise of retribution for dishonesty. The text states: Se þe þis quide awenden will, buten ic
self it be, god him fordo nu and on domisday, ‘He who wishes to alter this will, unless it be I
myself, may God destroy him now and on the Day of Judgment.’313 While this curse offers no
direct support for swearing, the punishment it invokes is aligned with those cautions against
perjury by evoking the power of supernatural punishment. Likewise, this statement is rooted in
the assumption that all respectable individuals, especially those fearful of the spiritual
punishment cited, will abide by the contents of the document. Thurstan’s will is not alone in
attempting to prevent fraudulent alteration of the language of his bequest, an indication of
widespread concern about the potential accuracy of expressions, especially written ones, to be
vulnerable to those individuals malicious enough to illegally modify or even counterfeit them.
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In addition to curses designed to keep documents unchanged and genuine, wills also
conclude with the names of those witnesses attesting to the integrity of the text. Such lists of
signatures corroborate the wider role played by the community as the guardians of truthful
expression. Although testamentary documents record no actual oath-taking language among
the accounts of signatories, it is a safe assumption that the process of signing is linked to a
declaration substantiating the legitimacy of the text.314 Only by joining the rank and reputation
of witnesses to the document itself could doubts about accuracy be effectively silenced.
Thurstan, in granting his estate at Wimbisc to Christchurch, evokes many notable individuals at
the conclusion of his bequest. Among the attestors mentioned in this document are King
Edward, the Lady Ælfgifu, Archbishop Eadsige, two earls, bishops from the major cities of
Lundene (London) and Winceastre (Winchester), and many other members of the nobility.315
Few would dare dispute the witness of the king, especially when associated with the other
religious and secular authorities present. Thurstan additionally calls on ealle þa þegenas on
Eastsexan, ‘all the thegns of Essex’ to provide him with the final measure of support. This
method of inclusive corroboration is again used by Thurstan in a second testamentary
document, where he involves an even larger group of witnesses from various locations innon
Norfolke ‘in Norfolk,’ innon Suffolke ‘in Suffolk,’ in Grauntebreggeschire ‘in Cambridgeshire,’ and
innen Essexe ‘in Essex.316 This catalogue ensures the involvement of a wide body of individuals
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to authenticate this will, allowing for even stronger testimony from additional members of the
community. Even if one group of witnesses is sufficient to declare Thurstan’s original document
valid, the careful inclusion of further supporters minimizes potential objections and maximizes
the safeguards against potential alteration, especially the crime of forgery. Although the
ancillary evidence offered by these wills does not provide us with the wording of an actual oath
taken by the signers, they do indicate a strong community awareness of the protection of
honest communication through reputation and authority, the foundational principles upon
which oath-taking is constructed within the legal texts.
In addition to the sparse attestations occasionally referencing swearing, documentary
sources offer further insights into issues of enforcement, which illuminate the complex nature of
this essential legal activity. Turning from extant wills to the evidence drawn from cartulary317
and epistolary sources, such texts further confirm the role of community participation in the
creation of legitimate expressions of sworn language. These charters and letters reveal a need
for additional, external sources of social enforcement to regulate these practices. For both
Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England, the secular and the ecclesiastical authorities are the only
forces capable of acting as the guiding forces in regulating matters of honesty. Moreover, the
accounts make abundantly clear that, in matters of enforcement, the agency of royal rule
outperforms attempts to regulate based solely on community participation.318 Such sources,
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especially when they obliquely mention oath-taking, confirm the active involvement of the
church and civil government with the administration of swearing in these communities. Despite
the continued ambiguity of the exact language of swearing, these diplomatic records clearly
emphasize how critical a role the influence of church and royalty plays in the process of
swearing.
CONCLUSIONS
The legal processes of swearing were both delicately complicated and extremely serious
activities within the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic communities. The value of words to offer
protection, lay charges, and to defend others from accusations are most apparent when they
find purchase within the judicial regulations of these early medieval peoples. A significant body
of Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon legal statutes describe in great detail how swearing, in its various
forms, ensures the proper function of justice by granting legal credence to the words of a
speaker. The preponderance of such laws makes it very tempting to understand all forms of
swearing as identical pieces of legislation, especially when considering how each is founded on
the principle that what is said must be a legally accurate account. Our careful study of the
English and Icelandic legal rituals, however, reveals that the legal function of each instance of
sworn language is divided into a delineated hierarchy of expressions, each more complicated
and authoritative than the last. From the rudimentary expressions designed to qualify
statements as ‘truth,’ we can see the effort to keep language honest by excluding underhanded
intentions or efforts to deceive. Yet within these simple provisions it is also made clear that not
many laws are designed to use only an expression of ‘truth,’ unregulated and unverified, as the
only source of substantiation. Indeed, this hesitation is part of a wider mistrust of the social
dependence on language that underscores both Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon legislation. Given
the genuine risks that language can be manipulated and that truth is subject to interpretation
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more than just occassionally, the communities of Iceland and England both codified more
rigorous methods of making language trustworthy through more formalized methods of
exchange. The pledge, as a more regulated exchange, seeks to close the gap between words
and deeds by requiring money or property to serve as the collateral for trust. By making the
cost of dishonesty substantive, the pledge further affirms the need to address issues of
inconsistency in legally authorized speech. The culmination of such efforts to safeguard
language is found in the oath, an exchange combining the ideological principles of ‘truth’ with
the ritualized consequences of the pledge. Oath-taking, therefore, serves to ensure untainted
indictments, certify testimonial statements of innocence, provide binding commitment to an
individual, or guarantee the highest level of credence for any claim made by plaintiffs or
defendants. Yet, even as the oath is used as the dominant form of legal corroboration, this
study of the law also reveals the existence of a very healthy skepticism in the Icelandic and
Anglo-Saxon legal texts for an unconditional embrace of this means of verbal exchange. As a
result of potential manipulation of even the most revered type of sworn language, the oath,
many laws in England and Iceland are designed to standardize and restrict access to oath-taking
as a means to reduce potential dishonest behavior associated with the manipulation of
language. The legal texts of Iceland and England reveal not only that some types of sworn
language are given more credence, as confirmed by their increased abstraction and more severe
penalties, but also that all forms of swearing are regarded apprehensively for their potential to
be abused. In the end, Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic legal texts offer a curious mixture of
appreciation of and concern for the power of sworn language, a sentiment also discussed within
the literary writings of these times.
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CHAPTER 4
SWEARING AS A LITERARY MOTIF
The Scope of Verbal Guarantees within Literary Texts
Ic on earde bad / mælgesceafta, heold min tela, / ne sohte searoniðas, ne me swor fela / aða on
unriht.319
I awaited destiny in the land, properly held myself, did not seek treacherous quarrels, nor did I
wrongfully swear many oaths.
These words, uttered by the Anglo-Saxon hero Beowulf as he finally succumbs to mortal
wounds sustained during his battle against the dragon, effectively epitomize the attitude found
in early Germanic literature regarding oath-taking as one of the most critical means for judging
the worth of an individual.320 If the pervasiveness of swearing in the legal texts of the AngloSaxons and the Icelanders demonstrates its social importance, then this valuation is further
reinforced by the frequency with which literary writings from the same period make mention of
this subject as a matter of serious consequence. Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger argue in
their book An Institutional Theory of Law, that legislation is only an “ideal entity in the realm of
practical data,” whose meaning is derived theoretically from the social norms it expresses.321
Laws may only present an idealized depiction of how to execute this critical activity, and such
pronouncements typically offer only narrow perspectives through which to gauge the efficacy of
the operation of swearing. As a result, the conceptual framework expressed in legal narratives
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provides only a limited venue to explore the specifics of swearing. Furthermore, the law – by
necessity – must omit the general exceptions, minor details, and extenuating circumstances that
might otherwise obscure or provide loopholes in its prototypical representation of oath-taking
because the interpretation of legal texts is, by necessity, a work of practicality. 322 That
practicality, however, does not excessively limit their interpretations. How that text is read is
“one way of appropriating the symbolic power which is potentially contained within the text.”
For medieval legal traditions though, it is impossible for modern readers to see that symbolism
in practice in the “interpretive struggles” of those who “control the text.”323 Literary examples,
on the other hand, allow greater freedom for a modern audience to observe variations in the
patterns of swearing that the laws alone might only suggest, especially where deviation from
the rules occurs, and to see the symbolic made concrete. Narrative provides a context to
enhance the unembellished instances of swearing found within the law. Because storytellers are
less concerned with establishing universal guidelines for acceptable practices of oath-taking
(something attempted by all legislation), their literary examples of swearing can focus less on
the mechanics and more on the background circumstances or complications that lawmakers
deliberately attempt to avoid. Pamela Barmash asserts that literature often enhances such
moments when legal themes are explored, thereby providing readers with deeper awareness of
the intricate features of how authors or redactors shape the function of action within the
framework of an existing legal system.324 Thus, if law offers a skeletal outline of how swearing
should operate under idealized conditions, literary examples fill those gaps in our
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understanding, illuminating the intricacies of sworn language by connecting the intention
behind the law with the realities of life.
While literary depictions of swearing often function within their respective narratives in
ways closely resembling those exchanges represented within the body of legislative texts, not all
examples of oath-taking correspond exactly to their legal counterparts. Just as the law omits
the procedures for some specific types of swearing, like the oath of blood-brotherhood, many
literary narratives also fail to employ some oaths or procedures essential to the law.
Descriptions of coronation oaths, for example, are conspicuously absent from the literature of
early medieval England and Iceland. This lack stems, on one hand, from the irrelevance of some
of these oaths as a significant literary motif, especially for the inhabitants of Iceland in regard to
oaths taken by kings. On the other hand, literary texts frequently minimize the explicit
differences between the oath types so carefully separated by law, or they omit their details
entirely from the narrative for the sake of expedience.325 As a result, my classification of these
literary examples of sworn language for this study must focus on connections to common motifs
about truth, rather than their representation in a specific type of legal category.
The concept of verity upon which swearing is built serves as a major thematic feature
throughout much of Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic literature. Stith Thompson’s comprehensive
study of recurring literary elements, The Motif-Index of Folk-Literature, recognizes three
important categories – society, testing, and deception – for understanding how honesty relates
to the design of popular narrative. Thompson’s classifications of motifs are organized as a
progression “from the mythological and supernatural toward the realistic and sometimes
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humorous.” 326 The groupings involving honesty are catalogued by Thompson in those sections
of the index where greater emphasis is placed on the interactions between the individual and
society. Likewise, Inger Boberg’s earlier work, The Motif-Index of Early Icelandic Literature, a
foundational text for Thompson’s own survey, categorizes exempla from medieval Norse
literature into identically positioned groups within her own organization of the survey. Thus,
the intersection of personal integrity and public language is recognized by both Thompson and
Boberg as a recurring literary subject worthy of notice within Iceland and England.
The first such classification falls under the heading of “Society,” and it primarily focuses
on social institutions where authority is derived from and exercised over others. Governmental
and domestic relationships, starting with royal authority and proceeding to the hierarchy of the
family unit,327 provide the context for evaluating an individual’s credibility and highlighting the
speaker’s dependency on the integrity in others. In this category, oaths are connected not only
with narrative representations of witness testimony or familial support, but also those
depictions of the actions of kings and political leaders, whose positions of social authority
necessitate involvement with the discernment of veracity. In this regard, literary examples
enrich our understanding of swearing as a social function by adding more detailed insight into
the relationships affected by exchanges found within the law. Likewise, Boberg and Thompson
also identify truth as a central component of “Tests,” the second thematic category connecting
honesty and its expression through swearing to the other social hallmarks of integrity, like
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prowess, intelligence, and reputation. This category includes those literary illustrations of how
swearing provides the means of appraising the integrity and credibility of an individual. Like the
relationships emphasized in the motif of society, the assessment of innocence or guilt as a
function of testing can frequently extend the mere scope of the legal realm. The instances
where this motif appears within the literary canon serve to enhance our understanding of legal
regulations. The ultimate motif involving truth in the work of both Thompson and Boberg,
however, falls within the grouping identified as “Deception,” which represents the most
significant and complex challenges to the validity of swearing. Regarding this section, Thompson
says: “A very large part of narrative literature deals with deceptions. The work of thieves and
rascals, deceptive captures and escapes, seductions, adultery, disguises, and illusions constitute
one of the most extensive chapters in the classification.”328 While some examples may call
attention to the specifically problematic processes complicating an oath, others may illuminate
the complex ethical consequences of such acts, for instance when speakers deliberately attempt
to violate or manipulate the order of sworn language. Categorizing these literary examples
based on their general functions in the narrative allows us to consider how individuals within
society, from a governmental to a personal level, view trustworthiness (and the expression of
this quality in swearing) as something constantly in need of protection against the very types of
exploitation so widely discussed within the literature.329 Therefore, I have structured this
chapter around the motifs of society, testing, and deception because each provides a useful
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framework to consider how the many literary illustrations depicting the nuanced backgrounds,
moral repercussions, and exceptions for swearing can enhance our appreciation of the laws
governing such exchanges.
If the oath attempts to integrate the socially constructed virtues of honor and
reputation with the individually crafted expression of language, then it is not surprising that
literary examples of these instances abound in the literatures of England and Iceland.
Accordingly, Beowulf’s final speech precisely illustrates the general ethos surrounding oathtaking, and its message is even more significant when understood in the context of the catalog
of the deeds offered as the legacy for a dying ruler. The entire poem is, at its core, a narrative
guide describing what a ruler must do to be considered a god cyning, ‘good king,’ a phrase used
successively to describe Scyld, Hrothgar, and finally Beowulf. Levin L. Schücking ascribes three
distinct features to Beowulf’s tenure as ruler, noting that keeping promises is only one aspect of
what makes this hero an honorable Germanic king.330 The other two characteristics of Beowulf’s
kingship, mentioned prior to the claim about his integrity, are the long duration of his reign and
the hesitance of neighboring rulers to dare an attack on his kingdom. While the oaths Beowulf
makes may not be the first feature identified by both Schücking and the poet, personal honesty
remains the defining characteristic that makes the other features of his successful reign
possible. As a result, Beowulf offers irrefutable proof linking the value of honesty with those
other characteristics, like bravery and honor, central to the warrior ethos of Anglo-Saxon and
Icelandic society. The usefulness of how this dying speech assesses truth, moreover, derives
from the fact that the hero lists this virtue among his personal accomplishments, thereby
providing a genuine sense of its value to the contemporary medieval audience. If an imposed,
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enduring peace serves as the critical marker of a prudent and respected ruler, this harmony
depends on Beowulf’s successful avoidance of the searoniðas, ‘treacherous quarrels,’ which
threaten to pull his community into larger and more violent conflicts. It is worth noting that the
Beowulf-poet uses the noun searoniðas elsewhere to describe two of Beowulf‘s more perilous
ventures, the attack of the nicoras, ‘sea-monsters,’ during the swimming contest against Brecca,
and the confrontation between Beowulf and the dragon inside the underground barrow.331
Each of these fights entails facing an opponent whose natural, animalistic fury and use of
cunning methods – underwater assaults for the nicoras and poisonous breath for the dragon –
require an extra effort from the hero to overcome them. For Beowulf to characterize the
potential warfare of the Geats against their enemies in this way suggests he understands the
probability for unchecked, petty conflicts to develop into a greater threat of devastating or
uncontrollable hostility. Although honesty, particularly on the part of the king, may initially
appear to be a personal characteristic discrete from the prevention of a savage or unchecked
blood-feud, Beowulf immediately draws the two conditions, the security of his people and the
power of his honesty, into their natural relationship by following the description of his
kingdom’s restraint in warfare with a pronouncement about his moderation in oath-taking. By
explicitly linking peace directly to his truthfulness, Beowulf makes a powerful statement about
how an individual’s moral integrity provides the community with a foundation upon which it can
prosper.
In addition to enumerating the individual’s responsibility to speak genuinely as a means
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to safeguard the community, Beowulf’s dying speech also raises many questions symptomatic of
the way other literary texts depict the act of swearing. Liberated from the constraints of
establishing oath-taking as a uniform or binding practice, specifically as these oath-taking events
function within a judicial context, the Beowulf-poet is empowered to shift perspectives or
selectively focus the attention of the audience onto details about swearing otherwise
overlooked within the law. Considering Beowulf’s final speech, it is clear to see that the poet
employs a certain level of ambiguity in the way the hero characterizes his honesty, thereby
allowing the audience to find personal application for these words. For example, the exact
nature of the aðas to which Beowulf refers remains tantalizingly unclear, and the audience is
free to ponder if they are related to his position as the king of the Geats or if they are connected
to his previous deeds as a heroic warrior. Because we know neither the language of these oaths
nor the people associated with their offering, only speculation about such details is possible.
Nevertheless, the use of the adjective fela, meaning ‘many’ or ‘much,’ to modify these
exchanges would suggest a high frequency of their use, marking them as significant if only for
the reason that Beowulf must have had more than one opportunity to swear in this way. For
oaths pertaining especially to royalty, two possible types seem to match Beowulf’s previous
description of his deeds: either those oaths associated with forming the bond between a king
and his retainers or those oaths connected to the establishment of diplomatic ties. The ruler of
any Germanic tribe would have good cause to strengthen bonds of loyalty among his own
retainers through verbal guarantees, and he would likewise look to extend the sphere of his
influence with verbal negotiations as the alternative approach to the use of destructive physical
violence against his opponent.
Prior to his fight with the dragon, Beowulf emphasizes the importance of the
responsibilities between ruler and retainer as he recounts his past exploits to his band of
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companions. He says in reference to his former lord: Ic him þa maðmas, þe he me sealde, /
geald æt guðe, swa me gifeðe wæs, / leohtan sweorde, ‘I repaid him the treasures, which he
gave me, in battle just as it was granted, with the gleaming sword’.332 This claim of reciprocation
for previous favor is built on the expectation that a warrior will meet his obligation by behaving
in battle as he formerly agrees to act for the ruler. Here, however, is where Beowulf’s words
resonate most with the reader, who has recently witnessed his band of retainers neglecting to
meet their social or military obligation to defend their lord. Prior to the fight Beowulf instructs
his band: Gebide ge on beorge byrnum werede, / secgas on searwum … Nis þæt eower sið, / ne
gemet mannes, nefne min anes, / þæt he wið aglæcean eofoðo dæle, / eorlscype efne, ‘Wait on
the barrow protected in mail coats, men in war-gear…That is not your venture, nor proper of a
man, except me alone, that he should fight with the monster, perform this heroic deed’.333
Despite their instructions to be merely spectators of the fight, these warriors chosen by Beowulf
to watch the deed share some culpability in not holding true to even this one basic instruction.
The poet recounts that, during the worst of the fight, they on holt bugon, ‘fled into the woods’
in a cowardly refusal to stand together watching the battle from relative safety.334
Not only does the behavior of the retainers reflect poorly on their courage, but it is also
equivalent to a betrayal of the trust Beowulf places in them to provide witness to his bravery.335
The statement about repaying Hrothgar for his gifts of treasure with brave deeds in battle, made

332

Beo., ll. 2490 – 92a.

333

Beo., ll. 2529 – 30a and 2532b – 2535a.

334

Beo., l. 2598.

335

It is interesting to speculate here about whether or not Beowulf is even aware of the flight of his
companions. The poem does not specify if he witnesses their retreat, and the struggle against an
overwhelming foe would certainly not allow for distraction. However, Wiglaf’s return to provide
assistance (in direct violation to Beowulf’s earlier command merely to observe) might prompt the hero to
wonder why the majority of his warriors were not also present to offer help during his time of need.

151

only a few lines earlier by Beowulf during his oration before the fight against the dragon, now
resonates with the audience observing that same hero fall victim to trusting cowardly retainers,
who themselves are not mindful of obligations toward their own reliable leader. Beowulf may
use his dying speech to assert his honesty in upholding his responsibility as king, despite the
failure of his own followers to conduct themselves with similar comportment, to indicate that
blame for the coming difficulty of the Geats lies not with him, but the faithless retainers who
cannot follow his example of proper conduct. Such an implied condemnation of the surviving
Geatish warriors, reinforced later by Wiglaf’s own censure, necessitates Beowulf distancing
himself from their failure with an assertion that he has always performed his role in this
relationship according to the customary social expectations. The leader’s honesty, as
comforting as his fidelity may seem, ultimately has no power to prevent the betrayal of the
retainers who count their own lives as more important than their integrity. Interpreting oaths
through such a perspective, where the faithfulness in the leader cannot guarantee identical
behavior in followers, offers a haunting glimpse into the potential collapse of the essential bond
holding the community together. Wiglaf confirms this view by explaining the effect of their
decision to the cowardly warriors:
Þæt, la, mæg secgan

se ðe wyle soð specan,

þæt se mondryhten,

se eow ða maðmas, geaf,

eoredgeatwe,
þonne he on ealubence
healsittendum

þe ge þær on standað –
oft gesealde
helm ond byrnan ,

þeoden his þegnum,

swylce he þrydlicost

ower feor oððe neah

findan meahte –
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þæt he genunga

guðgewædu

wraðe forwurpe, ða hyne wig beget,
‘Indeed, he who will speak the truth may say that the lord who gave treasure to you, the
war-gear in which you stand – when he often used to distribute on the ale-benches
helmets and war-shirts to the hall-sitters, a prince to his thanes, such as he the mightiest
anywhere both far and near could find – that he threw away the war-gear to his
distress, when war came upon him.’ 336
Wiglaf’s call for the shamed retainers to speak honestly is a scathing indictment of their
collective violation of Beowulf’s trust, which they should have preserved in exchange for the
exceptional equipment he provided to them. Even if the audience might forgive the retainers
for not joining the fight against the dragon, as they are previously instructed, Wiglaf’s
indignation at their cowardly retreat to the woods seems entirely justified. Furthermore, the
audience is invited to make the comparison between the reaction of the majority of the
retainers to the need of their lord and Beowulf’s reaction to the need of his community.
Wiglaf’s explanation of the honest treatment of such undeserving cowards further highlights the
disparity between Beowulf’s own bravery and the serious betrayal of those warriors who flee,
despite being removed from the actual battle and protected by their equipment.337 As Wiglaf
and Beowulf both indicate, a fundamental problem with dishonesty is the inability of an honest
person to prevent lapses of truth in others, even when they are indirect failures to act according
to the expectations of previous words. No amount of justification or complaint by either
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Geatish leader can avoid the complicated effects of dishonesty as it undermines the social
relationships holding together the community.
While the bonds of oath-taking joining a lord and his retainers provides one potential
reading of the oaths mentioned in Beowulf’s final speech, it is also possible that the fela aða on
unriht, ‘many oaths [not sworn] wrongfully,’ refer to the establishment of formal treaties for
peace between the Geats and their neighbors. The length of Beowulf’s reign and the peaceful
nature of that period are both facilitated by the honesty he uses in his political relationships. By
dealing earnestly with enemies, rather than trying to mislead, falsely flatter, or betray them,
Beowulf establishes a clear reason for his neighbors to respect a cessation of violence during his
reign. The most compelling evidence favoring this interpretation of the ‘many oaths’ is found in
the close proximity of Beowulf’s claim regarding his honesty to the pronouncement about the
harmony he experiences with the neighboring peoples. Indeed, a causal relationship potentially
exists between these two points of success in Beowulf’s tenure as king. In his speech before
Beowulf’s funeral, Wiglaf recounts the reasons for fear among the Geatish survivors when the
Franks, Frisians, and Swedes learn about the death of the king. In addition to Wiglaf recounting
the lengthy history of the conflict between the Geats and their enemies, punctuated by bloody
battles, he emphasizes the severity of the problem by stating: Ne ic te Sweoðeode sibbe oððe
treowe / wihte ne wene, ‘I do not expect any friendship or trust from the Swedish people’.338
With the demise of Beowulf, all reasons for believing the Swedish words of peace have also
disappeared, and Wiglaf anticipates their long-time foes will return to dealing duplicitously with
them in the absence of an explicitly honest broker of peace. The impending collapse of the
Geats under the pressure of resurging foreign hostility furthers the reading of Beowulf’s
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principled oath-taking as closely linked to the establishment of diplomatic ties. In the wake of
the tragic death of their king, the Geats lose more than an important military leader; they
ultimately lose the integrity and reliability necessary to prevent their enemies from turning
against them with the unrestrained violence that Beowulf prides himself on having avoided for
the fifty years of his reign.
Comparative depictions of oath-taking drawn across multiple sources yield an
abundance of information about how both Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic cultures typically respond
to internal and external pressures challenging the integrity of such exchanges.339 As exemplified
by the alternate interpretations of Beowulf’s dying remarks about honesty, the representations
of swearing within the corpus of extant literature from Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England can
enrich our appreciation for this legal feature. Although we may be tempted to dismiss the oaths
mentioned above as both overly vague and entirely inconsequential, they actually provide
salient points of inquiry allowing us to connect Beowulf with a larger body of writing that shares
a mutual respect both for language and for the power it possesses to provide attestation on
collective and individual levels. Searching the corpus of Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic literature for
examples of swearing, however, reveals that many of these texts do not include the actual oath
itself.
For those occasions when the language of swearing is absent from the text, determining
how individuals are bound together through relationships built on loyalty, honesty, and personal
honor is still possible. Looking, for example, at the record of the fight between Cynewulf and
Cyneheard from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle provides confirmation of how directly assumptions
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about a leader’s honesty impinge on the corresponding expressions of loyalty offered by
retainers, all of which ultimately dictates how violent the resolution of feud can become. After
Prince Cyneheard and his soldiers ambush King Cynewulf, their side offers feoh ond feorh,340
‘money and life’ to any royal retainers interested in defecting to their side. Neither side,
however, can negotiate with their opponents without a considerable fear of betrayal.
Cyneheard has already proven willing to attack his enemies when they are most vulnerable, thus
instilling fear that his promises may only be elaborate ploys to lure the remaining warriors to
their deaths. Likewise, Cynewulf’s surviving retainers would be demonstrating an opportunistic
desire for self-preservation at the cost of their loyalty, making them equally suspect for future
betrayal. The forthcoming violence, signaled by the arrival of Earl Osric and the remainder of
Cynewulf’s forces, further emphasizes the impossibility of peace when treachery is present.341
Cyneheard’s second and more generous offer, which he pleads with them to take, hiera agene
dom feos ond londes,342 ‘their own choice of money and land,’ is likewise rejected by Cynewulf’s
forces, whose sole desire is the death of their lord’s killers. While the bloodshed following
Cyneheard’s mistrust is an example of the destructive power of such broken relationships, it also
clearly illuminates the achievement of Beowulf in properly protecting his personal reputation for
being trustworthy and trying to enforce that same behavior on his community during his
lifetime.
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Enhancing the examples of Cynewulf and Cyneheard as support for Beowulf’s claims
about honesty, we need only turn to the corpus of Icelandic literature to acquire additional
substantiation of the firm relationship between trust and peace. One of the strongest instances
of just this type of bond is found early in Brennu-Njáls saga when Bergthora, Njal’s wife,
becomes involved in a bitter feud with Hallgerd, the wife of Gunnar, arising from insults
exchanged during a seating dispute during a communal vetrgrið,343 or ‘winter feast.’ Although
the violence of this feud begins to spiral wildly out of control due to the goading of the women
and increasingly involves higher-status individuals from each household, Gunnar and Njal
manage to remain honest with each other about their desire for peace and continued
friendship.344 During the settlement for the first killing, Njal and Gunnar candidly reconcile over
the slaying of Njal’s servant Kol without the saga redactor reporting any feelings of bitterness
from either party. Indeed, as Njal determines the self-judgment offered by Gunnar in arbitrating
the case, he says: ok munu vit þess þurfa at muna þat, er vit hofum lengi vel við mælzk, ‘and we
two will need to call to mind these things, which we have been saying to each other for a long
time’.345 Njal refers to their mutual friendship as a way to calm the tension of the feud and to
assure Gunnar that peaceful resolution is possible when both men remain confident about each
other’s integrity. For these two men, continued friendship offers more benefits than the
escalation of the feud, necessitating that they must rely on the guarantees of settlement to
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contain its spread. This is certainly the case when neither Bergthora nor Hallgerd seem content
to limit the feud, despite the commands of their husbands. Much like the retainers who reject
Beowulf’s final order at the expense of their integrity, Bergthora and Hallgerd also make a
conscious choice to reject the peaceful resolution effected by the men. While the situation in
Brennu-Njáls saga does not precisely parallel the question of obedience and integrity raised in
Beowulf, it does create an equally difficult situation where the hero’s integrity sharply contrasts
with his companions.
In an example commensurate to Beowulf’s own assertion about how closely
peacefulness is coupled with honesty, both Njal and Gunnar maintain an amicable rapport
throughout the violent course of the feud. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the
existence of deeper bonds, like sworn oaths of blood-brotherhood, as an explanation for the
profoundly enduring friendship existing between these two men. The audience is never witness
to any specific oaths sworn by either man to create such a solid friendship, and the prior
conversations shared between Njal and Gunnar express this relationship without defining it
beyond Gunnar turning to Njal for advice. Regardless of how limited the details of the saga are
about the connection between Njal and Gunnar, their words of settlement are sufficiently
strong enough to allow each critical moment of arbitration to conclude with peace until the
women again incite trouble; when that resolution is subsequently broken by the wives, each
new eruption of violence can return to harmony because, as Beowulf implies on his deathbed,
the absence of deception creates a stronger potential for genuine harmony. Neither Gunnar nor
Njal have reason to betray the commitment of their friendship, thus proving Beowulf’s own
association of honest speech with the durability of reconciliation. Moreover, these literary
representations of critical moments emphasize the spirit of trust necessary for swearing to
function successfully, especially when those around the hero disregard his earlier words,

158

providing audiences with a deeper insight into what truth and honesty mean as part of the core
values mutually understood by Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic communities.
The consideration of a motif-based approach in order to expand our appreciation of the
principles of swearing notwithstanding, we must place some limits on the scope of the literature
examined. The rich corpus of literature existing in early medieval England and Iceland presents
fertile ground for the exploration into sworn language’s literary role; no single body of writing
provides more carefully arranged narratives about legal and social interaction than the
Íslendingasögur, the sagas of Icelanders.346 These works, which Carol Clover describes as “an
acentric bundle of interlocking subplots,” provide numerous points of plot where personal
interactions involving sworn language can be observed.347 Additionally, this Icelandic saga
material provides a useful focus on the complexity of Icelandic legal traditions. Hermann Pálsson
states: “It would be a serious mistake to assume that legal issues in the sagas were necessarily
narrated as entertainment by regular storytellers during the phase of oral transmission.”348
Rather than remain silent about the process of legal challenges, therefore, saga narratives
frequently include these moments in vivid detail as they become critical components of the plot.
This focus on the intersection of law and the individual makes the sagas of Icelanders an
important resource for the intersection of social expectation and legal reality for the subject of
swearing. Likewise, Vesteinn Ólason characterizes these stories as possessing centrally unifying
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themes related to, “on the one hand, a concept of honour, and, on the other, society’s laws and
traditional methods of resolving disputes,” which allow many of these narratives to easily
connect with concerns about how reputation pertains to honesty.349 In this regard, the
Íslendingasögur offer many significant examples of oath-taking, providing especially detailed
contexts both for the events prior to swearing and for the outcomes following such exchanges.
While the Anglo-Saxon literary world may lack a comparably extensive collection of
narratives as cohesively connected by subject and style350 as the Íslendingasögur, early English
society is not without its own store of texts dealing with questions of honesty within their
greater narratives, notably within Old English poetry. While some Anglo-Saxon texts may be
more indirect in their representation of swearing than the sagas, they still reveal important
information about social, religious, or moral implications for oath-taking. What unites both of
these collections, however, is the way that concerns over honesty are frequently paired with
themes of community, heroics, and power in identical ways. Thus, even though the English
materials may not overtly provide the same expressions of oath-taking as the Icelandic sources,
they both emphasize the significance of honesty in building relationships between individuals
and within the community. Old English narrative poems, such as “The Battle of Brunanburgh,”
“The Battle of Maldon,” Beowulf, and “Judith,” are well known for dynamic heroes, who struggle
to maintain honor and integrity in the face of overwhelming moral and physical challenges. Like
the sagas, these narratives also provide the audience with moments when the struggles of one
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character become emblematically positioned against the larger questions of reputation and
behavior that underpin these texts. A large body of scholarship written about Beowulf, for
example, evaluates the eponymous hero’s deeds not only in terms of their heroic significance
but also as deeper symbolic messages to be interpreted against the wider backdrop of AngloSaxon religious and cultural values.351 Among those values defining correct behavior, personal
reputation, and honesty are two of the defining traits of the hero, who must strive to match the
expectation of action with carefully spoken words. Although physically overcoming adversity
acts as the most significant measure of reputation demonstrated by these heroic protagonists,
such texts often explore the more nuanced questions about the individual’s relationship with
society in equally important ways. In this respect, the substance of longer Old English heroic
poems closely resembles those sagas considered to be biographical, whose focus on specific
individuals also provides the means by which to consider in more depth the bonds existing
between heroes and the communities in which they live.
Although the corpus of Anglo-Saxon heroic poems is arguably the most influential
collection of literary works from this culture, these texts are only one type of the available
literary sources from early England employing the motifs of sworn language and honesty. The
so-called elegiac poems are another significant collection of Old English texts, outside the heroic
tradition, whose characters also provide us with examples of how honesty functions as a critical
literary theme connecting the individual’s words to the community evaluating the value of that
speaker. The plaintive verses of these poems are often filled with longing for inclusion and a
genuine desire for lasting relationships, all of which bespeak the role of the individual within a
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wider context of social order.352 Moreover, outside the community where an individual’s
reputation originates, words cannot have the same reliability to make them acceptable. As a
result, many of these narratives explore the challenges arising to reputation, especially in the
absence of community support, which occur outside standard heroic contexts. “Deor,” “The
Wanderer,” “The Seafarer,” “Wulf and Eadwacer,” “The Wife’s Lament,” and “The Husband’s
Message,” for example, relate the experiences of individuals disconnected from society, crying
out for someone who knows them while also addressing the influences of time and change on
the durability of such relationships. As Melanie Heyworth says, “All the elegies’ speakers are
socially removed, isolated, and solitary, a state likely to provoke nostalgia for a past that was
socially bonded and secure. In other words, the elegies’ speakers are positioned in situations
that facilitate the possibility for reminiscing nostalgically for an idealistic Anglo-Saxon social
paradigm of social integrity and security.”353 Indeed, these feelings of isolation and social
detachment are frequently linked with the pressing concerns of the speaker not having a sense
of identity beyond the community. The tone of unease that serves as a unifying feature of this
elegiac writing is closely related to concerns about an inability to trust and be trusted by those
unfamiliar with the speaker. As a result, these secular lyrics of exile and social detachment
make excellent companion texts through which to consider the moments in the saga narratives
where community conflicts put relationships with trust and honesty to the test.354
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While considering the many ways Icelandic saga narratives dovetail thematically with
the poetic texts of the Anglo-Saxons, any study of the literary motifs of honesty and swearing
would be incomplete without also exploring the religiously-based texts responsible for providing
the moral framework for society. The most logical texts to provide these worldviews are the
various pieces of gnomic wisdom literature, such as the Old Norse poem Hávamál and the Old
English “Maxims,” that deal with outlining human relationships within the context of the natural
world and within the community. Carolyne Larrington asserts that gnomic poems in the AngloSaxon and Icelandic world are “no mere collections of truisms,” rather they reflect a conscious
effort to depict the order of the world by establishing those natural and man-made systems
within which society functions.355 In addition to the wisdom poetry found within these two
traditions, I also consider other texts, especially religious and mythological works, whose literary
examples provide additional glimpses into the behavioral and cultural norms present within
Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic culture. The Codex Regius manuscript, also known as the Poetic
Edda, includes many such narrative illustrations of the principles central to the social behavior
and characteristics of pre-Christian Germanic practice. In ways similar to pre-Christian writings
about truisms and cultural expectations, Old English gnomic writings also pair nicely with Old
English homilies and hagiographic texts, whose explicitly Christian elements frequently discuss
those social expectations and behaviors that reinforce the ideals expressed within the AngloSaxon heroic narratives and Icelandic sagas. Thus, the Norse pre-Christian and Anglo-Saxon
Christian texts from the religious and gnomic traditions provide additionally important loci for
studying the ways language intersects with morality and social order in the form of sworn
language. Drawing from these foundational pieces of Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic
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literature, therefore, this chapter explores the motif of swearing for its enduring and influential
role. By exploring the ethical context, critical details, and harmful violations surrounding
honesty, we can gain a better understanding of how swearing is closely connected to matters of
society and governance, determinations of truth, and efforts to safeguard these very practices
against the threat of deception.
Swearing as the Literary Motif of “Society”
Oath-taking possesses a social dimension important for its proper function, as
demonstrated by the continuous community involvement in such exchanges. Trusted friends
serve as the witnesses, relatives attest to the probity of their family members, and neighbors act
as the arbitors sanctioning the validity of any swearing. Thus, the rituals behind each act of
oath-taking do more than bring together individuals within society; they also serve as the
implicit guideposts of moral, social, and political order for that same set of individuals. As
Sanford Levinson asserts: “In any case, the limits of tolerance may be marked by oaths that both
measure assent to the community’s central propositions and put the oath-takers on notice of
the boundaries beyond which they go only at the peril of communal reproach.”356 Given that
oath-taking reveals many of the complexities of society, the frequent presence of this motif
throughout Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic literature reinforces how words bind and even make the
community.
Many protagonists in both the Íslendingasögur and Old English narratives seek to
elevate their social positions largely by maintaining positive reputations and trying to prevent
disgrace from tarnishing that public standing. This dichotomy of honor and shame, which guides
behavior within these texts, generally encourages each character to conduct himself or herself
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bravely during battle, to possess a discerning mind, and to match actions carefully to words.
Regardless of how the quest to earn respect manifests itself, any such effort depends exclusively
on the receptivity of the community toward the actions of the hero.357 As Hugh Magennis
asserts, “The insistence on community in Old English poetry is such that in many poems it
appears that the life of the individual has no meaning away from community.”358 Integrity, the
intersection between an individual’s honor and the social perceptions of his character, is the
bridge that links the world of reputation to the essentials of swearing as they are expressed in
literature. Indeed, swearing is governed by four critical features, each originating from the
relationship between the individual and his surrounding community. As a result, the social
aspects of honesty become the foundation upon which the literary world also constructs truth,
especially by means of the force of socially derived reality or veracity.359 These four critical
features for oath-taking include knowledge of an individual’s identity, accuracy of the words, the
quality of witnesses,360 and the integrity of the statement’s recipient.
The societal role associated with each of these features in the constructing of AngloSaxon and Icelandic realities, through the assessment and implementation of oath-taking, is also
deeply associated with the discussions central to motifs of testing or deception. Overlapping
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interests, therefore, can tie these lines of inquiry together, as the exploration of how an oath
can be abused can also foster a wider discussion of how dangerously trusting society can
become. This interwoven framework allows recognition of such overlapping themes present in
these illustrations of swearing. Though all four parts of the process of swearing can be
independently linked to each motif, I have elected to discuss the effect of swearing as a
component of identity primarily through the lens of society. Likewise, the language of the oath
and the quality of the witnesses will serve principally as the emphasis for the motif of testing,
while the reception of the oath will function as the best means to discuss deception. Thus,
while each of the four attributes of the oath may be related, the involvement of community in
ensuring the smooth operation of swearing and the prevention of any abuse through the
identification of an individual based on reputation emerges as the central feature guiding the
process of swearing within the aforementioned literary corpus.
Identity initially appears to be a straightforward characteristic of sworn language,
predicated on the recognition of a unique person through physical attributes and immaterial
characteristics. A majority of English and Icelandic narratives, however, emphasize the struggle
of the protagonist to make a distinctive mark on society by making his or her positive qualities
known to his community. The pre-Christian poem Hávamál eloquently summarizes the
necessity of a positive identity in stanzas seventy-six and seventy-seven, urging the audience to
look beyond the standard markers of reputation.361 The poet says: Deyr fé, deyia frœndr, / deyr
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siálfr it sama; enn orðztirr deyr aldregi, / hveim er sér góðan getr. / Deyr fé, deyia frœndr, / deyr
siálfr it sama; / ec veit einn, at aldri deyr: / dómr um dauðan hvern,362 ‘Cattle die, kinsmen die,
and likewise the self dies; but renown never dies, for whomsoever gets a good reputation for
himself. Cattle die, kinsmen die, and likewise the self dies; but I know one thing that never dies:
the reputation of each dead man.’ Considering the importance of defining the intangibles of
personal status, identity becomes an interesting combination of family lineage, wealth, and
personal actions working together to define the individual. Sworn language, as one of the key
determiners of reputation, also plays an important role in the formation of social status.
Moreover, swearing deliberately invokes the individual’s name explicitly to link personal
notoriety with the success or failure of each oath.363 Obtaining a lasting reputation, as
advocated by Beowulf and the poet of Hávamál, means that each person must learn to balance
personal connections to the community with expectations of honesty.
When identity is obscured or mistaken, however, problems can arise for the success of
the language of oath-taking. The importance of recognition can be clearly seen in the passage
from Beowulf when the Danish coast-guard cautiously approaches the party of Geatish warriors
in order to ascertain their purpose in seeking Heorot. Margaret Pepperdene identifies this
episode not only for the literary connections “between classical antiquity and the heroic age of
western Europe” within the poem, but also for the way that this initial encounter between
Beowulf and the Danes provides the point at which “Beowulf’s adventure in Denmark actually
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begins.”364 The guard challenges: Nu ic eower sceal / frumcyn witan, ær ge fyr heonan /
leassceaweras on land Dena / furþur feran, ‘Now I would know your lineage before you from
hence go further into the land of the Danes as spies’.365 This request bespeaks the larger
assumption that any unknown man cannot possibly express his intentions without evoking
suspicion in the mind of the listener. In the lines prior to this question, the sentry expresses the
complexity presented by a war-band entering Hrothgar’s land so openly and with the seemingly
heroic appearance of their leader. Nis þæt seldguma, / wæpnum geweorðad, næfne him his
wlite leoge, / ænlic ansyn, ‘That is not a retainer distinguished by weapons, unless his look, the
excellent countenance, plays him false’.366 Indeed, the sentry’s identification of the warriors as
leassceaweras, ‘spies,’ implies that their anonymity and the nature of his duty prevent him from
trusting their words, even if a full explanation of their purpose is given. It is not until Beowulf
identifies his father, a man known in Hrothgar’s kingdom, that the sentry can relax his suspicions
slightly.367 Providing his lineage grants Beowulf tolerance inside the kingdom by creating
accountability, acknowledging who is ultimately responsible if these warriors are caught making
trouble for the Danes. Indeed, this encounter along the Danish coastline offers only the initial
test of Beowulf’s integrity through identity, and this routine reoccurs with increasing
significance as the hero approaches the end of his journey.368 Thus, despite Beowulf’s own
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appearance as a heroic character, his language does not enjoy the full measure of trust among
the Danes until it is given the benefit of being connected explicitly to an ancestry known to the
community.
While the example of Beowulf demonstrates the benefits of connecting oneself with an
established identity for the purpose of gaining credibility, the correlation between dependability
and recognition is further supported by those instances when anonymity complicates situations
involving trust. Brennu-Njáls saga includes one of the most interesting moments of concealed
identity within its opening episodes. When the audience first encounters Gunnar Hamundarson,
he takes responsibility for the legal case of his relative, Unn, to recover the money lost by her
father in her earlier divorce. To assist in the complicated process of restarting the legal case, Njal
advises his friend to employ a carefully crafted disguise to mislead his opponent into providing
the exact wording necessary to issue the legal summons for the lawsuit. The saga records:
Nú skalt þú ríða heiman við þriðja mann; skalt þú hafa váskufl yztan klæða ok undir
soluváðarkyrtil móredan; þar skalt þú hafa undir in góðu klæði þín ok taparøxi í
hendi…Þá mun eptir spurt, hverr sé sá inn mikli maðr. Forunautar þínir skulu segja, at
þar sé Kaupa-Heðinn inn mikli, eyfirzkr maðr, ok fari með smíði; hann er maðr skapillr ok
margmæltr, þykkisk einn vita allt; hann rekr aptr kaup sín optliga ok flýgr á men, þegar
eigi er allt gort sem hann vill…mun þá sá orðrómr á leggjask, at Kaupa-Heðinn sé
manna verstr viðfangs ok sízt sé logit frá honum,
Now, you should ride from home with three men, and you should wear a rain-cloak on
the outside with a homespun tunic underneath; then you should also wear your good
clothing under that and carry a small ax in your hand…Afterwards [the people of the

final challenge to identity comes from Unferth’s flyting episode (ll. 506 – 606), which requires Beowulf to
directly account for questions about his past actions.
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area] may ask who the bulky man is. Your followers should say that he is the mighty
Peddler-Hedin, a man from Eyjafirth, and he is traveling with merchandise; he is a
derisive and talkative man, who considers himself to know everything; he frequently
voids his bargains and immediately flies at men when things do not go as he wishes…
public opinion will arise that Peddler-Hedin is the worst of men to deal with and what is
told of him is true enough. 369
Rather than approaching Hrut with a straightforward challenge, Njal’s strategy to reopen the
lawsuit depends almost entirely on exploiting the established social expectations regarding
reputation affecting legal credibility. Njal knows that a persona deliberately crafted to exhibit
aggression and dishonesty will mislead Hrut and his household into believing that no valid legal
summons could come from someone with such questionable moral character. By placing
Gunnar on the fringes of a community, as a traveling salesman, and tainting that position further
with accusations of dishonest deals, Njal exploits Hrut’s own expectations about the behavior of
a guest in his household and his erroneous assumptions about the integrity of a fictional
persona based only on misdirected rumors.
Njal’s effort to ensnare Hrut using social expectations is further elaborated by the
careful way this false identity is constructed. Even the witnesses accompanying Gunnar are not
made less threatening to Hrut, since Njal instructs them to instigate the stories about Hedin’s
flawed character. This lessens concerns over their role in any legal action by giving Hrut the
impression they will be reluctant or unable to support his claims. As clever as this manipulation
of identity seems, the ruse does not succeed for Gunnar. Because he focuses so intently on
disguising himself from Hrut, he neglects to collect the words in the proper sequence with
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proper attesting witnesses to prevent the lawsuit from being declared procedurally invalid.
Indeed, because he enters Hrutsstadir while known as Peddler-Hedin, Gunnar’s refutation of
Hrut’s claim will require him to reveal, before the court, the extent of his effort to conceal his
true identity. Such a revelation undermines the presentation of the case, especially when
procedure dictates that Gunnar must offer while under oath, at þvi at hann segi sok sina fram,370
“that he is presenting his case.” While Gunnar and Hedin are technically the same individual,
such an attempt to manipulate the case undermines any trust that Gunnar may need to
prosecute his claim. William Pencak summarizes the situation as follows: “Njal must use unjust
means (the tricking of Hrut through the disguise of Gunnar) to plead what may be technically a
just case, although both Njal and Gunnar question the moral validity of Unn’s claim. Then
Gunnar, who was trying to catch Hrut on a technicality, trips up on one himself by not having
witnesses present, whereupon he tries to salvage his case by resorting to the same ‘illegal’
challenge he was trying to overcome!”371 Although the plan to disguise Gunnar’s identity may
not be the only complication obscuring justice in Brennu-Njáls saga, it does provide a very clear
example of how important credibility among the community is for the process of justice. Once
the reality of Gunnar’s disguise is revealed and his legal options become limited, he is forced to
rely on strength rather than the assistance of neighbors and relatives, whose reluctance to
attach personal reputations to questionable legal situations is understandable.
Gunnar’s attempt at disguise in Brennu-Njáls saga provides one clear example of how
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important identity created within the community is for empowering honesty,372 but there are
more just like it. Those Icelandic sagas focusing on the lives of outlaw-heroes also echo the
concerns regarding the implicit complications of separating a warrior’s reputation from the
society responsible for validating trust in him. As these heroes become further alienated from
the locus of their identity, the moral challenges to integrity and truth become increasingly
harder to define and control. The initial manifestation of such an erosion of truthfulness often
takes the form of the hero disguising himself by concealing his identity for protection. Outlaws
commonly resort to wearing heavy cloaks, using false names, and otherwise obscuring
themselves to travel freely among the communities that have previously rejected them. Grettis
saga Ásmundarsonar, the account of Iceland’s longest surviving outlaw, provides a number of
examples of how Grettir avoids capture through disguise, while he continues residing among the
very people hunting for him. Using tricks to deceive the community and obscure his person,
however, puts Grettir at an increased risk of his opponents, like Thorbjorn, resorting to similarly
fraudulent means to capture him. One of the best examples of how the erosion of identity
directly threatens Grettir is found in chapter seventy-two of the saga, when he attends the
Hegranes Assembly under the pseudonym of “Gest,” and the crowd urges him to compete in the
wrestling matches.373 Grettir’s initial refusal on the grounds of being a stranger is met with
increasingly forceful requests by the men of the district, until he is eventually offered a very
generous pledge of security to elicit his participation. Haf Thorarinson, who proposes the
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formulaic truce, offers particularly generous terms to Grettir with a moment of swearing
designed to assuage any concerns about violence. The saga thoroughly notes the wording of
this agreement, enumerating the language of each provision, rather than abridging this
transaction, thus serving as an invaluable example of the process of impromptu swearing:
“Hér set ek grið,” segir hann, “allra manna á millum, einkanliga þessum sama Gesti til
nefndum, er hér sitr, ok at undir skilðum ollum goðorðsmonnum ok gildum bœndum, ok
allrar alþýðu vígra manna ok vápnfærra, ok allir aðrir heraðsmenn í Hegranessþingi…Set
ek þessi grið fyrir oss ok vára frændr, vini ok venzlamenn, svá konur sem karla, þýjar ok
þræla, sveina ok sjálfráða men. Sé sá griðníðingr, er griðin rýfr eða tryggðum spillir,
rækr ok frá guði ok góðum monnum, ór himinríki ok frá ollum helgum mannum, ok
hvergi hæfr manna í milli ok svá frá ollum út flæmðr sem víðast varga reka eða kristnir
men kirkjur sœkja, heiðnir men hof blóta, eldr brennr, jorð grœr, mælt barn móður kallar
ok móðir mog fœðir, alder elda kynda, skip skríðr, skildir blíka, sól skínn, snæ leggr, Finnr
skríðr, fura vex, valr flýgr várlangan dag, ok standi honum beinn byrr undir báða vængi,
himinn hverfr, heimr er byggðr, ok vindr veitir votn til sjávar, karlar korni sá; hann skal
firrask kirkjur ok kristna men, heiðna holða, hús ok hella, heim hvern, nema helvíti.”374
“Here I make a truce,” he said, “between all men, particularly to this same one named
Gest, who is sitting here, and it includes all the chieftains and great freeholders, and all
the common men capable of battle and bearing weapons, and all other men from the
district of the Hegranes Assembly…I establish this peace for us and our kinsmen, friends
and relatives, for men and women, bondwomen and slave men, boys and free-men. He
is a truce-breaker, whoever breaks this truce or invalidates this pledge, and he is
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banished from God and good men, from the kingdom of heaven and from all holy men,
and nowhere is he fit to be among men and driven out from all just as widely as wolves
are hunted or Christian men seek a church, heathen men sacrifice at temples, fire burns,
earth grows, a crying child calls its mother, and a mother rears a son, a man lights a fire,
a ship sails, shields gleam, the sun shines, snow blows, a Finn skis, a fir-tree grows, a
hawk flies for the spring-long day with a strong wind in his keeping under both wings,
heaven turns, home is built, wind leads water to the sea, and men sow grain; he shall be
deprived of the church and Christian men, heathen men, house and stone, every abode,
except hell.”
Haf crafts an impressively official truce, praised as being offered with mikilli roksemð, ‘great
authority’ by the audience, and those same assembled crowds also fall for Grettir’s ethical
entrapment with eagerness in their desire to watch Grettir wrestle.375 The extensive list of
adherents offered before the swearing, intended to assure Gest that the entire community will
honor the speech, leaves the Assembly little possibility of refusing the truce without risking the
equally extensive punishment that follows.
Despite the risk of exile and the damage to community honor, the threat of violence
does intrude into the scene once Grettir deliberately reveals himself to his enemies to test their
honor and honesty. For a moment, the truce seems at the point of shattering as vildu sumir
halda griðin, en sumir eigi, ‘some wished to maintain the truce, but others did not’.376 Those
calling for renewed violence could theoretically justify their action by arguing that the
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agreement was technically made in bad faith with an “unknown visitor,” whose initial
misrepresentation of himself before the Assembly should invalidate the entire act. Indeed, an
outlaw denied the protection afforded by law would seem an unlikely candidate to make
credible accusations of dishonesty against those seeking his death. This fraudulent moment of
swearing, therefore, serves no real preventative measure against violence threatening Grettir.
Lurking underneath the light-hearted humor of this foolish pledge, which depicts Grettir’s
opponents as equally imperceptive and rash, is the grim revelation that this abuse of identity
and heightening of the moral danger helps to propel the narrative toward the compromising
behavior that will cost Grettir his life. Grettir’s backing of his foes into an ethically problematic
choice, where they must choose between either a high-cost alternative of forgoing vengeance
or acting in a morally corrupt way, makes it easier for Thorbjorn to forsake integrity later when
the hostilities resume. Pencak observes: “When Grettir appears not as ‘the famous outlaw’ but
as an anonymous ‘Guest,’ he is popular for both his personality and abilities. But the refusal of
the Thingmen to accept common-sense justice and put their feelings [sic] and salvation over an
outlawry verdict sixteen years old signals the end of the sense of honor and decency which had
to support legal technicalities.”377 Thorbjorn does employ evil sorcery to attack and weaken
Grettir after the events at the Hegranes Assembly, thereby risking the same exclusion from the
community – especially from a Christian perspective – which Haf’s language offers as
punishment.378 By pushing the limits of swearing, the hero reveals how delicate these bonds of
honesty are when truly tested. As Grettir turns the forces of identity and honesty against the
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entire community, this behavior only encourages his foes to ignore these very same limitations
later when they resume the pursuit of vengeance against him.
While concealed identity and compromised honor may initiate the moral collapse that
eventually kills Grettir, the consequences of a separation from community are not always so
overtly destructive to the individual. Additional literary accounts of exile confirm that
separation from regular society actively impairs an individual’s integrity. One such illustrative
glimpse into the harm caused by social displacement is found in the Old English poem “The
Wanderer,” from the Exeter Book, which voices the initial hopelessness of the narrator’s desire
to recover from the loss of the companions who vouched for his reputation and established his
identity. The poem recounts:
Oft ic sceold ana

uhtna gehwylce

mine ceare cwiþan.

Nis nu cwicra nan

þe ic him modsefan

mine durre

sweotule asecgan.379
Often I must lament my cares alone at every dawn. Now there is no one alive with
whom I dare to speak my mind openly.
The wanderer understands that, in the absence of a community, his status as an outsider will
continually deprive him of both the ability to speak plainly and to have others recognize his
potential value. Loss of community also translates into a concern for never again being able to
find true camaraderie, as the wanderer must perpetually be a stranger to those around him.
Manish Sharma, who attempts to reconcile the optimistic Christian ending of the poem with its
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earlier elegiac content, believes: “identity cannot be affirmed directly, but must be considered in
light of the fact that the heroic world, the necessary correlate of heroic identity, has been
extinguished. The ground for the heroic subject, therefore, is no longer the rich plentitude of an
oral community, but becomes, on the contrary, the irrevocable loss of that community.”380 The
struggle to reconcile this longing for acceptance with the reservation and skepticism associated
with a stranger represents a serious challenge to the wanderer’s ability to be considered as a
trustworthy and prized individual in an unfamiliar society. The poem further expounds on this
complicated relationship as the wanderer adds:
ond ic hean þonan
wod wintercearig

ofer waþema gebind,

sohte sele dreorig

sinces bryttan,

hwær ic feor oþþe neah

findan meahte

þone þe in meoduhealle

min mine wise,

oþþe mec freondleasne

frefran wolde,

weman381 mid wynnum.
And I, wretched, advanced thence as desolate as winter over the binding of the waves, I
sought, with sadness at the loss of the hall, a giver of rings, where I might find the one,
far or near, who in the mead-hall might know of my own [lord], or who would comfort
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me, a friendless one, to persuade me with joys.382
While the wanderer obviously desires to reclaim the physical rewards of the hall, as measured in
treasure and companionship of the comitatus, his detachment from community logically
complicates any such return. As Patrick Cook relates, “one thing distinguishing this poem from
other Anglo-Saxon treatments of exile is its portrayal of the fragmentation of the comitatus into
monadic units of the individual self.”383 Disintegration of support leads to an increasingly
internalized individual, thereby making openness and the trust built upon that quality even
more challenging to acquire after the loss of this social foundation. Without the attestation of
friends, family, or a living chieftain, the wanderer must endure an uncertain and disbelieving
world whose outlook parallels the skepticism of the Danish coastguard before learning of
Beowulf’s lineage. Unlike Beowulf, however, the wanderer faces a lack of essential community
connections to prove either his identity or intentions to the apprehensive listener.
Wita sceal geþyldig,
ne sceal no to hatheort
ne to wac wiga

ne to wanhydig,

ne to forth ne to fægen,

ne to feohgifre

ne næfre gielpes to georn,

ær he geare cunne.

Beorn sceal gbidan,

þonne he beot spriceð,

oþþæt collenferð

cunne gearwe,

hwider hreþra gehygd
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The wise man should be patient, he should not be too fervent nor too hasty in speech;
he should not be too unyielding a warrior nor too hasty, neither too forward nor too
elated, not too covetous nor ever too eager for fame, before he knows with certainty.
The man should wait, when he speaks a boast, the one bold in spirit, until he knows
entirely whither the intention of the hearts will change.384
As the poem progresses away from the opening lament for lost community, toward an eventual
acceptance of the wanderer’s fate, the poet again reasserts the struggle to find a place for
speech in a world of strangers. Pauline Head suggests that the wanderer successfully
overcomes the challenges of identity only by creating a wider community beyond the one
originally lost in the opening lines of the poem.385 Yet even as the effort to create a wider sense
of association with those people enduring similar suffering is underway, the wanderer again
voices dissatisfaction with the disjointed nature of fractured identity and compromised trust.
Knowing the true intentions of the heart becomes an unlikely task for any human, especially for
an outsider in an unfamiliar community. In spite of the wanderer’s questionable reputation and
the uncertainty accompanying his status as outsider, the closing advice of the poem reasserts
the ability of truth to transcend the difficulties caused by exile and compromised character. As
the narrative moves closer toward its resolution, the poet offers this final advice: Til biþ se þe
his treowe gehealdeþ, ‘He who keeps his faith is good’.386 Focusing on personal integrity outside
of the narrow confines of a physical community allows the wanderer to face skepticism and
uncertainty through an expectation of reliability no longer dependent on the validation of
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others. Despite the limitations on straightforward speech and the loss of implicit trust
accompanying the separation from community-based identity, “The Wanderer” ultimately
describes trust as an idiosyncratic virtue whose value is derived entirely from the potential
strength of personal integrity. Although the poem’s concluding message points readers toward
the way reputation exists beyond community, this consolation comes only in a metaphysical
sense as the community is replaced by a celestial notion of integrity. As a result, the poem
deliberately looks beyond community for the broader explanation of how ideal truthfulness
transcends such boundaries, so that the reward awaiting the protagonist after this life provides
some comfort for his present suffering. Nevertheless, the poet also carefully promotes the
perspective that an earthly, skeptical community remains present while the wanderer is alive,
and this same community continues to judge an individual’s credibility as entirely dependent on
the opinion of others.
Even though the contemplative speech of the wanderer vividly laments the distress
caused by a skeptical community refusing to accept an outsider, other literary examples confirm
the attitude of cynicism by cautioning against trusting without restraint. Such illustrative
narratives advocate for careful examination of the limitations to trustworthiness, especially for
strangers without an established place in the community. Likewise, these narratives seem to
justify the stigma of mistrust expressed throughout “The Wanderer.” No other literary piece
provides more proof for mistrusting the speech of an outcast than the Old Norse
“Völunadarkviða,” an account of the life, suffering, and revenge of Volund the legendary smith.
This poem, found among the mythic tales from the Poetic Edda, offers its audience a suitably
complex moral landscape in which the forces of suffering and estrangement from community
heighten the protagonist’s quest for revenge against the king who exploits and then imposes
separation from the support of society on the hero. Unlike the doubt that saturates the
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landscape of “The Wanderer,” confidence in the malleability of trust pervades “Völundarkviða”
as the hero deliberately manipulates those around him, through cunning and skill at the forge,
to fashion a status as an exotic outsider in order to complete a bloody retribution. Unlike “The
Wanderer,” where the stranger longs for acceptance among a community of trusting individuals,
“Völundarkviða” reveals how the members of a community can fall victim to exploitation when
they fail to question the integrity of the outcast.
Unlike the exile of Grettir or the wanderer, Volund’s exclusion from society initially
begins as a self-imposed condition. In the opening lines of “Völundarkviða,” Volund belongs to a
strong family unit with the support of his two brothers and their supernatural wives.387 When
the valkyrie wives return to their former pursuit of battles and Volund’s brothers depart to find
them, the smith alone remains behind at his forge. The poet describes this isolation in the lines:
Þá screið Egill at leita Olrúnar. Enn Slagfiðr leitaði Svanhvítar. Enn Völundr sat i Ulfdölom, ‘Then
Egil skated in search of Olfrun, and Slagfið searched for Swanwhite, but Volund remained at the
Wolfdales’.388 Unlike his brothers, Volund’s decision to favor waiting over acting, whether
motivated by a belief his wife would return or a reluctance to leave his forge, places him at
serious risk without the protective support of family. Not long after the departure of his former
community isolates him, Volund is attacked by the king of the Swedes, Nidud, who desires to
profit from the exceptional talents of this mysterious craftsman.389 After depriving Volund of his
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wife’s ring, his weapons, and even his freedom to leave the forge, Nidud – at the urging of his
wife – imprisons his skillful captive in isolation on the isle of Sævarstaðr. Despite the best
efforts of the queen to remove the dangerous smith, thereby minimizing potential harm to her
family, Volund ironically uses this same status as enigmatic stranger to manipulate the trust of
Nidud’s children and thereby enact his revenge.
When the poem recounts the journey of the young Swedish princes to Volund’s island in
search of his treasures, the cunning smith quickly lures them by means of greed and
overconfidence to believe his intentions to be honest and benevolent. Volund tells the young
princes:
Komið einir tveir, komit annars dags!
ycr læt ec þat gull um gefit verða;
segita meyiom né salþióðom,
manni ongom, at iþ mic fyndit.
Come by yourselves, the two of you, and come another day! I will let the gold be given
to you two; do not tell the maidens or the hall-servants, or any other man that you two
have met me. 390
Why the boys decide to follow Volund’s request for secrecy is an interesting point of
speculation, and their naiveté contrasts sharply with the calculating nature of their suspicious
parents. Perhaps the two boys were not present when their mother observed Volund’s bared
teeth and sparkling eyes, ámun ormi þeim, “similar to the serpent”.391 More likely, their greedy
desire to acquire the treasure of the smith overshadows the warning of their mother’s cautious
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approach to the smith. Whatever the reasons for their decision to trust, the innocent boys are
drawn to the forge by a youthful expectation that the outsider will honor his promise to
distribute gifts to them. Rather than providing treasure, Volund murders the princes, conceals
his action, and crafts jewelry for the royal family from their corpses. The boys’ promise of
secrecy allows Volund to hide the fate of the boys from Nidud’s household, while he
simultaneously uses their remains392 to craft jewelry for the very woman mourning her tragic
loss.
This same technique of blatant deception under the guise of trusted stranger is
employed for a second time by the smith when he pursues further punishment against Nidud’s
daughter, Bodvild. When Bodvild approaches Volund for assistance repairing a magic ring, he
makes additional promises to the jejune princess to shape the course of his revenge, saying: Ek
bœti svá brest á gulli, / at feðr þínom fegri þiccir / oc mœðr þinni miclo betri, oc siálfri þér at
sama hófi, ‘I will mend [the ring393] so that the break in the gold might seem more beautiful to
your father, and much better to your mother, and to you the same degree’.394 Volund’s speech
exploits Bodvild’s belief that his intentions are sincere in trying to help her. Prior to this
promise, she confides in him, Þoriga ec at segia, nema þér einom, ‘I dare not speak, except to
you alone’.395 Here Volund no longer needs to make a plea for secrecy, since Bodvild herself has
already ensured the isolation necessary for him to exact his next phase of revenge. Just as he
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appealed to the greed of the princes, Volund baits his trap with pride as he promises Bodvild a
secret knowledge that will allow her to surpass both her father and mother in discernment
about the quality of the ring, since only she will know exactly where the flaw will be. The vanity
of such secretive wisdom makes Volund’s enticement more appealing, and whatever caution
Bodvild feels about trusting the mysterious smith is overwhelmed. The rape of the princess
completes Volund’s revenge, while concurrently forcing the smith directly into the lineage of
Nidud’s family and removing his status as outsider in the community.396 Bodvild’s child
subsequently possesses symbolic significance, representing Volund’s ultimate triumph over
Nidud since the murder of the two royal heirs leaves the king no alternatives for the survival of
his family. In the poem’s final stanza, Bodvild candidly reveals the painful lesson she has learned
about not being excessively trusting. As she says: “Satt er þat, Níðuðr, er sagði þér: / sátom við
Völundr saman í hólmi, / eina ögurstund, æva skyldi,” “That is true, Nidud, what he said to you:
We, Volund and I, remained together on the island only for one unfortunate hour, it never
should have happened”.397 If there is accusation in the last lines of her reply, that emotional
response is surely directed toward her father whose personal failure to protect the community
against the potentially dangerous outcast creates this misfortune. Indeed, Nidud’s insatiable
desire to exploit the work of the smith seems to blind him to the fact that Volund possesses
formidable cunning and skill. Ursula Dronke notes that, the “art of the smith is a mystery that
invests him with menace and awe. He is in command of the supernatural forces of fire and
metal: a nature distinct from other men.”398 Under the circumstances, Nidud should have been
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aware of Volund’s ability to twist language and emotion as easily as he shapes metal into
spectacular creations of his own design. The poem communicates clearly a cautionary lesson
about the outsider’s threat to the community, exploiting its most innocent members, and the
failure of the one individual who should act to prevent that abuse. Volund’s lack of credibility
should never have been in doubt, but Nidud’s own avarice pushed him to bring a stranger into
his territory without the appropriate societal warnings.
In conclusion, the powerful role community plays in determining a speaker’s credibility
makes it the most significant aspect of how sworn language can be assessed in the literary
world. The ability of the literary hero’s acquaintances, friends, and family to join the power of
identity to the value of reputation, especially for honesty, complements the task of witnesses to
invest credence to swearing within the law. It is that same community, however, that bears the
responsibility of determining negative consequences, as when facing an inability safely to
determine reputation or when dishonesty is proven. Those who deliberately or unintentionally
fall outside the boundaries of the community, like outlaws, wanderers, and exiles, pose a serious
threat to social order if their actions undermine trust and leave little recourse for punishment
should they succeed in deception.399 In light of such concerns, it is not surprising that a
community moves swiftly to make the testing of honesty a factor tightly connected to the
quality of an individual’s reputation or that dishonesty receives a similar, if not greater,
emphasis in many of the literary narratives.
One concise, yet effective example of how influential the judgment of society is on a
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person’s reputation can be seen in Hallfreðar Saga, where the poet-hero must wrestle with the
damaging fallout for his dishonorable behavior. Kolfinna, Hallfred’s sweetheart, is engaged to
another man, yet Hallfred refuses to honor their betrothal. When Hallfred loses his bid to steal
Kolfinna away, he finds himself quickly fettered and facing dire consequences for his ignoble
actions. Hallfred’s father is only able to make peace between the two young men by offering his
personal oath that Hallfred will no longer pursue Kolfinna. Hallfred feels trapped by his father’s
oath as, no matter what choice he makes, society will assign blame. Initially, he is concerned
that if he holds to the truce, then he will have been humbled by Kolfinna’s fiancé and will lose
his beloved. On the other hand, if Hallfred rejects his father’s agreement to end the fight, then
he will damage his father’s reputation. Hallfred soon comes to the realization, however, that
there is more at stake even than his father’s reputation. Hallfreðr segir: “Hverr mun mér þá trúr,
ef faðrinn bregzk?”400 ‘Hallfred asks: “Who will be true to me then, if my father breaks faith?”’ In
this moment, it becomes clear to Hallfred that the loss of confidence in his father’s oaths among
the community will ultimately result in a concomitant loss of confidence in his own oaths. As
Hallfred’s musings on his situation prove, society will be quick to judge either choice he makes
as proof of deficiency; but, it is only in the negating of his father’s oath that he will create a
situation in which the community will carry that criticism into future generations. To diffuse the
tension and keep the promise intact, Hallfred is ordered by his father to go abroad into a selfimposed exile. The decision to make this a voluntary exile, rather than taking actions that would
require exile, allows Hallfred to retain the general goodwill of his society and minimize the
damage to his reputation and to his family’s reputation. Ultimately, it is the potential for societal
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condemnation that holds Hallfred to his unwilling pledge and undoubtedly prevents an outbreak
of local violence, thus justifying the role of society as an external arbiter of integrity.
Swearing as the Literary Motif of “Testing”
If oath-taking derives legitimacy from the ability of the community to unite known
identity and good reputation into a sense of credibility, the successive effects of this action
shape the reliability of the participants in more significant ways, either positively or negatively.
Narratives exploring such ramifications allow audiences to observe a character’s growth while
dealing with the challenges presented by swearing. Indeed, such literary examples often
explore those very scenarios when swearing becomes exceedingly complicated; what initially
appears as a black or white moral choice frequently transforms into an ethically ambiguous
decision, where characters must struggle against the awareness of how community judgments
will attempt to punish deceitfulness and reward honesty. As a result, the consequences
produced from a moment of swearing are further illuminated by the risks and rewards discussed
in many literary texts. Literary explorations delving into such tests of credibility, therefore,
challenge the notion that honesty is a zero-sum game, where only one side is morally right and
the other is forced to be wrong.401 Thus, it is worth considering more closely how the
interactions between the oath-taker and community, as depicted within the literature, are part
of a larger process of societal assessment, in which integrity is enhanced for those participants
determined to be making honorable choices and diminished for those discovered to be making
dishonorable ones.
Because swearing provides a precise means for the appraisal of personal integrity by the
community, many literary texts justifiably employ this motif as a means of harmonizing personal
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interests with the wider principles that bind the community together. One of the most
important classifications of early Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon literature in which authors engage
with honesty as a serious theme is Old English and Old Norse gnomic poetry. Lynn L. Remly
asserts that gnomic verses offer a “‘universal form of literature,’ which characteristically
‘celebrates phenomena of the natural world’ or ‘promulgates principles of law and morality’” in
clear ways.402 Norse and Anglo-Saxon audiences, therefore, would share an appreciation for the
caution offered by these admonitory poems as they outline the proper function of the universe
or the appropriate behavior required for any given situation. Indeed, many of these wisdom
poems espouse special caution for the treatment of swearing that echoes those same concerns
found within legal texts guarding against abuses. Trust, as Larrington notes, is a universal theme
shared equally between Old Norse and Old English gnomic poems seeking to explain the
individual’s role within both the community and the wider world.403 In the quintessential
wisdom poem Hávamál, although the poet does not directly mention oath-taking, the verses do
offer a glimpse into how language constructs credibility in the Germanic world. The poem
explains:
Vin sínom skal maðr vinr vera
og gjalda gjof við gjof;
hlátr við hlátri scyli hölðar taca,
en lausung við lygi.404
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‘A man should be a friend to his friends
and repay gifts with gifts;
a man should give laughter for laughter
and repay treachery with lies.’
This stanza demonstrates the poet’s effort to strike at the very center of the controversy
surrounding oath-taking as especially vulnerable to manipulation by personal interests. When
reputation and honesty become so malleable as to require falseness in response to deception,
then all that remains is a personal sense of integrity that must be carefully protected against
such a flawed system. Although Hávamál may initially appear to advocate dishonesty, this
complex response can only be judged reasonable as an answer for an earlier act of treachery.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Old English gnomic verses from “Maxims II,”
found in MS. Cotton Tiberius B.i., also echo this cautious view about honesty’s fragile foundation
within the community. Between the behavior of natural phenomenon and enumeration of
emblematic traits, the poem affirms: Soð bið switolost,405 ‘truth is the most deceptive.’ Precisely
what the poet might intend with this line is the source of much scholarly debate, as
disagreement over the adjective switolost makes this expression somewhat troubling. Henry
Sweet favors reading this superlative form as a derivation from the adjective sweotol, meaning
“certain or evident,”406 thereby producing a positive reading of the nature of honesty. Yet such
an interpretation struggles against Hávamál and other texts that would suggest that truth must
be carefully guarded and that integrity of reputation demands close protection. Tom Shippey,
among other scholars, suggests an alternative reading of switolost that connects to swecol,
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“deceitful,”407 to produce a more pessimistic perspective on how truth should be assessed
within the community. If dishonesty is a realistic danger that threatens to undermine
reputation, then the poets of “Maxims II” and Hávamál both understand the genuine danger in
naively approaching language with an expectation it will always function appropriately. By
advocating a cautious approach and a suspicious assessment of each individual’s claim to
honesty, the authors of such gnomic texts recognize the challenge of oath-taking that requires
an individual to risk his own carefully guarded reputation against the potential manipulation of
an opponent’s dishonest language.
Within the lines of Beowulf, the cautionary approach to oath-taking espoused in the
gnomic literature also plays a major role in assisting the efforts of the reader to determine the
worth of the characters within the narrative. Those men who uphold the requirements of their
verbal agreements, like Beowulf, prevail over the challenges to integrity in the way they seek to
balance words and deeds.408 In exploring the boundaries and ramifications of this action,
however, the poet also exposes moments where the audience must interpret how swearing
influences the larger action of the narrative for better or for worse. Indeed, one of the earliest
instances of swearing in the poem occurs when Hrothgar recalls the events that drove Beowulf’s
father, Ecgtheow, to seek refuge among the Danes. In this illustrative example, the context of
diplomatic negotiations seems to provide an interesting background for interpreting this
exchange. Ecgtheow fled from the vengeance of the Wylfings because wearþ he Heaþolafe to
handbona / mid Wilfingum, ‘he became the slayer by his own hands of Heatholaf among the
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Wylfings’.409 Hrothgar presents a solution to this potentially deadly feud by both harboring
Beowulf’s father and brokering an agreement to end the fighting that might result. He relates to
Beowulf: Siððan þa fæhðe feo þingode; / send ic Wylfigum ofer wæteres hrycg / eald madmas;
he me aþas swor,’Afterwards I settled the feud with money; sent old treasures to the Wylfings
over the back of the water; he swore oaths to me’.410 The ambiguity around the identity
referenced by the masculine pronoun he makes the consequences of this particular oath
difficult to determine. One logical possibility reads Ecgtheow as the subject of this moment of
swearing, since he is unquestionably indebted to Hrothgar for paying the wergild to end the
feud. In this sense, as Kemp Malone suggests, the reciprocal nature of such giving might require
Beowulf’s father to bind himself contractually to the Danish king as a way of repayment for
brokering the peace deal with the Wylfings.411 Despite this reasonable interpretation, it is
possible that the oaths are not only offered by Ecgtheow in this context but also by Hrothgar.
Because Hrothgar never elaborates beyond this reference to provide the particulars of the oaths
or the parties who speak them, this ambiguity allows for other potential interpretations for who
speaks and what is sworn.
The large body of modern English Beowulf translations offers very little help to clarify
the potential ambiguity present in Hrothgar’s statement about oaths. Many translators attempt
to turn aside any uncertainty in the passage through an explanatory footnote, offering some
hope of clarity for this unspecified line. A majority of these translators, however, construe the
oaths to be sworn by Ecgtheow, thereby placing him in the service of Hrothgar as a retainer. E.
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Talbot Donaldson’s critical prose translation footnotes the word “oaths” with an explanation
that the individual offering them is “Ecgtheow, whose feud with the Wylfings Hrothgar had
settled.”412 In a similar manner, Roy Liuzza’s translation offers an even longer footnote to justify
the explanation of how this oath might necessitate Beowulf’s arrival among the Danes. His
annotation reads:
Hrothgar pays the wergild for the man Ecgtheow killed, and Ecgtheow swears an oath of
loyalty and support. It is this oath, passed on to the next generation, that Beowulf is
fulfilling (at least this is Hrothgar’s public sentiment; his thoughts in the privacy of his
council are somewhat different).413
To avoid the complexity of this situation entirely, Kevin Crossley-Holland’s rendition of the
passage liberally removes any trace of the pronoun and forces the issue by stating: “Ecgtheow
swore oaths to me.”414 Despite the desire of many translators to turn this moment of vague
swearing into some sort of hereditary test of Beowulf’s desire to fulfill his father’s obligations,
the uncertainty around what type of oaths Hrothgar means and why they might be offered
generates more questions about how readers should interpret the relationship formed between
the Danish king and his Geatish visitors.
Reading the ambiguity of Hrothgar’s statement as an obligation necessitating Beowulf’s
arrival in Denmark complicates the heroic nature of the upcoming fight against Grendel. If the
poet intends us to see this entire quest as merely an effort to reimburse Hrothgar, it devalues
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what Beowulf hopes to accomplish by constraining the deed as an act of obligation, rather than
an undertaking of heroism. Indeed, some support from the text itself argues against an
interpretation of Ecgtheow’s swearing as a compulsion of service, a perspective that gathers
further justification as Beowulf wins more honor after the defeat of Grendel and his mother.
Prior to accepting the quest to destroy the monstrous Grendel, for example, Beowulf seems to
have formed limited connections with Hrothgar for himself. When Beowulf is finally announced
before the king by the Danish herald, Hrothgar only offers the reply that Ic hine cuðe
cnihtwesende, ‘I knew him as a young boy’.415 If the oaths mentioned within the context of
Ecgtheow’s effort to seek refuge among the Danes are indeed creating a responsibility of service
to Hrothgar, then the young Beowulf would surely have been raised in Heorot until that
obligation is realized. Moreover, when Beowulf introduces himself before Hrothgar, he would
not need to say: Ic eom Higelaces / mæg ond magoðegn, ‘I am the blood-relative and young
retainer of Hygelac’.416 Acknowledging a previous relationship would certainly have expedited
the proof of sincere intentions for Beowulf’s visit when his band of warriors is questioned both
by the coastguard and Wulfgar. Thus, while the interpretation of this enigmatic reference to
oath-taking might point to the necessity of Beowulf acting to protect Heorot as repayment of
paternal debt, it seems more likely that an alternative explanation of these oaths provides a
better reading of their function within the wider context of the narrative.
Exploring Ecgtheow’s oath as something other than a contract of fidelity liberates
Beowulf to fight against Grendel for his own motivations, rather than only striving to meet his
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father’s obligation to a powerful friend.417 Considering the oath of Beowulf’s father as simply a
routine component in the traditional process of feud resolution418 also connects this moment in
the narrative with those other texts where swearing tests the resolve of a character to hold true
to his word. One such oath-taking exchange occurs in Grettis saga Ásmundarsonar shortly after
Grettir has been declared an outlaw by Thorir, a powerful individual who uses his influence to
pursue vengeance for the killing of his sons; at þetta væri meir gort af kappi en eptir logum, ‘in
this matter he did more for zeal than according to the law’.419 Much like Ecgtheow’s flight from
the retaliation of the Wylfings, Grettir must now evade an enemy whose desire for retribution
forces a prominent member of society to become an outsider. This displacement of the warrior
heightens his danger to the community by severing any ties constraining the destructive power
of his violence. Facing the prospect of an unjust term of outlawry, Grettir begins dealing harshly
with the people of Isafjord by taking food and robbing their farms until his behavior provokes
the anger of the entire community. Janice Hawes views Grettir’s “unheroic sheep-stealing” as
an action that not only diminishes his social status, but also transforms him into an outsider
“similar to Grendel’s status” or the supernatural Glam, whose predatory actions also make them
antagonistic to the communities around them.420 In the beginning of Chapter 52, the bœndr,
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free-holding farmers of the district, waylay Grettir, overpower him in a fierce struggle, and bind
him securely. While still imprisoned and facing execution, Grettir is rescued by Thorbjorg, the
wife of one of the leading men in the district, after she observes his condition and adeptly
intervenes to establish a peaceful resolution between Grettir and the farmers. The saga records
her capable handling of the volatile situation between the enraged hero and the wary farmers:
Hon svarar: “Vera má, at Grettir hafi sakar til þess, en ofráð mun þat verða yðr
Ísfirðingum, at taka Gretti af lífi, því at hann er maðr frægr ok stórættaðr, þó at hann sé
eigi gæfumaðr. Eða hvat villtu nú vinna til lífs þér, Grettir, ef ek gef þér líf?” Hann svarar:
“Hvat mælir þu til?” “Þú skalt vinna eið,” sagði hon, “at gera engar óspekðir hér um
Ísafjorð; engum skaltu hefna, þeim sem í atfor hafa verit at taka þik.” Grettir kvað hana
ráða skyldu.
She answers: “It might be that Grettir deserves this, but it will be too great a task for
you men of Isafjorð to take Grettir’s life, because he is a famous and high-born man,
although he is not a fortunate man. What will you do now for your life, Grettir, if I grant
life to you? He answers: “What do you stipulate?” “You must swear an oath,” she said,
“to cause no trouble here in Isafjord. You will not take vengeance on any of those who
attacked and captured you.” Grettir declared she should decide the terms.421
In order to conclude Grettir’s struggle against the farmers without resorting to additional
violence, Thorbjorg requires an oath from the hero to act as the guarantor for his release. In
negotiating this bloodless resolution, Thorbjorg demonstrates her prudence, mercy, and
intelligence to her husband Vermund, who initially views sparing Grettir as a mistake. Brokering
this peace, however, allows Thorbjorg to prevent Grettir from expanding the damage already
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done to the community in requital against the farmers who ambush and roughly treat him.
Pencak, as he examines legal injustice unfolding within Grettis saga, characterizes Thorbjorg as
“the first person in Iceland to give Grettir real help.”422 He further asserts: “Thorbjorg is the first
person to place Grettir’s immediate crimes in the context of his larger career and reputation.
She doubts his guilt, and reasons beyond the mere fact of his outlawry to the truth that the
Althing isn’t working well, and that Grettir’s relatives might come after her.”423 Here too another
connection can be made to the situation of Beowulf’s father, whose worth is also recognized by
Hrothgar despite the potential feud he brings into the community. Since Ecgtheow’s
companions cannot provide him with the protection he needs, like Grettir, this protection
comes from outside of the usual sources. Both Thorbjorg and Hrothgar transform the expected
outcome of their respective situations, one operating as an intelligent partner for her husband
by safeguarding his interests in the district and the other as a foreign king intervening in the
feud of an outsider. Thorbjorg, like Hrothgar, also evaluates the fight as a nonbiased arbitrator
who uses the authority of her position to resolve things efficiently. Despite experiencing a
shameful defeat, Grettir actually honors his words to Thorbjorg without punishing any of the
farmers who overpower him. The establishment of this truce shifts the plot of the saga as
Grettir looks elsewhere for refuge during his flight.
Not every representation of oath-taking offers the same successful resolution for
violence as the positive outcomes connected to Grettir and Ecgtheow. Indeed, examples
abound in both Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic literature to highlight the potential disasters resulting
from the failure of language to conclude violence successfully. The gap between credibility and
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mistrust is exploited by the Beowulf-poet when the narrative pauses to relate the tale told in
Heorot during the feast to celebrate Beowulf’s victory over Grendel. This digression about the
bloody feud raging between the Danes and Frisians presents one of the clearest indications for
how troubling the test of an individual’s honesty can be when honesty fails. As the scop
recounts the violent aftermath of the battle between the Danes and Frisians, he explains how
each side resumes a tenuous co-existence by validating this reconciliation through oath-taking.
The narrative explains:
Đa hie getruwedon
fæste frioðuwære
elne unflitme

Fin Hengeste

aðum benemde,

þæt he þa wealafe
arum heolde,

on twa healfa

weotena dome

þæt ðær ænig mon

wordum ne worcum
ne þurh inwitsearo

wære ne bræce,
æfre gemænden

ðeah hie hira beaggyfan
ðeodenlease,

banan folgedon

þa him swa geþearfod wæs;

Then they confirmed the strong compact of peace on two sides. Finn declared to
Hengest with undisputed oaths, with valor, that he would rule the survivors with honors
according to the judgment of the councilors, so that no man should break the
agreement by either words or deeds, or complain through enmity, though they
followed the killer of their ring-giver, lord-less, when necessity was thus imposed on
them.424
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These oaths do not attempt to make Finn and Hengest members of the same community;
instead, they draw additional attention to differences between the two groups by forcing them
into an uneasy peace, an arrangement made even more convoluted by the monetary
compensation exacted from the Frisians in order to conclude the battle. What truly complicates
the oath between Frisians and Danes, however, is the provision expressly preventing jealous
thoughts between these former enemies. The powerful temptation to remember the former
hostility is not preventable through words alone, especially since this single agreement has
application to a large group of warriors only covered by the oath of their leaders. Unlike
Ecgtheow, who successfully brokers peace through his oath and the force of Hrothgar’s
influence, the Danish warriors do not hold to their agreement with Finn for longer than the
length of their winter together. The collapse of this oath leads us to wonder whether blame for
its failure can be placed on Hengest, who seems unable to prevent violence once the sword is
placed in his lap. Here the test of the oath is measured in the ability of the leader to control the
more aggressive impulses of his warriors, and both Finn and Hengest fail to use promises
effectively to enact a real or lasting peace.425 Thus, despite any initially honest intentions for
these oaths from both rulers, the collapse comes from the inability of promises to restrain the
powerful emotional response of vengeance that eventually overrides these verbal bonds.
If the oath-taking process from the Finnsburg episode is one of the most noticeable
demonstrations of the collapse of sworn language in the context of an audience’s attempt to
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assay the personal integrity of a character, 426 similar moments of testing can be found
throughout the narratives of the Íslendingasögur. Indeed, many sagas focusing on the exploits
of poets and heroes open with betrothal scenes that place the protagonists in similar moments
that test the binding quality of the protagonists’ vows. Given the extreme importance of
betrothal arrangements in the world of the sagas, finding these ritualized procedures with the
endorsement of an oath to validate such transactions is not unexpected.427 Under these
circumstances, however, the true appraisal of a speaker’s integrity occurs when engagements
are extended at the request of the protagonist, who often revisits the terms of the original
agreement and provides a subsequent oath to reflect these changes. This exact situation arises
in Brennu-Njals saga, when the formidable Hrut extends his engagement to Mord’s daughter,
Unn, by three additional years while he is abroad in Norway to pursue an inheritance claim.
After consulting with his future father-in-law, Hrut and Mord breyttu þeir máldaganum, “break
the agreement,” to signify formally the new arrangement superseding their previous contract.428
While away from Iceland, Hrut falls victim to the political pitfalls of the Norwegian court,
becoming the lover of Queen Gunnhild as a way to further his inheritance claim and gain
recognition. Hrut’s relationship with Gunnhild, however, forces him to neglect the essence of
his engagement to Unn. Although he becomes the queen’s lover while technically still an
unmarried man, readers now have cause to question Hrut’s integrity as he further conceals his
engagement from Gunnhild. When he does eventually depart from Norway to uphold the terms
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of his three-year betrothal, Gunnhild pressures Hrut to reveal the reason for his return to
Iceland. While Hrut does not technically lie about having a wife in Iceland, he deliberately omits
telling the queen that a fiancée is waiting for him. The reluctance Hrut has to disclose his whole
story, as well as his momentary disregard of the attachment outlined by his betrothal, is the first
sign that his integrity is not entirely faultless.429 The success of Hrut’s marriage to Unn is,
thereby, jeopardized by the queen long before she places him under a curse as punishment for
not disclosing this prior obligation.
The challenge to integrity presented by an extended engagement also dominates the
initial chapters of Gunnlaugs saga ormstungu; the poet-hero’s betrothal to Helga the Fair takes
place under the noted concern that a desire to travel may prevent the fulfillment of any
agreement between Illugi and Thorkel, the parents of the betrothed couple. Indeed, this
concern explains why Thorkel stipulates so carefully: “þá skal Helga vera heitkona Gunnlaugs en
eigi festarkona ok bíða þrjá vetur. En Gunnlaugr skal fara utan ok skapa sig eftir góðra manna
siðum en eg skal laus allra mála ef hann kemur ei svo út eða mér virðisk eigi skapferði hans,”430
‘then Helga shall be promised to Gunnlaug but not betrothed and she will wait for three years.
And Gunnlaug should go abroad and model himself after the practice of good men and I will be
free from all matters if he does not come back as required or his temperament is not pleasing to
me.’ Indeed, Gunnlaug fails to uphold his agreement with Thorkel, and the engagement to
Helga is broken by the poet-hero’s rival, Hrafn, who has promised to take revenge on Gunnlaug.
In this respect, Gunnlaug faces an even greater test of his character than Hrut in the challenge
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to uphold his word. Unlike Hrut’s self-inflicted problems with honest betrothal, Gunnlaug faces
an opponent who actively attempts to subvert his efforts to meet the terms of the engagement.
The challenge to the protagonist’s integrity is further magnified for Gunnlaug, as he returns to
Iceland too late to prevent the collapse of his betrothal and the marriage of Helga to Hrafn.
Gunnlaugs saga unfolds as the eponymous hero continues to lament his lost love, an obsession
that eventually costs him his life in a duel with Hrafn.
This motif of betrothal providing tests of a hero’s integrity also appears in two other
sagas, Bjarnar saga Hítdælakappa and Kormáks saga, which highlight the breakdown of the
agreements as the protagonists fail to uphold their pledges. In Bjarnar saga, Bjorn fails to fulfill
the terms of his engagement to Oddny before she is married to another suitor. The potential
damage to Bjorn’s reputation for honesty, however, is mitigated by the fact that his romantic
rival for Oddny actively manipulates this situation to destroy Bjorn’s successful return to Iceland
for the marriage. As Theodore Andersen notes, Thord adds the falsified detail that Bjorn has
made him heir to his betrothal to Oddny in order to pressure her relatives to compromise on the
terms of the engagement before the hero can return.431 Although the failure of Bjorn’s verbal
agreement in the opening of the saga foreshadows the struggles that will define him throughout
the rest of the narrative, audiences can have some sympathy for his position as a victim in this
collapse. In a similar way, Kormak too is the victim of forces outside of his control that subvert
his efforts to discharge the agreement of his betrothal. Unlike Bjorn, who suffers only from a
rival’s dishonest assurances to the bride’s family, Kormak faces a stronger opposition that
deliberately keeps him away from his fiancée using supernatural means. Þórveig seiddi til þess
at þau skyldu eigi njótast mega, ‘Thorveig worked a spell on him so that they might not be able
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to enjoy one another.’432 Being denied a happy marriage due to the manipulations of
enchantment makes Kormak a much more sympathetic character for the damage done to his
reputation by the broken betrothal. While the marriage of his former fiancée to a strong
romantic rival completes the traditional love triangle that links Kormáks saga with Bjarnar saga
and Gunnlaugs saga, the unwarranted criticism that Kormak receives because of his bewitched
state makes his situation slightly less disparaging. Nevertheless, the power of oath-based
agreements to affect a hero’s reputation is derived, in the end, from the way Old Norse society
tests personal integrity against societal norms. This is amply demonstrated in these three saga
examples.
In conclusion, the motif of testing throughout the literary sources of Anglo-Saxon
England and medieval Iceland allows for some interesting interplay between the power of sworn
language and the role of the community in evaluating the effects of such transactions. The
presumption of how credibility improves when the hero’s speech is successful counterbalances
the acceptance that failure by the protagonist to live up to his word will be met with an equally
decisive loss of reliability in his trustworthiness among his peers. The mixed results of
potentially improving or tarnishing social standing make oath-taking both a force for benefit and
a threat to reputation, as the gnomic literature of both cultures demonstrates. These wisdom
poems express clearly, between establishment of cosmic and social orders, that trust remains an
elusively rigorous characteristic that can be useful as often as it can be destructive. The many
narrative examples, wherein the hero is closely assessed for how well his deeds match his
promises, reinforce the notion that oath-taking as a literary motif allows for testing of the
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characters against an idealized expectation of how honesty should function. Strong-willed
individuals with reputations for well-developed integrity, like Hrothgar, Ecgtheow, and Beowulf,
carefully harmonize their speech with their behaviors to prove their social importance as
dependable and authentic individuals. On the other hand, an equally compelling collection of
examples demonstrates that some individuals are not capable, like Hengest, Finn, and Hrut of
preventing the collapse of what has been sworn and the inability of language to guarantee
action. Here we can see how detrimental failure can become when the reputations of heroic
warriors, whose strength makes them seem admirable, are not sufficient to counteract the
unpredictable nature of human decision-making. In the emergence of a third group of heroes,
consisting of Bjorn, Gunnlaug, and Kormak, we see how the incredible complexity involved in
the execution of the oaths taken occasionally mitigates the disastrous results of broken
promises. The mixture of success and failure that accompanies the employment of swearing as
a motif of testing would suggest, therefore, that society faces a genuine exigency for careful
monitoring of the custom of swearing. While the reputations of heroes rise and fall based on
the assessment of their ability to uphold their word or succumb to the manipulation of those
forces tempting the breach of trust, it is clear that oath-taking in literary venues allows for the
nuanced exploration of how precisely proper behavior should be encouraged and problematic
abuses should be punished.

Swearing as the Motif of “Deception”
While many literary examples of oath-swearing offer descriptions of how an individual’s
behavior and integrity are tested by the difficulties of such exchanges, those moments when the
system fails to ensure honesty are the most significant ones. Any exchange of oath-taking is
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dependent on social validation and assessment of character, so Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic
writers are also naturally drawn to illustrating tensions created within this system, as when one
side might be forced to contend with the social boundaries of appropriateness and honesty.
Such examples include not only those obvious cases where falsehoods deliberately undermine
the process of oath-taking, but also those instances when deception entraps the parties inside
larger moral dilemmas that force truly difficult choices between honesty and duplicity.
Cases involving clear treachery are easy to identify, and they present in straightforward
terms the consequences of manipulation and deceit. One such example is the poem “The Battle
of Maldon,” which consists of 325 lines of verse describing the fatal encounter between the
English Earl Byrhtnoth and a band of Viking warriors. The tragedy of the English loss is
compounded by the fact that broken promises seem responsible for the collapse of Byrhtnoth’s
initial military success and for the failure of his soldiers to stay together after the death of their
earl. In the first instance, the Viking army’s use of treachery to accomplish it goals corresponds
to the expectedly deceitful nature of an invading force of pirates. The English forces are most
likely aware of the many accounts of the duplicity of these pirates, having previously fallen
victim to the Viking habit of violating peace treaties.433 Indeed, when the Viking messenger
addresses the English with an offer of peace that claims wið þam golde grið fæstnian, ‘with that
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gold to secure a truce,’ the earl’s skepticism of the offer and harsh refusal seems justified.434 As
informed as Byrhtnoth is about the unreliability of Viking treaties, his later behavior toward his
opponents is more puzzling. After initially containing the raiding army at the causeway of the
shore, providing the English with a natural advantage, the earl allows the Vikings to gain ground,
which turns the tide of battle against him. The complexity of why Byrhtnoth chooses to
relinquish his advantage is a source of scholarly speculation,435 yet the poem describes how
deception by the Vikings did play some part in making this change. The poet says: Þa hi þæt
ongeaton and georne gesawon / þæt hi þær bricgweardas bitere fundon, / ongunnon lytegian þa
laðe gystas, / bædon þæt hi upgang agan moston, / ofer þone ford faran, feþan lædan, ‘ Then
they perceived that and saw clearly that they found there the stern defenders of the bridge, and
so the hateful strangers began to act deceptively, they asked that they might have a landing, to
go over the ford, to lead the troops onward’.436 How exactly the Vikings worded their entreaty
requesting land is never explicitly provided, but Byrhtnoth’s decision to listen to their words
marks the beginning of true difficulty for the English forces. Deception forms, therefore, a
nucleus for the events of this poem. Indeed, despite an indistinct description of how the Vikings
influence the earl, the narrative focuses on the unfortunate consequences of deception allowed
to develop unhindered. In the resulting fight, the earl is slain and his soldiers are faced with the
decision to flee from the battlefield or remain behind to fight against the Viking forces. Stephen
J. Harris explains the crux of their conflict in “The Battle of Maldon” accordingly:
In the case of Maldon, it is in the presence of one’s superiors that the fulfillment of
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one’s oath can be verified. One question, then, is whether the oaths of all the soldiers
are still binding after Byrhtnoth’s death. Another question is whether a Christian and a
pagan can be bound together by an oath. In this respect, it is interesting to note that
when King Alfred defeated the pagan Viking Guthrum at Edington, their treaty (in other
words, their mutual oath-giving) was preceded by Guthrum’s baptism into
Christianity.437
The clash of ethical questions with questions of faith makes “The Battle of Maldon” a case study
in the complexities of addressing honesty across competing ideologies, giving many of the
seemingly straightforward instances of literary deception a multitude of layers.
The danger to the virtue of an individual presented by the abuse of oath-taking is thus a
key feature expressed throughout the countless religious texts written to address practical
concerns about honesty among members of the Christian community. Thus, many Anglo-Saxon
church leaders, particularly those at the end of the tenth century experiencing the difficulty of
Viking raids, social disintegration, and the anticipation of an immanent apocalyptic catastrophe,
adopted attitudes in their writings regarding oaths that reflected legal precedence.438 One such
patristic figure from the late tenth-century Church is Ælfric, whose homiletic writings educated
his audience against their vices. In the “Decollation of St. John the Baptist” he writes:
Crist sylf gefæstnode his spræce þa ða he spræc to anum samaritaniscum wife mid
þysum worde: crede mihi. þæt is: gelyf me. Ðeahhwæðere gif we hwær unwærlice
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swerian. & se að us geneadige to wyrsan dæde, þonne bið us rædlicor þæt we þone
maran gylt forbugon. & þone að wið gode gebetan.439
Christ himself confirmed through his discourse, when he spoke to a Samaritan woman
with these words: crede mihi. That is: ‘Believe me.’ Nevertheless if we anywhere
heedlessly swear and the oath compels us to worse deeds, then it is wiser for us that we
avoid the greater offence and make good the oath with God.
The message echoes, deliberately, the complaint of Æthelstan that oaths are being given
without regard to their meaning or the intention that they be kept by the speaker. Ælfric
connects his observations on the status of oaths with biblical references in an effort to inspire
his audience so that they, like Christ, offer only promises they intend to keep. However, the
idea is also emphasized that any promises leading to additional sins are not to be kept as Ælfric
emphasizes that God would much rather see broken words and moral actions than the
fulfillment of evil through faulty oaths. Likewise, the “Homily for the Fifth Sunday in Lent”
reads:
Ælcum geleaffullum men is eac swiðe to warnigenne wið manaða, forðan ðe hi synt
swiðe forbodene ægðer ge on ðære ealdan æ, ge on ðam godspelle. Manega men tellað
to lytlum gylte, þæt hi oðre men mid manaðum beswicen, ac witun hi, þæt hi beoð
ealswa miceles wites scyldige, swa ða manslagan and ða unrihthæmeras and ða
oferdrinceras. Eac is manna gehwilcum þearf, þæt he hine forhæbbe fram leasum
cyðnyssum, forðam hit is swiðe hefig gylt and fram urum drihtne sylfum forboden, ða he
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wið Moysen spræc on ðære dune, þe man hæt Sinai, and ðus cwæð: Non falsum
testimonium dices ; þæt is: Ne sæge ðu na lease cyðnysse.440
For every believing man is likewise especially to guard (himself) against perjuries
because they are especially forbidden both in the Old Law and in the Gospel. Many men
reckon too small an offense, that they deceive other men with false oaths, but they
know that they are also guilty of a great punishment, as are the murderers, and the
illegitimate wives, and the drunkards. Likewise it is necessary for every man, that he
abstain from false testimony, because it is an exceedingly grievous crime and forbidden
by our Lord himself, when he spoke with Moses on the mountain, which men call Sinai,
and said in this manner: Non falsum testimonium dices; That is: ‘You shall not speak with
false testimony.’
The themes of guarding against false words are appropriated from the law codes and combined
with a Christian message. In referencing the Old Law, Ælfric draws explicit connections between
biblical regulations binding Christians against false swearing and those legal codes extant in the
kingdoms of the Anglo-Saxons that express equivalent themes. While the edicts of the kings
require physical punishment, exacted in either monetary or bodily fines, the religious writings
speak to the spiritual penalties imposed when a sinner breaks the faith of words. Working
together, corporeal and divine judgments provide strong incentives for Anglo-Saxons to hesitate
when making or breaking promises.
Within a generation, another influential Anglo-Saxon church member will explore the
social and religious obstacles created by swearing. In the early eleventh-century, the clergyman
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Wulfstan is responsible not only for many religious orations but also for his contribution drafting
legal codes for both Æthelstan and Cnut.441 In his Creed, Wulfstan recounts:
Ðider sculan æwbrecan & ða fulan forlegenan; ðider sculan mansworan & morðwyrhtan;
ðider sculan gitseras, ryperas & reaferas & woruldstruderas; ðider sculon þeofas &
ðeodscaðan; ðyder sculon wiccan & wigleras, &, hrædest to secganne, ealle þa
manfullan þe ær yfel wohrton & noldan geswican ne wið God þingian.442
There [outside heaven] will be the adulterers and the foul fornicators; there shall be the
ones who swear falsely, and the murderers; there shall be the covetous, robbers and
plunderers and despoilers; there will be the thieves and criminals; there will be the
witches and magicians, and ones swiftest to speak, all those sinful people who before
performed evil things and did not wish to stop nor to be reconciled with God.
This statement makes very clear that the spiritual penalty for misusing oaths is nothing less than
forfeiture of the rewards of heaven. The Creed, therefore, supplements the available laws by
adding further punishment, and the religious community advances the position of the law
separating the truth from deception. Wulfstan’s Sermo Lupi ad Anglos, the invective sermon,
which illustrates the critical situation facing the Anglo-Saxons, includes the following statement:
ond eac syndan wide, swa we ær cwædan, þurh aðbrycas ond þurh wedbrycas, ond þurh mistlice
leasunga forloren, ond forlogen ma þonne scolde;443’And also there are, far and wide, as we said
before, more than should be, lost and perjured through the breaking of oaths and through
violations of pledges, and through various lies.’ Wulfstan’s pronouncement of the moral decline
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of England repeats the earlier criticism directed against the prevalence of false swearing
proclaimed in Æthelstan’s code. It also reflects Wulfstan’s moralizing legal codes, issued by
Æthelred and Cnut, English kings who ruled in the early decades of the eleventh century,
demanding the immediate conversion or departure of, among others, those guilty of perjury.444
Such strong links between laws and religious sermons indicate that where the enforcement of
the law codes results in exile, the Church also supplements with spiritual restrictions. The Sermo
Lupi consistently reiterates the gravity of this problem by demanding better behavior from the
English:
ond utan word on weorc richtlice faian, ond ure ingeþanc clænsian georne, ond að ond
wed wærlice healdan, ond sume getryða habban us betweonan butan uncræftan;445
and let us order words and deeds justly, and cleanse our thoughts with zeal, and keep
oaths and pledges carefully, and have some loyalty between us without evil practice;
Ælfric and Wulfstan effectively adopt the work of punishing individuals who abuse the power of
swearing oaths. They enhance the enforcement of the civil law against the falsification of oaths
with the addition of harsh divine regulations broadcast from the pulpit to augment the legal
protection of the truth.
The Íslendingasögur, as well as the literature of the Anglo-Saxons, spend a significant
amount of time dealing with the potential problems of abuse in oath-taking. The cautious
optimism that reputation and social protection together can be enough to safeguard the ability
of an individual to swear is severely challenged by those narrative examples dealing extensively
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with the real danger of deception. Just as the laws address the likely break down of judicial
function and aggressively seek to punish any transgression, so too the examples taken from Old
English and Old Norse-Icelandic stories provide a cautionary exploration of the tenuous nature
of swearing in order to demonstrate what happens when the infallibility of the system of oathtaking is confounded by what Henry Ordower calls the “devious manipulation of legal
process.”446 The rules that should be fixed are made pliant, and the very people who are
charged with the protection of the law become the ones who work to subvert it. Nowhere is
this theme of corrupt leadership considered in greater detail than in Bandamanna saga. Here
Odd’s legal case seeking to outlaw the villain Ospak is derailed by minor procedural errors, and
justice is denied on the grounds of technicalities. The jealousy, greed, and resentment of the
chieftains in power, however, are truly the causes for the defense against Odd’s suit. The saga
author shows how the men who are expected to be the custodians of the legal system instead
abuse it for their personal gain, and it is only when Odd engages the service of his cunning
father, Ofeig, that his legal troubles begin to turn around. Anderson describes Odd’s father as,
“the most winning rogue in saga literature,” who is “the master persuader who knows how to
uncover the weaknesses of his opponents, where to drive wedges, and how to weave his
arguments into a pattern of plausibility.”447 In pursuing the case against Ospak, Ofeig appeals to
the judges to remember that they have made personal oaths to réttast ok sannast ok helzt at
lögum, ‘judge both justly and fairly according to the law.’448 The appeal on behalf of Ofeig to the
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oaths required of the judges to deliver untainted verdicts should have been enough to compel
them into hearing Odd’s case fairly, but Ofeig knows that the oaths alone are not enough to
ensure the cooperation of the judges. Therefore, Ofeig supplements this incentive with a little
money from the purse he continues to drop and pull back throughout his speech. The saga
author clearly points out that it is not enough to rely on the oaths alone to ensure justice; only
when the money is on the table does ‘justice’ transpire and the judges only consider their
eiðabrigðin, ‘oath-breaking’ as a secondary concern.449 Oaths become completely devalued
from this perspective, and Odd acquires his verdict not through the exercising of truth but
through an exchange of silver that reminds the audience more of a purchase agreement than a
legal case. While the verdict is one that Odd rightfully should have received had the minor
technicalities not interfered, the fact remains that justice is tainted by the way the oaths are
exploited and the truth is sold.
In addition to the initial scene showing how those oaths fail to work as the safeguards of
justice for Odd, Bandamanna saga also tells of how the eight chieftains conspire together to go
after Odd in order to confiscate his money. Again, the very people who are responsible for
maintaining justice instead turn to an abuse of their power in spite of their sworn duty to the
law. The eight confederates seal their underhanded agreement to work together against Odd
eiða ok hyggja nú, at þessu megi ekki bregða ok engi muni traust á bera eða kunnáttu í móti at
rísa ‘with oaths and now they think that no one would have the power or confidence to break
this agreement or the knowledge to stand against it’.450 The oath provides an ironic undertone
to the forming of this confederacy, especially when the chieftains should be swearing to protect
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rather than to exploit this man. Like common criminals, and just like the judges from the earlier
chapter, the leaders who should exemplify honor and respect exchange these virtues for the
opportunity to turn a small profit by manipulations of the law.451 Thus, Bandamanna saga
renders the judicial system of the Icelandic world in a very unflattering light, where money
carries more substance than truth and oaths are given to whomever has the most money to
offer rather than the most truth on his side.
Víga-Glúms saga presents a situation where, unlike the disregard of justice in favor of
money, personal advantage is the justification for manipulating legal swearing to the fullest
extent. Glum Eyjolfsson’s ability to use words to his advantage is well established prior to the
moment concerning his swearing; Glum is skilled enough with his speech to þrætta, ‘to argue,’
with his kinsman Guthbrand until Guthbrand accepts the credit for a killing that Glum’s enemies
want to punish him for with legal charges. And while Glum’s verbal manipulation might have
freed him from any legal action, his words in a later verse reveal that he possibly has a
responsibility for the killing. For this reason, Glum is summoned and asked to give testimony
under oath regarding his role in the matter. This sworn testimony will, his enemies believe,
require him either to admit guilt for his role in the killing, or perjure himself by lying under oath.
The scene is, therefore, set for Glum’s words to be used as weapons against him, and neither
prospect will allow his escape from prosecution, since he becomes either a killer or a liar as a
result of the oath.
Just at the moment when words appear to be most dangerous to him, however, Glum
again employs them with an aptitude for turning language to his advantage. The saga tells how
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in the presence of six witnesses and in three different temples, Glum warps the moment of oath
swearing so that he neither speaks falsely nor impeaches himself:
Þá kvað Glúmur svo at orði: "At ek nefni Ásgrím í vætti, annan Gizur í það vætti, at ek
vinn hofseið at baugi, ok segi ek þat Æsi, at ek vark at þar ok vák at þar ok rauðk at þar
odd ok egg, er Þorvaldur krókur fékk bana. Líti nú á eið þeir er spekimenn eru og við eru
staddir."452
Then Glum spoke with these words: “I name Asgrim as witness, and next [I name] Gizur
as a witness that I take a temple oath and on the ring I deny that to the god, that I was
(not) at that place, and struck there, and I did (not) redden the point or edge [of my
weapon] there, where Thorvald Hook suffered death. Now let those wise men who are
standing by look on the oath.”
John McKinnell, in his translation for The Complete Sagas of the Icelanders, notes about this
oath: “Glum’s oath depends on the preposition at having the same form as a poetic negative
suffix, so that ek vark at þar – ‘I was at that place’ and ek varkat þar – ‘I was not there’ sound
identical.”453 The clever way that Glum phrases his language when swearing allows for the
greatest possible ambiguity in the matter. Because the saga’s narrator never reveals to the
audience precisely who struck the killing blow against Thorvald, it is impossible to determine
where Glum is speaking the truth and where he is lying. Glum is indeed present when Thorvald
is killed, and he quite possibly struck against him with his weapon, however the key point of
declaring guilt, whether his blows against Thorvald drew blood, is appropriately ambiguous. The
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oath can be read either as an admission of his guilt, or a strong claim of innocence, and both are
equally valid interpretations under this standard. Glum’s enemies, however, naively believe in
the power of the oath formula to expose only the absolutes of guilt and innocence, and they fall
victim to the duality of Glum’s words until the deception is revealed by outside parties. When
Thorarin, Glum’s enemy and brother of the slain man, is finally made aware of the language he
replies: Ekki fundum vér at, ‘we found nothing wrong’.454 The ‘truth’ of the oath, as this instance
reveals, is all in the matter of the interpreter’s perspective. And while Glum does not break the
letter of the law in swearing this oath, he does violate the spirit through language that allows
him to pass off unclear wording as the truth, knowing it could be misinterpreted.
The delivery of true words in a general sense, which are false in their details, composes
a major literary element in more saga narratives than just Víga-Glúms saga. When the love
affair between the noble lady Spes and Thorstein is exposed by the injured husband in Grettis
saga, the lady is permitted to clear her name using an oath in the presence of the bishop. It is
here that the saga redactor employs a common motif among deceptive swearing practices
known as the “equivocal-oath,” which allows the person swearing enough ambiguity in his
language to “avoid the consequences of lying and still conceal the truth.”455 Together Spes and
Thorstein conspire to set up just the right conditions where Spes can swear with words that,
while technically true, also withhold her affair from her husband. This particular equivocal-oath,
using the touch of the accused as the point of honesty for the purpose of obfuscation, used in a
similar manner in the Tristan and Isolde legend, requires Thorstein to disguise himself as a
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beggar who carries Spes across a muddy ditch and is in return paid for his services.456 Using this
very public contact with a camouflaged Thorstein, Spes then swears:
En fyrir það vil ek sverja, at engum manni hefi ek gull gefit ok af engum manni hefi ek
saurgazk líkamliga útan af bónda mínum ok þeim vándum stafkarli er tók sinni saurugri
hendi á lær mér, er ek var borin yfir díkit í dag.
Therefore I will swear that I have not given gold to any man or been defiled bodily by any
man, except for my husband and the vile beggar, who placed his dirty hand on my thigh,
when I was carried over the ditch today.457
Spes is not swearing falsely before the bishop in the most liberal sense because she is openly
disclosing her contact with Thorstein, who is her only lover other than her husband. Moreover,
the way that Spes describes the touch of the ‘beggar’ is laden with sexual imagery, particularly
through the word lær, which refers to the “fleshy parts of the body” and “the leg above the
knee.”458 The intimacy obliquely referenced in this word in the graphic description of how
Thorstein disguised as the ‘beggar’ inappropriately touches Spes, while in a public space,
provides her with enough material to avoid perjuring herself with this oath. As a result of this
oath, which simultaneously reveals and conceals the truth, the frustrated husband cannot seek
further legal action against either Spes or Thorstein. Ultimately, he is charged with slander
himself for bringing false charges against his wife, and Spes subsequently divorces him. Not only
is justice stymied by allowing Spes to carry out her affair in a legally approved way, but also her
husband’s legitimate grievance is transformed into a way to punish him further. Even when the
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truth behind Thorstein’s disguise is eventually revealed, and the whole meaning of the oath is
made clear, the deceived husband fekk enga rétting þess máls, ok er hann ór sögunni, ‘received
no compensation for this matter, and he is out of the saga’.459 While the husband is clearly not
an appropriate match for a woman as intelligent and beautiful as Spes, this disparity does not
change the way the authority and integrity of law are destabilized through the power of words.
While the legal rituals represented in this story demonstrate a careful consideration of the
accuracy of what Spes says, they also prove the ineffectiveness of such laws to enforce the spirit
of the oath-taking, as Spes carefully exploits the vulnerability of the oath.
The Icelandic saga that contains the most references to individuals swearing oaths in a
legal context is Brennu-Njals saga, whose plot is propelled by detailed attention to litigation.
The prevalence of oaths is consequently not surprising, as Ordower asserts, the “legal claims
without an identifiable foundation arise frequently to move the plot along, and litigation
contributes meaningfully to dramatic tension.”460 With a judicially rich narrative, the author
must also include many instances of oaths to authenticate the progression within the storyline.
Yet these legal proceedings consistently break down throughout the saga, and the moments
that should be marked by the arbitration of law instead collapse with violent results.
Predictably, the emphasis on the failure of law to adapt to the changing social, political, and
religious structure of Iceland also implies a similar decline in oaths and other legal formulas that
should be holding the nation together.461 True to this pattern, many of the oaths in BrennuNjáls saga are not the binding expressions of personal honor that they should be. The oath,
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therefore, is not the final authority on truth that the laws of Grágás and Jónsbók would suggest.
Frequently the saga’s characters are required to use deception, and the oath becomes merely
another vehicle that leads to further frustration of justice and additional violence. For example,
in the case against Hrut to reclaim Unn’s dowry, Gunnar disguises himself in order to trick Hrut
into the summons, and this manipulation causes Hrut to pronounce the very language that is
used in his own summoning.462 At the trial, moreover, Gunnar offers eiðspjalls síns ok framsögu
sakar ok sóknargagna, ‘his oath-swearing and his statement of charges and his proofs for
prosecution’ which should move the case forward.463 Gunnar’s witnesses, evidence, and oaths
should all be enough proof for a successful trial; however, as discussed above, Hrut is able to
raise procedural discrepancies to block Gunnar’s action and invalidate his oaths. Hrut’s party
quite easily disarms the power of these oaths, and what should be a legally binding moment is
confounded instead by ineffective procedures. Following this breakdown in the system of
justice, Gunnar does not return to the law but issues a challenge to Hrut to settle the matter
through a duel. The process that was once regulated by words and legal precepts devolves into
a situation where the threat of violence and physical strength determine the outcome. BrennuNjáls saga represents, therefore, a world in which the process of swearing has been stripped of
its ability to regulate legal action. Fraudulent means are required to follow the steps in bringing
a case, oaths do not have their intended authority to facilitate peaceful conclusions, and only a
man’s capacity for brute force delivers any resolution for the grievance.
Even as the redactor of Brennu-Njals saga explores the deficiencies of oath-taking in the
context of Icelandic judicial structure, these verbal declarations also serve as a way to examine
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the moral and spiritual repercussions of words. Following a failed attempt at arbitration
between Flosi and Njal’s sons regarding compensation for the death of Hoskuld, the enraged
Flosi and his supporters all swear that they will seek blood vengeance against their opponents.
The saga relates:
Flosi mælti: "Því vil ek heita Sigfússonum at skiljast eigi fyrr við þetta mál en aðrir hvárir
hníga fyrir öðrum. Vil ek ok þat vita, hvárt nökkur er sá hér, at oss vilji eigi veita at þessu
máli."
Allir kváðusk þeim veita vilja. Flosi mælti: "Gangi nú allir til mín ok sverji eiða, at engi
skerisk ór þessu máli." Gengu þá allir til Flosa ok sóru honum eiða. Flosi mælti: "Vér
skulum ok allir hafa handtak at því, at sá skal hver hafa fyrirgört fé ok fjörvi, er ór gengr
þessu máli.
Flosi said: “This I promise to the Sigfussons, never to abandon this case until either one
side or the other falls dead. I wish also to know whether there is anyone here who is
not willing to give support to us in this case.”
And they all declared their assent. And Flosi said: “Now let everyone come to me and
swear an oath not to withdraw from this case.” Then they all went to Flosi and swore
oaths to him. Flosi said: “We shall also all have a pledge that he shall have forfeited
property and life, whoever withdraws from this case before it is concluded.”464
The language used by Flosi to bind his supporters together is very powerful, and therefore also
very perilous. By excluding the option of a peaceful settlement from their oaths, they have
obliged themselves to use only violence against Njal’s family. All of the weight of their personal
honor becomes linked to this need for bloodshed, and this is heightened by the extremity of
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what the men swear. The lack of moderation in requesting that either group be completely
destroyed, as well as the decision to punish any oath-breaker with confiscation and death,
requires Flosi and his companions to either commit inexcusable brutality or suffer the
consequences of what they swear. Adding more tension to this already troubled situation is the
fact that Iceland has already converted to Christianity, placing even more moral constraint on
these men. According to Christian doctrine, oaths should never be sworn casually and
participation in murderous activities is a mortal sin.465 Agreeing to Flosi’s words, therefore,
results in an irresolvable tension that will either necessitate a heinous killing or the total
collapse of their integrity by breaking their oath. This is precisely what happens when the attack
on the Njálssons begins to fail, and Flosi says:
Eru nú tveir kostir, ok er hvárrgi góðr: sá annarr at hverfa frá, ok er þat várr bani, en hinn
annar at bera at eld ok brenna þá inni, ok er þat stór ábyrgð fyrir guði, er vér erum menn
kristnir sjálfir. En þó munu vér þat bragðs taka.
Now there are two choices, and neither are good: the first is to give up – and that is our
death; the other is to set fire [to the house] and burn them within [the building], and
that is a great responsibility before God, since we are Christians ourselves. Nevertheless
we must take some step in this.466
Flosi identifies here the essential moral dilemma his oath causes, and his men cannot take either
course of action without serious repercussions. Although it would be more morally acceptable
under the Christian faith to break the oath and refrain from the burning, Flosi and the others
choose instead to maintain their oaths even in the face of penalties against both their souls and
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their honor.467 Because the oath binds these men into a situation where they must break the
law, commit sins, and surrender some personal honor no matter how they act, the immoderate
oath that is upheld cannot be justified.468 The lack of responsibility that Flosi and the burners
exhibit leads to a collapse in the legal system at the end of Brennu-Njals saga where the entire
social structure of Iceland almost breaks down through violence at the Assembly. Thus, in this
most dangerous form, the oath is represented as a moral trap, which cannot allow its
participants to escape its use without some damage to their inner selves.
The motif of deception reaches an important literary apex within the Old English biblical
poem Genesis B, from the Junius 11 manuscript. The Genesis-poet carefully embellishes the
original Old Testament storyline by providing critical details, like the account of Satan’s rebellion
and exile from heaven, to establish a wider framework prior to the temptation in Eden.469 By
amplifying the biblical narrative in this fashion, the poet carefully explores new dimensions in
the complex emotions and ambitions associated with the army of devils and their malevolent
leader. Along with developing the motivations for Satan’s beguiling of humanity in a more
defensible way, the Genesis-poet also carefully overlays important Germanic themes, like loyalty
to one’s lord or exile into the plot.470 R. E. Woolf observes: “by an almost metaphorical
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treatment the terms used of persons and situations derived from heroic society could be applied
to Satan, for his disobedience to God had an intrinsic likeness to the revolt of a þegn from his
lord and the subsequent punishment of being an outcast from heaven was a fate of which the
exile of a þegn from his natural place in his lord’s hall might well appear the earthly shadow.”471
Recasting the story in these social terms transforms Satan from an impersonal force of
temptation into a comprehensible adversary, whose origins and agency can be explained, or
even pitied by the audience. Satan’s frustration at the loss of his previous reputation and his
jealousy over humanity’s subsequent exaltation validates his request for a fallen angel to seek
revenge for this slight by tempting humanity. Thus, the development of the war against good
and evil in Genesis progresses along the lines of a feud necessitated by the betrayal of Satan
against God’s supremacy, placing issues of deception and trust in the center of this narrative.472
If petty jealousy initiates the demonic quest to expose the vulnerabilities of humanity, it
is fitting that another corrupting deficiency of character, deception, is closely associated with
the agent responsible for carrying out Satan’s orders. The devil who volunteers for the job of
tempting Adam and Eve is suitably equipped to accomplish this task. The poem relates:
Anginnan hine þa gyrwan godes andsaca, / fus on frætwum, (hæfde fæcne hyge), / hæleðhelm
on heafod asette on þone full hearde geband, / spenn mid spangum; wiste him spræca fela, /
wora worda,473 ‘then an enemy of God began to prepare himself, ready in adornments, (he had
a guileful heart), he set the helmet on his head and bound it very firmly, fastened with clasps; he
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knew many speeches, twisted words.’ Sharp contrast exists between the appearance of the
tempter, externally adorned and equipped as if he will perform heroic deeds, and his internal
disposition, which is actually corrupted and pusillanimous. This divergence between the devil’s
form and the reality of his soul foreshadows the deception facing Adam and Eve, when the
devil’s pleasant words will conceal the darker intentions of the deed he instigates.
Accompanying the poet’s deliberate pairing of external and internal difference, to
highlight the distinction between fair-sounding words and foul deeds of betrayal, Genesis also
introduces an extra-biblical moment of temptation when the devil first approaches Adam with
carefully crafted falsehoods designed to contravene God’s commandment forbidding eating
from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. By initially claiming that he is a messenger
from heaven, the devil veils his words to Adam, hoping that they will be enthusiastically
accepted as a divine command. Not only does he appeal to Adam’s vanity, but by claiming that
God has been praising his words and work, the tempter also attempts to underscore how eating
the fruit will remedy the shortcoming in Adam’s abilities: Nu he þe mid spellum het / listas
læran. Læste þu georne / his ambyhto, nim þe þis ofæt on hand, / bit his and byrige. Þe weorð on
þinum breostum rum, / wæstm þy wlitegra, ‘Now He bid by messages that you be taught
cunning. You should eagerly attend his commands, take you the fruit in hand, eat of it and
taste. You will become unencumbered in your breast, your form (will be) more fair’.474 The devil
shrewdly joins his appeal to Adam’s vanity with an underhanded criticism that his intellect is not
yet complete until he gains the knowledge provided by the tree. Such a simultaneous effort to
provoke both pride and envy, however, falls unsuccessfully on the father of humanity. Adam
responds nat þeah þu mid ligenum fare þurh dyrne geþanc þe þu drihtnes eart boda of heofnum,
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‘I do not know whether you come with lies through evil design, or if you are a messenger of the
Lord from heaven’.475 Adam’s healthy skepticism of the devil’s commands and his reluctance to
act in contradiction to a personal command from God successfully thwarts this initial attempt at
introducing sin into paradise.
Not only does Adam implicitly rebuff the devil’s assertion that his intellect is missing an
essential component, he also declines to trust the initial claim that this message originates
directly from God without any corroborating evidence. He states: ne þu me oðiewdest ænig
tacen / þe he me þurh treowe to onsende / min hearra þurh hyldo, ‘you have not shown any
token which my Lord sends to me through truth and favor’.476 Adam cites the disparity of the
content in the devil’s message as well as the fact that he does not possess the regular physical
signs that his message is divinely inspired. This request to link the devil’s verbal appeal with
physical cues of legitimacy suggests that Adam is already aware of the breakdown in the union
of veracity and action in the cosmos.477 The initial rejection of the first temptation also
foreshadows the skepticism emerging for all future verbal transaction after the Fall of humanity
occurs. Although this initial scene of temptation originates outside traditional biblical accounts,
the poet uses it to suggest a wider rift between pleasant sounding words and the stark reality of
actions.
The devil, though rebuffed by Adam, does not abandon his efforts at temptation.
Focusing instead on Eve, the serpent’s successive request builds even further upon the illusion
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of heavenly sanction for his message. The second attempt opens with a caution that Adam’s
earlier rejection will incur God’s wrath, a claim that preys upon his wife’s fear of divine
retribution. The serpent’s speech connects that fear with an inflated sense of self-importance
by suggesting that Eve can save Adam by offering the forbidden fruit to her husband and lending
her credibility to the plea of the serpent. Appealing to the protective nature of the first woman
inspires pride in her abilities and thus mirrors Satan’s own original transgression, as she seeks to
elevate her status above the man.478 More significantly, the devil urges Eve to manipulate her
own language to induce Adam’s cooperation, advocating that she become, in essence, his
surrogate tempter. The serpent urges:
Meaht þu Adame eft gestyran, gif þu his willan hæfst and he þinum wordum getrywð.
Gif þu him to soðe sægst hwylce þu selfa hæfst bisne on breostum, þæs þu gebod godes
lare læstes, he þone laðan strið, yfel andwyrde anforlæteð on breostcofan, swa wit him
bu tu an sped sprecað.
You will be able, moreover, to manipulate Adam if you command his desire and he
trusts your words. If you tell him truly what an exemplary precept you yourself hold in
your breast, because you have followed the command of God’s instruction, he will
abandon the hateful strife, the evil answer in the breast-chamber, so that we two both
together might speak so as to convince him. 479
The devil provides powerful motivation for Eve’s compliance, especially by suggesting she can
join him in an angelic conspiracy to keep Adam’s earlier rejection hidden from God. Despite this

478

The implication here should not focus on Eve as “inferior” to Adam prior to the Fall, since both are
created imago dei, in the image of God. Yet gaining the knowledge from the tree before Adam would
allow her to assert dominance over him, thereby disrupting the partnership they share; in the same
manner, “saving” him from the wrath suggested by the devil would also allow Eve to possess more favor
with the divine at the expense of their formerly identical relationship with God.
479

Gen., ll. 568 – 75a.

225

compelling pretext for her behavior, the devil’s speech offers one significant clue to his
malicious intent. The impossibility of trying to conceal any action from an omniscient deity
reveals the false nature of his promise, making his willingness to speak insincerely about Adam’s
rejection serve as a signal to the treacherous nature of his words. Unlike the skepticism initially
protecting Adam, however, Eve never doubts that these words might not correspond to the
reality of the situation. As a result, this successful deception allows for the introduction of sin
into Eden and the corruption of all language throughout creation.
The poet of Genesis paints a disconsolate picture of deception’s destructive capabilities,
especially the devil’s use of flattery to achieve Satan’s purposes. This illustrative, philosophical
discussion about the nature of sin and the collapse of dependable language further corroborates
other literary examples of dishonesty, wherein a scarcity of skepticism facilitates the corruption
of swearing, as substantiated by those sagas where oaths fail to prevent the abuse of justice or
wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The oath, within the legal and literary narratives of Anglo-Saxon England and medieval
Iceland, finds potency not only from the text of the law or the mandates of society, but also
from the internal measure of the moral and spiritual (both Christian and pagan) integrity of the
person delivering the oath. While the legal oath might attempt to regulate intentions and
motivations within the context of seeking justice, the representative literature of the AngloSaxons and Icelanders enhances our understanding of the full application of these processes.
The complexity of this duality can be seen in these literary corpora through the lens of the
motifs of “society,” “testing,” and “deception.” Society creates integrity in an individual through
its familiarity with the speaker, testing allows the words of an individual to be held against his
actions and deeds to evaluate his honesty, and deception represents one of the greatest threats
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to the oath-system by subverting the values of society and falsifying the test. Taken together,
these motifs reflect the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic acknowledgement of the power and
vulnerability of oaths.
Although the process of swearing legal oaths is overtly regulated and is already a very
complicated and serious activity within the Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon world, countless works of
Old English and Old Norse-Icelandic literature add subtle moral undertones by pointing out the
inherent danger of exploited language. Examples from the collection of Íslendingasögur and key
Anglo-Saxon texts all speak to their audiences about the importance of a person following
through on his words with genuine deeds. The system of trust spelled out in the laws, and given
divine importance in the Christian homiletic texts, finds application in the models for correct
behavior found in these examples from the Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic literary corpus. These
works stress that words may indeed fail, and opponents will most certainly tell lies, but the
honorable Anglo-Saxon or Icelander does not allow his own words to be incompatible with his
behavior. These heroic and social models emphasize the importance of honesty to inspire
emulation, while also warning society of what happens when false oaths are permitted to run
rampant among the community. The Anglo-Saxons and Icelanders recognized the benefit of
trusting an individual’s word, as well as the danger of placing too much faith in an oath or
reputation. Thus, Anglo-Saxon and Icelandic literary narratives abound with examples of how
society actively fights falsehood through laws applying corporal punishment to deceivers,
sermons delivering righteous vengeance for speaking falsehoods, and the shame of opprobrium.
Countless literary texts urge their audiences to be careful about whose words they trust
and counsel them to monitor their own speech to avoid falling victim to the dangerous nature of
words and their misuse. As demonstrated by the many laws punishing perjury, the fear and
reality of false oaths present a danger that stands to undermine the very fabric of both islands’
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judicial structures. While legal texts may make the oath an essential feature of promoting
justice and delivering correct rulings, the literary pieces from this period explore the more
nuanced background of appropriate and inappropriate usage of the oath-taking motif. And yet,
as powerful as oaths are for the legal world of England and Iceland, the process of swearing also
includes the risk for the manipulation of that language. The examples of how oaths fail to
prevent violence and how they are easily manipulated for personal gain suggest that these
spoken guarantees are not as infallible as they might initially seem from the legal perspective.
Moreover, many of these formal exchanges can result in morally ambiguous situations, as in the
example of Flosi, where the speaker is bound to perform undesirable activity or face an equally
destructive loss of honor. What remains abundantly clear, even in the tangle of intentions and
perceptions produced by the Germanic oath-culture, is that the struggle for impartial justice and
objective truth is at the heart of any society claiming to offer justice.

CHAPTER 5
THE SUCCESSION OF SWEARING MOTIFS IN LEGAL AND LITERARY CONTEXTS
Was ther nevere man so hardy, / That durste felle hys false body: / This hadde he for hys lye.
Now Jesu, that is Hevene-kyng, / Leve nevere traytour have betere ending / But swych dome for
to dye.480
There was never a man so bold, who would dare to take down [Wymound’s] false body [from
where it was displayed after execution]: he received this for his lie. Now Jesus, who is the
heavenly king, never let a traitor have a better ending, except to die by such a judgment.481
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In Bound by Words: The Motif of Oath-Taking and Oath-Breaking in Medieval Iceland
and Anglo-Saxon England, I have examined how the social implications of honesty permeate the
legal and literary writings of both the Anglo-Saxons and medieval Icelanders. This study has
analyzed the practice of swearing through the exploration of specific legal rituals and literary
motifs, often associated with honesty, within these writings. Ultimately, society’s responsibility
for validating true speech and punishing deceptive words is revealed through its role in
assessing truth from a variety of perspectives: as statements of veracity, pledges, vows, and
ultimately oaths.
As important a subject as truth is for both English and Icelandic writers, these two
cultures also seem hesitant to wholly rely on the dependability of swearing as a force for social
order. On the one hand, oath-taking is frequently portrayed as a sacrosanct act, able to
constrain or compel action until one’s deeds meet the standards expressed by one’s words. On
the other hand, however, honesty appears as a fragile feature of interpersonal relationships,
inherently exposed to the potential exploitation of social weakness. Reconciling these two
positions takes careful consideration of how the texts produced within these two cultures depict
the desire for control over language, as well as how they also represent moments when control
is lost and the boundaries preventing abuse are contravened.
When law is approached as the means of enforcing appropriate behavior, it places legal
texts at the nexus of important discussions concerning honesty. Indeed, a preoccupation with
establishing trust is abundantly reflected in the major legal collections of Iceland, especially
Grágás and Jónsbók, and the significant body of legal codes issued under the guidance of various
Anglo-Saxon kings, such as Wihtræd, Alfred, or Æthelstan. Consequently, swearing becomes the
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primary means by which the members of the community responsible for administration of
justice (either judges or members of a jury) are confirmed, plaintiffs declare their prosecutions
to be valid, defendants express their innocence, and witnesses endorse their testimony. Here
the legal rituals appear to overwhelmingly recognize speech as the means of inciting suitable
behaviors, and they unflinchingly adopt words as the fundamental foundation upon which
justice is established. No case, in England or Iceland, could be considered authentic without
some form of swearing contributing to its progression. As a result, the oath becomes deeply
entrenched in the justice systems of these islands as the integral component of legal
administration.
Even at the height of the oath’s influence, though, the legal texts acknowledge the
potential malleability of language and, therefore, the importance of guarding trust carefully.
The high cost of the eternal vigilance necessary to maintain the oath’s role in the quest for social
order is clearly recognized by legal authorities. When cases call for more significant action or
offer increased risks, additional attestation is required by the law to alleviate the intensified
pressure on the viability of language to deliver justice.
The legal texts may rely heavily on honest oaths to legitimize action, yet they reflect
equal concern over how easily abused these exchanges can be when dishonest language
masquerades as truth. The very presence of these laws leads to the inevitable implication that
fraudulence is indeed prevalent in the system. In order to avert the potential dangers of
falsehood, the legal texts balance the optimism of the oath with a series of skeptical regulations
punishing perjury or constricting who can swear. To impress upon society the danger that
fraudulent language poses to a successful legal system, these laws will often excise the offender
from the community, either by literally cutting out his tongue or, more symbolically, by exiling
him, thus ensuring that no further mendacity can occur. Thus, the laws show how the legislative
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leaders of Anglo-Saxon England and Iceland try to control or limit improper access to swearing in
order to ensure that those who swear do so without outright deceitfulness or subtle
equivocation.
Much like the legal texts, swearing occupies a complex, dual-layer position of admirable,
yet dangerous, necessity in the narrative works of England and Iceland. Although the law may
be more explicit with its reliance on swearing as a positive force, the literature is not without its
own means of promoting honesty. While the expressions of truthfulness for literary texts may
not always take place in the courtroom, the need for sincerity is easily transformed to fit the
narrative devices of each particular aesthetic, be they concerns raised by gnomic, heroic,
elegiac, or historical compositions. For each of these categories of literature, the message of
trust as a measure of an individual’s worth is deliberately reinforced. An overwhelmingly
affirmative attitude about the utility of swearing has the most cultural resonance, however, in
the heroic literature of both cultures. England and Iceland are defined by their respective
heroes, like Beowulf or Gunnar, whose worth can be effectively measured by their abilities to
match words with deeds. The benefits of authenticity in language are thus reinforced by the
power of the hero to exemplify a life grounded in integrity for the community.
If law recognizes the power behind swearing to bring reliability to one’s actions, then
the literature provides an embodiment of what that command of language might look like when
actualized within the fictionalized narratives of life. Paralleling the legal texts, the literary ones
also emphasize the delicate balance holding together the system of swearing. Deception
becomes, consequently, a major theme within the narratives of many literary texts, as
characters struggle to maintain honesty in a dishonest world. Like the law, which seems to
allude to an unwanted prevalence of deceptiveness, the significant number of literary texts
broaching this subject would indicate an awareness of the magnitude of the problem. The laws
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approach dishonesty with the objective of preventing or correcting it, while the literary texts are
more concerned with demonstrating what happens after deception occurs. In this respect, as
my examples illustrate, the literary world explores the nuanced circumstances contributing to
fraud and its aftermath as it affects society.
In order to avoid the negative consequences of deception, both the laws and the
literature of Anglo-Saxon England and medieval Iceland rely on the participation of neighbors,
friends, and relatives as oath-helpers or witnesses to ensure that no words of attestation are
taken without the oversight of the community. The literary writings of Anglo-Saxon England and
Iceland further this trend by stressing even more matter-of-factly the role society plays in
keeping reputation accurate. Characters are involved in safeguarding their reputations closely
throughout the literary narratives, and questions about a character’s sincerity or authenticity
may lead to dishonor. As exile and alienation drive some characters outside of the sphere of
community, we can further see how detrimental any separation from the system of established
reputation is for their ability to participate in any future rituals of swearing. Most importantly,
however, is the way that literary texts urge the public to exercise caution when dealing with
individuals of dubious standing. Society is warned, through the many examples of exploitative
language, to maintain a continuous vigil over trust when it comes from externalized forces of
uncertain credibility. On the other hand, those literary representations of successful betrayal or
deceit from within the protected confines of familiar society offer somewhat more worrisome
considerations of the delicacy of trust. The correlation of concern represented by the parallel
focus on social scrutiny and the use of reputation in both legal and literary texts in medieval
England and Iceland simply underscores the magnitude of the status which truth holds in their
world.
In investigating the legal and literary representations of swearing within the Anglo-
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Saxon and Icelandic worlds, I have found that there are significant overlapping concerns
expressed within these texts. While the literature does not always perfectly mirror the image of
how swearing works from the legal texts, each set of examples bespeaks both the necessity of
using language to assert veracity as well as the urgency of using caution to minimize the risk of
trusting too casually or extensively. If the legal texts share regulations primarily to enforce a
sense of social order, then the literary ones offer narratives of how these legal procedures play
out in the wider context of life, especially when law is contravened by deception or
complications that challenge the smooth operation of swearing.
Although the shifting religious and political situations in both Iceland and England in the
Middle Ages are marked by the influx of new political, religious, and social matters for both
cultures, the questions about the nature of trust and deception raised by the Anglo-Saxons and
early Icelanders continue to resonate. The Norman Conquest of 1066 is seen as a delineating
event in English history that superimposes a new French nobility over the existing Anglo-Saxon
class structure.482 It also allows for the influence of a more Continentally-based legal tradition
to make its presence felt in the subsequent codes issued by later rulers of England, without
losing the English focus on the importance of swearing. In a similar way, the exertion of greater
Norwegian royal control over Iceland in the wake of the Gamli Sáttmáli and Jónsbók, especially
manifested through the issuance of royal amendments, retains the Icelandic emphasis on
refining the methods of containing social irregularities through the regulation of language. Legal
rituals surrounding swearing, and the concern for maintaining its integrity, continue to function
as important features of the legal landscape long after significant changes come to these
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Interestingly enough, although this is characterized as a French influence, it is worth remembering that
the family line of the Duke of Normandy is distinctly Scandinavian in origin.

233

governmental systems.483
In a literary sense, moreover, many of the concerns about a character’s integrity and the
trust of language continue to operate as themes worthy of significant discussion across the
centuries. The consideration of these themes within this dissertation further illuminates how
such changes in the meaning of “truth” have evolved and how they should be read. Richard Firth
Green’s authoritative work, A Crisis of Truth: Literature and Law in Ricardian England, explores
similar questions on the nature of honesty for the later medieval period. This dissertation,
although written after Green’s text, provides both the information on medieval Icelandic and
Anglo-Saxon writings previously lacking for the early medieval period and the connections
between law, literature, and the conceptualization of truth in the same works. Green’s work
indicates that, as the body of legal codes and literature grew throughout the Middle Ages,
writers continued to address the gradations of “truth.” Indeed, as the Middle English Romance
Athelston shows, these important motifs continue to elaborate on the qualities of characters,
increase tension within narratives, and ultimately drive the plot toward climax. King Athelston
finds himself in the unenviable position of arbitrating between his two sworn brothers, one of
whom is falsely accusing the other of treason. The innocent earl must swear an oath defending
his honor and reinforced by his participation in an ordeal of fire. That oath is witnessed by the
Archbishop of Canterbury, lending it further support. When the oath of the innocent earl is
vindicated by the ordeal, the value of sworn testimony is reinforced.
Such literary occasions providing opportunities for deeper discussions of honesty
abound in those works developing from prolific literary traditions, such as the Arthurian
narratives, which find popularity among Old Norse and English readers. Here too we might see
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parallel moments within the English and Icelandic fascination with honesty as a continued
theme among later texts, especially as Arthurian stories involving betrayal and deception, like
the legend of Tristan and Isolde, find their way into both cultures. Because this material
provides authors of English and Norse traditions with so many rich opportunities, it is not
surprising that the legal rituals surrounding honesty and deception serve as promising sources of
literary tension. Ultimately, however, honesty is more than a vehicle for legal or literary
production, it is a critical element in the success of the long-standing, Germanic tradition of
associating honor with truth.

235

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abels, Richard P. Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1988.
Ad-Darraji, Hadher Hussein Abbood, Thomas Chow Voon Foo, Shaik Abdul Malik Mohamed
Ismail, and Esbah Shaker Abdulah. “Offering as a Comissive and Directive Speech Act:
Consequence for Cross-Cultural Communication.” International Journal of Scientific and
Research Publications 2.3 (March 2012): 298 - 303.
Ælfric. “Decollation of St. John the Baptist.” In Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies. Edited by Malcolm
Godden. London: The Early English Text Society, s.s., 5, 1979.
------. “Fifth Sunday in Lent.” In Angelsächsische Homilien und Heiligenleben. Edited by Bruno
Assmann. 1889. Reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgeseelschaft, 1964.
-------. “Saint Agnes.” In Ælfric’s Lives of Saints. Edited by Walter Skeat. London: The Early English
Text Society, o.s., 76., 1900.
Alfred the Great: Asser’s Life of King Alfred and Other Contemporary Sources. Ed. and Trans.
Simon Keynes and Michael Lapidge. London: Penguin Books 1983.
Altnordisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. Edited by Jan de Vries. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957.
The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots. Edited by Calvert Watkins. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2000.
Andersson, Theodore M. The Icelandic Family Sagas: An Analytic Reading. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1967.
Andersson, Theodore M. and William Ian Miller. Law and Literature in Medieval Iceland:
Ljosvetninga Saga and Valla-Ljots Saga. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989.
“Andreas.” In The Vercelli Book. Edited by George Philip Krapp. Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records,
vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.
Aristotle. The “Art” of Rhetoric. Translated by J.H. Freese. Loeb Classical Library. 1926. Reprint,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.
-------. The Categories, On Interpretation, and Prior Analytics. Translated by H.P. Cooke and Hugh
Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library. 1938.Reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1962.
-------. De Interpretatione. Translated by E. M. Edghill. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.,
1982.

236

Athelston. In Four Romances of England. Edited by Ronald B. Herzman, Graham Drake, and Eve
Salisbury. Middle English Texts Series. 349 – 71. Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute
Publications, 1999.
Attenborough, Frederick L., ed. and trans. The Laws of the Earliest English Kings. 1922. Reprint,
Felinfach, Wales: Llanerch Publishers, 2000.
Austin, J. L. How to Do Things With Words. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisá. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Baker, Peter S., ed. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition. MS. F. Vol. 8.
Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2000.
Baltensberger, Herman. Eid, Versprechen und Treuschwur bei den Angelsachsen. Ph.D. diss.,
University of Zurich, 1920.
Bandamanna saga. In Grettis saga Ásmundarsonar. Edited by Guðni Jónsson. Vol. 7 of Íslenzk
Fornrit. 294 – 363. 1937. Reprint, Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 2001.
Barmash, Pamela. “The Narrative Quandary: Cases of Law in Literature.” Vetus Testamentum 54
(Jan. 2004): 1-16.
Baron, Jane. “Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity.” The Yale Law Journal
108.5 (1999): 1059 - 85.
Bartlett, Robert. Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986.
Bately, Janet, D. N. Dumville, and Simon Keynes, eds. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, Vol. 3: MS. A.
Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1986.
Beck, Heinrich. Wortshatz der altisländischen Grágás. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1993.
Bede. The Old English Version of Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People. Ed. and
Trans. Thomas Miller. The Early English Text Society, o.s., 96. 1891. Reprint, London,
1959.
Benchbook for U.S District Court Judges. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center, 1996.
Black’s Law Dictionary. Edited by Bryan A. Garner. 9th ed. Rochester: West Publishing, 2009.
Bloch, Marc. Feudal Society. Translated by L. A. Manyon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1961.
Bloomfield, Morton and Leonard Newmark. A Linguistic Introduction to the History of English.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963.

237

Bok, Sissela. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
Bosworth, Joseph and T. Northcote Toller, comp. An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. 1898. Reprint,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Boulhosa, Patricia Pires. Icelanders and the Kings of Norway: Mediaeval Sagas and Legal Texts.
Boston: Brill, 2005.
Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field.” Translated by
Richard Terdiman. The Hastings Law Journal 38 (July 1987): 805-53.
Bradley, S. A. J., trans. and ed. Anglo-Saxon Poetry. London: Everyman, 1997.
Brennu-Njáls saga, Edited by Einar Sveinsson. Vol. 12 of Íslenzka Fornrit. Reykjavík: Íslenzka
Fornritafélag, 1954.
Bright, James W., ed. “The Battle of Maldon.” Bright’s Anglo-Saxon Reader. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1935.
Brody, Burton F. “Anglo-Saxon Contract Law: A Social Analysis.” DePaul Law Review 19 (1969):
270 - 86.
Broekman, Jan M. “Communicating Law.” In Law as Communication. Edited by David Nelken.
45 – 62. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth University Press, 1996.
Brooks, Peter and Paul Gewirtz, eds. Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
Burke, Michael E. and Robert L. Pigeon, eds. Law, Authority, and Society: Readings in Ancient
and Medieval Social Thought. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1995.
Burrow, J. A. Gestures and Looks in Medieval Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002.
Buttrick, David. Speaking Jesus: Homiletic Theology and the Sermon on the Mount. Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2002.
Byock, Jesse L. “The Age of the Sturlungs.” In Continuity and Change: Political Institutions and
Literary Monuments in the Middle Ages. Edited by Elizabeth Vestergaard. 27 – 42.
Odense: Odense University Press, 1986.
-------. Feud in the Icelandic Saga. 1982. Reprint, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.
-------. Medieval Iceland: Society, Sagas, and Power. 1988. Reprint, Berkeley: University of
California, 1990.
Canfield, J. Douglas. Word as Bond in English Literature from the Middle Ages to the Restoration.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.

238

Chambers, R.W. Beowulf: An Introduction to the Study of the Poem with a Discussion of the
Stories of Offa and Finn. 1932. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
Childers, J. “The Dispersion of the Equivocal-Oath Motif.” Arv: Nordic Yearbook of Folklore 36
(1980) 107 - 117.
Clanchy, M. T. From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066 – 1307. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1979.
Clark, George. “The Hero and the Theme.” In A Beowulf Handbook. Edited by Robert Bjork and
John Niles. 271 – 90. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.
Cleasby, Richard and Guðbrandr Vigfusson. An Icelandic – English Dictionary. London: Oxford
University Press, 1874.
Clover, Carol. The Medieval Saga. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
Cook, Patrick. “Woriað þa Winsalo: The Bonds of Exile in ‘The Wanderer.’” Neophilologus 80.1
(1996): 127-137.
Cox, Robert. “Snake rings in Deor and Völundarkviða.” Leeds Studies in English 22 (1991): 1-20.
Crossley-Holland, Kevin. “Beowulf.” In The Anglo-Saxon World. 71 – 142. Rochester, NY: Boydell
& Brewer, 2002.
Dennis, Andrew, Peter Foote, and Richard Perkins, eds. and trans. Laws of Early Iceland: Grágás,
the Codex Regious of Grágás with material from other manuscripts. 2 vols.
Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1980 - 2000.
Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm. 32 Vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 18541960.
Discenza, Nicole Guenther. The King’s English: Strategies of Translation in the Old English
Boethius. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005.
Diplomatarium anglicum aevi saxonici. Edited by Benjamin Thorpe. London: Macmillian, 1865.
Diplomatarium Islandicum: Íslenzk Fornbréfasafn. Vol. 1. Edited by Jón Sigurðsson.
Copenhagen: Hinu Íslenzka Bókmentafélagi, 1857.
Donaldson, E. Talbot, trans. Beowulf: A Prose Edition. 1975. Reprint, New York: W. W. Norton,
2002.
Drew, Katherine F. Law and Society in Early Medieval Europe. London: Variorum, 1988.
Earl, James W. “Christian Traditions in the Old English Exodus.” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen
71 (1970): 541 - 70.

239

Edda, Die Lieder des Codex Regius nebst verwandten Denkmälern. Edited by Gustav Neckel and
Hans Kuhn. 5th ed. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1983.
Egils saga Skalla-Grímssonar. Edited by Sigurður Nordal. Vol. 2 of Íslenzk Fornrit. 1933. Reprint,
Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 1988.
Einhard. Annales Regni Francorum. Edited by Friedrich Kurze. Hannoverae: Impensis Bibliopolii
Hahniani, 1895.
Eyrbyggja saga. Edited by Einar Sveinsson and Matthías Þórðarson. Vol. 4 of Íslenzk Fornrit.
1935. Reprint, Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 1985.
Faarlund, Jan T. The Syntax of Old Norse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Faulkes, Anthony, trans. “The Saga of Grettir.” In Three Icelandic Outlaw Sagas. 69 – 272.
London: Everyman, 2001.
Gallagher, Edward G., ed. The Law of Suretyship. 2nd ed. Chicago: American Bar Association,
2000.
Genesis. In The Junius Manuscript. Edited by George Philip Krapp. Vol. 1 of Anglo-Saxon Poetic
Records. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931.
Gneuss, Helmut. “’The Battle of Maldon’ 86: Byrhtnoð’s ‘Ofermod’ Once Again.” Studies in
Philology 73.2 (Apr. 1976): 117 – 37.
A Gothic Etymological Dictionary. Edited by Winfred P. Lehmann. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986.
Grágás efter det Arnamagnæanske Haandskrift Nr. 334 fol., Staðarhólsbók og en Række andre
Haandskrifter. Edited by Vilhjálmur Finsen. 1883. Reprint, Odense: Odense University Press,
1974.
Grágás. Islændernes lovbog I fristatens tid, udgivet efter det kongelige Bibliotheks Haandskrift.
Edited by Vilhjálmur Finsen. 2 vols. 1852. Reprint, Odense: Odense University Press, 1974.
Green, Eugene. Anglo-Saxon Audiences. New York: Peter Lang, 2001.
Green, Richard Firth. A Crisis of Truth: Literature and Law in Ricardian England. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
Greenfield, Stanley B. “The Formulaic Expression of the Theme of ‘Exile’ in Anglo-Saxon Poetry.”
Speculum 30.2 (1955): 200 – 6.
Grettis saga Ásmundarsonar. Edited by Guðni Jónsson. Vol. 7 of Íslenzk Fornrit. 1937.
Reprint, Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 2001.

240

Grosskopf, John Dennis. “Time and Eternity in the Anglo-Saxon Elegies.” In Time and Eternity:
The Medieval Discourse. Edited by Gerhard Jaritz and Gerson Moreno-Riano. International
Medieval Research 9. 323 – 330. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2010.
Gunnlaugs Saga Ormstungu. In Borgfirðinga sögur. Edited by Sigurður Nordal and Guðni
Jónsson. Vol. 3 of Íslenzk Fornrit. 51 – 107. 1938. Reprint, Reykjavik: Íslenzk
Fornritafélag, 2001.
Hallfreðar Saga. In Vatnsdæla Saga. Edited by Einar Sveinsson. Vol. 8 of Íslenzk Fornrit. 135 –
200. Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 1939
Hanafin, Patrick, Adam Gearey, and Joseph Booker. Law and Literature. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
Hanks, Willam F. “Notes on Semantics in Linguistic Practice.” In Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives.
Edited by Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993.
Haralds Saga ins Hárfagra. In Heimskringla. Edited by Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson. Vol. 26 of Íslenzka
Fornrit. 94 – 149. 1941. Reprint, Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 2002.
Harris, Joseph. “Love and Death in the Männerbund: An Essay with Special References to the
Bjarkamál and the Battle of Maldon.” In Heroic Poetry in the Anglo-Saxon Period. Edited
by Helen Damico and John Leyerle. 77 – 114. Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute
Publications, 1993.
Harris, Stephen J. “Oaths in The Battle of Maldon.” In The Hero Recovered: Essays on Medieval
Heroism in Honor of George Clark. Edited by Robin Waugh and James Weldon.
Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2010.
Hávamál. Edited by David A. H. Evans. London: Viking Society for Northern Research, 1986.
Hawes, Janice. “Monstrosity of Heroism: Grettir Ásmundarson as an Outsider.” Scandinavian
Studies 80.1 (Spring 2008): 19 – 50.
Hazeltine, Harold D. “The Formal Contract of Early English Law.” Columbia Law Review 10
(1910): 608 - 17.
Head, Pauline. Representation and Design: Tracing a Hermeneutics of Old English Poetry. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1997.
Herzfeld, Michael. “Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral
Systems.” Man, n.s., 15.2 (June 1980): 339 – 51.
Hexter, Ralph J. Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval Literature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1975.
Heyworth, Melanie. “Nostalgic Evocation and Social Privilege in the Old English Elegies.” Studia
Neophilologica 76 (2004): 3 – 11.

241

Hill, Thomas D. “The Crowning of Alfred and the Topos of Sapientia et Fortitudo in Asser’s Life of
King Alfred.” Neophilologus 86.3 (2002): 471-6.
Hough, Carole. “Legal and Documentary Writings.” In A Companion to Anglo-Saxon Literature.
Edited by Phillip Pulsiano and Elaine Treharne. 170 – 87. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
Humphreys, Sally. “Law as Discourse.” History and Anthropology: The Discourse of Law 1.2
(1985): 241- 64.
Hyams, Paul. “Feud and the State in Late Anglo-Saxon England.” The Journal of British Studies
40 (January 2001): 1- 43.
Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. Edited by Julius Pokorny. Bern: A. Francke,
1959.
Irvine, Susan, ed. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition. MS. E. Vol. 7 Cambridge:
D. S. Brewer, 2004.
Islendinga Sogur: Orðstöðulykill og texti. CD-ROM. Reykjavik: Mal og menning, 1998.
Jack, George. Beowulf: A Student Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Járnsíða eðr Hákonarbók. Edited by Þórður Sveinbjørnsson. Havniæ: Sumptibus Legati
Arnæmagnæani, 1847.
Jochens, Jenny M. “The Church and Sexuality in Medieval Iceland.” Journal of Medieval History
6.4 (December 1980): 377-92.
Jóhannesson, Jón. Íslendinga Saga: A History of the Old Icelandic Commonwealth. Translated by
Haraldur Bessason. 1974. Reprint, Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press,
2006.
Jónsbók. Edited by Olafur Halldorsson. 1904. Reprint, Odenes: Universitetsforlag, 1970.
Jurasiski, Stefan. Ancient Privileges: Beowulf, Law, and the Making of Germanic Antiquity.
Morgantown, WV: West Virginia University Press, 2006.
Kaske, Robert. “Sapientia et Fortitudo as Controlling Theme of Beowulf.” Studies in
Philology 55.3 (July 1958): 423 - 56.
Keyes, Ralph. The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2004.
Keynes, Simon. “The Fonthill Letter.” In Words, Texts and Manuscripts: Studies in Anglo-Saxon
Culture Presented to Helmut Gneuss. 53 – 97. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1992.
Keyser, R., and P. A. Munch, eds. Norges gamle lov indtil 1387. Vol. 1. Christiania:
Gröndahl, 1846.

242

Klaeber, Friedrich, ed. Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburg. 3rd ed. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath &
Co., 1950.
Klaeber’s Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburg. Edited by R. D. Fulk, Robert E. Bjork, and John D.
Niles. 4th ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008.
Kormáks saga. In Vatnsdæla saga. Edited by Einar Sveinsson. Vol. 8 of Íslenzk Fornrit. 203 – 302.
1938. Reprint, Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 2001.
Lapidge, Michael. “The Comparative Approach.” In Reading Old English Texts. Edited by
Katherine O’Brien O’Keeffe. 20 – 39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Larrington, Carolyne. A Store of Common Sense: Gnomic Theme and Style in Old Icelandic and
Old English Wisdom Poetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Larson, Laurence, trans. The Earliest Norwegian Laws Being the Gulathing Law and the
Frostathing Law. 1935. Reprint, Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2008.
Lear, Floyd Seyward. Treason in Roman and Germanic Law. Austin: University of Texas Press,
1965.
Lee, Alvin A. Gold-Hall and Earth-Dragon: Beowulf as Metaphor. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1998.
Levinson, Sanford. “Constituting Communities Through Words that Bind: Reflections on Loyalty
Oaths.” Michigan Law Review 84.7 (June 1986): 1440 – 70.
Lewis, Charlton and Charles Short, eds. A Latin Dictionary. 1879. Reprint, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996.
Liebermann, Felix. Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen. 3 vols. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1903 - 16.
LiPuma, Edward. “Culture and the Concept of Culture in a Theory of Practice.” In Bourdieu:
Critical Perspectives. Edited by Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Liuzza, Roy. Beowulf: A New Verse Translation. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2000.
Lucas, Peter J. “Loyalty and Obedience in the Old English Genesis and the Interpolation of
Genesis B into Genesis A.” Neophilologus 76 (1992): 121-35.
MacCormick, Neil and Ota Weinberger. An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal
Positivism. 1986. Reprint, Hingham, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
Magennis, Hugh. Images of Community in Old English Poetry. Cambridge Studies in Anglo-Saxon
England 18. 1996. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
-------. “Treatments of Treachery and Betrayal in Anglo-Saxon Texts.” English Studies 75 (1995):

243

1-19.
Magnusson, Magnus and Hermann Pálsson, trans. Njal’s Saga. New York: Penguin Books, 1960.
Magoun, Francis P. “Víga-Glumr’s Equivocal Oath.” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 53 (1952):
401 - 408.
Malone, Kemp. “Ecgtheow.” In Studies in Heroic Legend and in Current Speech. 108 - 115.
Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1959.
Marshall, James. “Lawyers, Truth, and the Zero-sum Game.” Notre Dame Law Review 47 (1971):
919-26.
Mayr-Harting, Henry. The Coming of Christianity to Anglo-Saxon England. 1972. Reprint,
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.
“Maxims I.” In The Exeter Book. Edited by George Philip Krapp and Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie.
Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records, vol. 3. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936.
“Maxims II.” In The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems. Edited by Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie. Anglo-Saxon
Poetic Records, vol 6. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942.
McKinnell, John, trans. “Killer-Glum’s Saga.” Vol. 2, The Complete Sagas of Icelanders. Edited by
Viðar Hreinsson. Reykjavik: Leifur Eiriksson Publishing, 1997. 265 - 314.
Miller, William Ian. “Avoiding Legal Judgment: The Submission of Disputes to Arbitration in
Medieval Iceland.” The American Journal of Legal History 28.2 (1984) 95 - 134.
------. Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1997.
------. “Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in Medieval Iceland and
England.” Law and History Review 1.2 (1983): 159-204.
------. “Gift, Sale, Payment, Raid: Case Studies in the Negotiation and Classification of Exchange
in Medieval Iceland.” Speculum 61.1 (1986): 18 – 50.
------. “Ordeal in Iceland.” Scandinavian Studies 60 (1988): 189 - 218.
Mitchell, W. J. T. “Representation.” In Critical Terms for Literary Study. Edited Frank Letricchia
and Thomas McLaughlin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Moore, Sally Falk. Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1978.
Mossé, Fernand. A Handbook of Middle English. Translated by James A. Walker. 1952. Reprint,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

244

Nordal, Sigurður. Icelandic Culture. Trans. Vilhjálmur T. Bjarnar. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Library, 1990.
O’Brien O’Keeffe, Katherine. “Heroic Values and Christian Ethics.” In The Cambridge Companion
to Old English Literature. Edited by Malcolm Godden and Michael Lapidge. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
O’Donoghue, Heather. Old Norse-Icelandic Literature. London: Blackwell, 2004.
Oliver, Lisi. The Beginnings of English Law. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.
Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. New York: Methuen, 1982.
Orchard, Andy. “Grettir and Grendel Again.” In Pride and Prodigies: Studies in the Monsters of
the Beowulf-Manuscript. 140 – 68. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.
Ordower, Henry. “Exploring the Literary Function of Law and Litigation in Njal’s Saga.”
Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 3.1 (1991): 41-61.
Pálsson, Hermann. Oral Tradition and Saga Writing. Vienna: Fassbaender, 1999.
Pálsson, Hermann and Paul Edwards, trans. Eyrbyggja Saga. New York: Penguin, 1989.
Pencak, William. The Conflict of Law and Justice in the Icelandic Sagas. Value Inquiry Book Series
21. Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1995.
Pepperdene, Margaret. “Beowulf and the Coast-guard.” English Studies 47 (1966): 409 – 19.
Pinto, Louis. “Theory in Practice.” In Bourdieu: A Critical Reader. Edited by Richard Shusterman.
London: Blackwell, 1999.
Pollock, Frederick and Frederic Maitland. The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward
I. 2nd ed. 1907. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Pons-Sanz, Sara M. Norse-derived Vocabulary in late Old English Texts: Wulfstan’s Works.
Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2007.
Quinn, Judy. “From Orality to Literacy in Medieval Iceland.” In Old Icelandic Literature and
Society. Edited by Margaret Clunies Ross, 30-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
Remly, Lynn L. “The Anglo-Saxon Gnomes as Sacred Poetry.” Folklore 82.2 (1971): 147 – 58.
Renoir, Alain. “The Heroic Oath in Beowulf, the Chanson de Roland, and the Nibelungenlied.”
In Studies in Old English Literature in Honor of Arthur G. Brodeur. Edited by Stanley B.
Greenfield. 237 – 55. Eugene, OR: University of Oregon Press, 2001.

245

Ricketts, Philadelphia. High-Ranking Widows in Medieval Iceland and Yorkshire. Boston: Brill,
2010.
Roberts, Jane, Christian Kay, and Lynne Grundy, eds. A Thesaurus of Old English. 2 Vols. Exeter:
Short Run Press, 1995.
Robertson, A. J. The Laws of the Kings of England. 1925. Reprint, Felinfach, Wales: Llanerch
Publishers, 2000.
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 10 vols. New York: Routledge, 1998.
Schneewind, Jerome. “A Note on Promising.” Philosophical Studies 17.3 (1966): 33 - 5.
Schücking, Levin L. “The Ideal of Kingship in Beowulf.” In An Anthology of Beowulf Criticism.
Edited by Lewis E. Nicholson. 35 – 49. 1964. Reprint, Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1980.
Schulman, Jana K. “Make Me a Match: Motifs of Betrothal in the Sagas of the Icelanders.”
Scandinavian Studies 69.3 (1997): 296 - 321.
------. Jónsbók: The Laws of Later Iceland. Edited by Hans Fix. Bibliotheca Germanica, n.s., 4.
Saarbrücken, Germany: AQ-Verlag, 2010.
Scragg, Donald G., ed. The Battle of Maldon. Old and Middle English Texts Series. 1981. Reprint,
Hong Kong: Wing King Tong, Co., 1991.
Scudder, Bernard, trans. “Egil’s Saga.” Vol. 1, The Complete Sagas of Icelanders. Edited by Viðar
Hreinsson. Reykjavik: Leifur Eiriksson Publishing, 1997. 33 - 177.
Searle, John R. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
------. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970.
Sharma, Manish. “Heroic Subject and Cultural Substance in The Wanderer.” Neophilologus 96
(2012): 611-629.
Sheehan, Michael. The Will in Medieval England: from the Conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to the
End of the Thirteenth Century. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963.
Shippey, Tom. Poems of Wisdom and Learning in Old English. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1976.
Silving, Helen. “The Oath: I.” Yale Law Journal 68 (1959): 1329 - 90.
Slusher, Jeffrey. “Runic Wisdom in ‘Njal’s Saga’ and Nordic Mythology: Roots of an Oral Legal
Tradition and North Europe.” Cardoza Studies in Law and Literature 3.1 (1991):
21 - 39.

246

Speculum regale. Konungs-Skuggsjá. Konge-speilet. Edited by Rudolph Keyser, P. A. Munch, and
C. R. Unger. Oslo: C.C. Werner & Co., 1848.
Starr, June. “The ‘Invention’ of Early Legal Ideas.” In History and Power in the Study of Law: New
Directions in Legal Anthropology. Edited by June Starr and Jane F. Collier. 345 – 68.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Stenton, Frank. Anglo-Saxon England. 3rd ed. 1971. Reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985.
Strömbäck, Dag. The Conversion of Iceland: A Survey. Trans. Peter Foote. London: Viking Society
for Northern Research, 1997.
Sturluson, Snorri. Edda: Prologue and Gylfaginning. Edited by Anthony Faulkes. Vol. 1. 1982.
Reprint, Exeter: Short Run Press, 2000.
Surber-Meyer, Nida Louis. Gift and Exchange in the Anglo-Saxon Poetic Corpus: A Contribution
Towards the Representation of Wealth. Geneva: Slatkine, 1994.
Sørensen, Preben Meulengracht. “Social Institutions and Belief Systems of Medieval Iceland and
Their Relations to Literary Production.” In Old Icelandic Literature and Society. Edited by
Margaret Clunies Ross. 8 – 29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Taylor, Nathaniel. The Will and Society in Medieval Catalonia and Languedoc, 800-1200. Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 1995.
Thundyil, Zacharias P. Covenant in Anglo-Saxon Thought. Delhi, India: Macmillan Co. of India,
1972.
Tubbs, J. W. The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Víga-Glúms Saga. In Eyfirðinga Sögur. Edited by Jónas Kristjánsson. Vol. 9 of Íslenzk Fornrit. 3 –
98. 1938. Reprint, Reykjavík: Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 2001.
Wagner, Karl Heinz. Generative Grammatical Studies in the Old English Language. Heidelberg:
Julius Groos, 1969.
“The Wanderer.” In The Exeter Book. Edited by George P. Krapp and Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie. Vol.
3 of Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records. 134 – 7. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
Weisberg, Richard H. Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992.
Weisberg, Richard and Jean-Pierre Barricelli. “Literature and Law.” In Interrelations of Literature.
Edited by Jean-Pierre Barricelli and Joseph Gibaldi. New York: Modern Language
Association of America, 1982.

247

West, Robin. Narrative, Authority, and Law. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
White, Caroline Louisa. Ælfric. Hamden, CN: Archon Books, 1974.
White, James B. The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1973.
Whitelock, Dorothy, ed. Anglo-Saxon Wills. 1930. Reprint, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
------. Sermo Lupi ad Anglos. London: Methuen’s Old English Library, 1967.
Wormald, Patrick. Legal Culture in the early Medieval West: Law as Text, Image, and Experience.
London: Hambledon Press, 1999.
------. The Making of English law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
------. “Oath.” In A Companion to Anglo-Saxon Literature. Edited by Phillip Pulsiano and Elaine
Treharne. Oxford: Blackwells Publishers, 2002.
Wrenn, C. L. A Study of Old English Literature. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1967.
Wright, Joseph. Grammar of the Gothic Language. 1957. Reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Wulfstan. “The Creed.” In The Homilies of Wulfstan. Edited by Dorthy Bethurum. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1957.
Yorke, Barbara. Kings and Kingdoms of Early Anglo-Saxon England. New York: Routledge,
1990.

248

